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Abstract
Collaborative business processes are the current trend of business processes supported
by the advances in technology like the Internet and collaborative networks. Enterprises
no longer do business in isolation. e customer demands are always changing and be-
coming sophisticated with dynamic requirements and the shortening period in which
they must be met. Collaborative business processes must conform with not only cus-
tomer demands but also with laws, standards, best practice and regulations. ese im-
pose constraints on the business process that must be satised otherwise they aract
criminal charges or nancial nes. Corporate scandals for companies like Enron, World-
com, Societe General etc. were a result of non-compliance. is aracted regulations like
the Sarbanese Oxley Act, Basel III, Anti money laundering act among others with articles
guiding operational practice.
However, non compliance is still observed especially among SMEs that do not possess
the skilled man power or the funding to acquire automated compliance solutions. In this
thesis, we sought to support non-expert end users through a compliance management
approach that can guide the specication and verication of compliance for collabora-
tive business process with a range of policy and regulatory requirements. Collaborative
business processes dier from traditional business processes. ey are characterised by
specic aributes that present unique verication requirements that cannot be auto-
matically addressed by existing verication approaches. To achieve the intended goal,
design science research method was employed to develop a mechanism to elicit require-
ments from dierent sources, translate them into formal constraints based on formal
semantics, and a set of algorithms were composed to support compliance verication.
e algorithms provide meaningful and easy to understand feedback to the end user
about the compliance or violation of the collaborative business process.
ii
Due to the fact that policies and regulations change oen, we adopted simulation anal-
ysis as a technique to assess and analyse the impact of such changes to the business
process before actual implementation.
e thesis artifacts are evaluated based on known information systems model evaluation
methods following the design science recommended steps and the Method Evaluation
model (MEM). We also validate and evaluate the compliance algorithms using a dierent
industrial use case (the car insurance trading business process) from the case used in
their design (the pick and pack business process). Further more, the performance of the
algorithms is evaluated based on their computation complexity.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
”If you dene the problem
correctly, you almost have the
solution.”
Steve Jobs
Apple Inc
1.1 Background
Business process management (BPM) brings together knowledge from computer science
and management science to support the design, management and implementation of
business processes through application of techniques, methods and tools [3]. rough
the various suggested methodologies, management of business processes is enforced
through design and analysis, conguration, enactment and execution, implementation
and monitoring. In other words, a business process undergoes a life cycle. e BPM
life cycle is composed of three overlapping phases, i.e. (Re) design and analysis, imple-
ment/congure and, Run and Adjust.
e (Re) design phase refers to the design and analysis of business processes. Models
of business processes are created and analysed at design time. e implement/congure
phase transforms the business process model into a running system (e.g. a process aware
information system) while in the Run and Adjust phase the process models are imple-
mented, run and adjusted as may be required. e data logged during the execution is
1
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used to support further analysis and verication of the running processes. Figure 1.1
illustrates the phases of the life cycle. At the core of BPM is the business process upon
 
 
Figure 1.1: BPM life cycle [3]
which organisations activities are modelled, organised and managed [44].
To understand the business process, various denitions have been used;
– a structured set of logically related activities performed to achieve a business
outcome [146].
– adds value for the customer by processing inputs into outputs [66].
– a structured set of activities designed to produce a specic output [42].
Given the various denitions, for common understanding in this report the business
process is dened as;
A structured set of interrelated activities routinely performed within and between
organization(s) to achieve a predetermined outcome.
e adopted denition considers structured business processes within and among orga-
nizations. is implies that;
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- Business processes are also unstructured and informal. However, formal and struc-
tured processes are preferred to support application of formal methods and tools for
design and analysis.
- Business processes exist internally (traditional business processes) or among dier-
ent organizations (collaborative business processes). e interest of this research con-
centrates on the laer type of business processes.
e rest of the chapter is structured as follows; Section 1.2 introduces the collaborative
business processes and describes how they dier from traditional business processes
while section 1.3 presents the methods for composing process models. In section 1.4, the
subject of business process verication is introduced forming a basis for understanding
business process compliance which is introduced in section 1.5 and process compliance
verication described in section 1.6. Section 1.7 presents the technical foundation that
motivated the research as well as the major research question upon which the research
focus, major research objective and the specic objectives are based and stated in section
1.8. Section 1.9 lists the publications and contributions from this research while Section
1.10 presents the structure in which the thesis is presented, and section 1.11 summarises
the Chapter.
1.2 Collaborative Business Processes (CBP)
Besides the fact that collaborative business processes are conducted among several or-
ganisations to achieve a common business goal [27], they are characterised by specic
aributes not common to traditional business processes. CBP are described by complex
dynamic behaviour which is considered to autonomous yet collaborative, distributed
yet interrelated, stable yet dynamic [121]. Collaborative business processes are dened
as processes that cross organisational borders where multiple organisations or several
partners operate on shared business process [9].
To describe and represent business processes, models are designed following pro-
cess modelling principles [159]. Models present a diagrammatical expression of business
processes to facilitate their understanding, analysis and improvement. Various tools are
used for this purpose based on formalisms like petri nets, Event Chains, UML and busi-
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ness process management notation (BPMN). Chapter 2 provides extended analysis of
these formalisms and modelling tools. However, in this thesis all models are presented
based on BPMN for simplicity and convenience of illustrations. For example, Figures 1.2
and 1.3 show two BPMN models illustrating the disparity between traditional and col-
laborative business processes respectively. In these gures, the same process is modelled
from two perspectives i.e. as a traditional single organisation business process (Figure
1.2) or as an interactive collaborative business process executed among several partici-
pants.
Ph
ar
m
ac
y
Visit
Pharmacy
Describe
Illness
Drugs &
Price
Pay
Get
Drugs
Leave
Don't
Pay
Figure 1.2: Single organisation business process
In Figure 1.2 model, a patient can buy drugs if the illness requires no prescription.
e patient enters the pharmacy, describes the illness to the pharmacist who will identify
necessary drugs, asks the patient to pay, issue the drugs and the patient leaves the phar-
macy. If the patient cannot pay for some reasons, no drugs are issued. Whereas in Figure
1.3, the patient must have a prescription in order to acquire drugs or get treatment. In
this scenario, the business process model represents collaboration between the patient,
hospital, pharmacy and Insurance Company. e patient visits the general practitioner
(GP) for diagnosis. Aer, the GP prescribes drugs or other treatment, the patient visits a
pharmacy to acquire drugs. e pharmacist will receive the prescription, identify drugs
and ask the patient to pay. e patient can pay by cash or use insurance cover if she/he
is a policy holder. If the patient does not pay, the process ends. Otherwise the drugs
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Figure 1.3: a collaborative business process
are issued aer payment and the patient exits the pharmacy. If the patient was a policy
holder, the pharmacy claims the payment from the insurance company.
1.3 Composing Models
ere are dierent ways through which process models are designed. For instance, mod-
els are designed from scratch, discovered from event log data, selected from existing
models, by merging dierent model parts or by combining individual models into one
bigger model. e outcome from modelling process are models which are; descriptive
(e.g. as-is model or as-to-be model situations), normative (i.e. representing the logical
sequence of activities) or executable (interpretable by tools and systems) [3].
Due to the structural dierences between the traditional and collaborative business
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processes, the designing of collaborative business processes presents a unique challenge;
the process must satisfy a set of business and operational requirements from all stake-
holders, conform with regulatory requirements in form of policies, laws and standards
regulations as a cross organisation or cross border process. Moreover, distinctive char-
acteristics impose unique requirements necessary for the design and specication of
collaborative business processes; the need to keep organisation specic data private,
creation and formal specication of partner interfaces for interaction, mapping them
to executable processes, need to support data ow between partners, various cross or-
ganisational units and roles that must be supported, need for semantic annotation syn-
chronisation [171] Ziemann and Matheis 2007, Lippe and Ziemann 2011 increase the
complexity of collaborative business processes necessitating the need for continuous
checking and verication [86].
1.4 Business Process Verication
Despite being described as normative, models may exhibit undesirable behaviour in form
of errors that can prevent successful execution or lead to undesired behaviour at runtime.
Errors like incompleteness, inconsistencies and ambiguities if unchecked are passed on
from design and specication to actual business processes. It is therefore necessary to
verify models through diagnosis, identication and checking for such errors. Process
model verication encompasses the identication of errors inherent in models [163, 164]
at either design time, runtime or both. Verication is a way to prove that the designed
process possesses required properties and at the same time does not have bugs. Formal
verication involves the application of mathematical models to prove correctness of a
design given a set of specications. To achieve verication, three main techniques are
used [18]:
– eory proving: a technique for verifying systems by formally constructing
and checking derivations using formulas, axioms and inference rules for de-
riving new formulas form existing ones. eory proving applies logic like
high order Logic (HOL) to reason about artifacts.
6
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– Simulation: a technique used to study and analyse properties concerning
model behaviour which facilitates understanding the actual process behaviour.
– Model checking: Figure 1.4 shows model checking verication technique. In
this technique models are veried by exploring all of their states systemat-
ically. e techniques check the conformance of the model behaviour spec-
ied as a system against a set of properties specied as constraints. Model
checking employs the use of temporal logic to support reasoning and discov-
ery of errors that may escape simulation.
requirements  System
Property speciﬁcation
Satisﬁed Location  error
Violated + 
counter example 
System Model
Formalising  Modeling
Model Checking
Simulation
Figure 1.4: a view of model checking adopted from [18]
Figure 1.4 illustrates the steps undertaken to achieve model checking. e prelimi-
nary steps involve establishing requirements to form properties to be checked, formalis-
ing them and translating them into formal properties through specication. On the other
hand, the system to be checked is specied through modelling into a system model which
then is model checked against the properties. e outcome would then show whether
the properties are satised, if not, a counter example is given. e advantage of model
checking over other methods is the ability to point to the source of the error. In this
thesis, a combination of simulation and model checking techniques is used are used to
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support verication of collaborative business processes and checking them for compli-
ance.
1.5 Business Process Compliance
Compliance is a big topic in the business world today and costing the industry huge sums
of money and time in nes and litigation or tuning the business processes to comply
with the requirements of standards, laws and regulations [130, 86]. Due to the corporate
world nancial scandals involving giant companies like Enron, Tyco, Global Crossing
and Adelphia, Enron, HIH, Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale, WorldCom inter alia [83], compliance has
come to the fore as a measure to guide and monitor corporate business behaviour world
to avoid a repeat. Strict regulations and laws were instituted for not only nance in-
dustry but to all sectors world over, e.g. the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 [139],
the Basel III Accord [19], HIPPA (HIPAA 2018) and the consumer protect Act 2015 (UK),
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), ITIL, ISO/IEC 20000 (interna-
tional standard for IT service management), System and Organisation Controls (SOC).
e regulatory agencies monitor organizations to ensure that they compliant to the reg-
ulations specied. Such regulations are external to organisations and are observed on
top of internal policies within the organisation which are established to guide business
operations. From an organizational perspective therefore, compliance must be achieved
for both internal and external policies and regulations.
Compliance refers to adherence to rules, norms, laws and other regulatory require-
ments like standards and best practice. In terms of business processes, compliance has
been dened in several ways as follows;
“A desired outcome, with regard to law and regulations, internal policies and proce-
dures, and commitment to stakeholders that can be consistently achieved through managed
investment of time and resources. Compliance management includes the legal and tactical
activities in day to day business processes” [104].
“e relationships between the formal specications of a business process and the for-
mal specications of a set of normative constraints, where a process is compliant if the
specications of the processes do not violate the constraints formalising the norms” [59].
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“an act or process to ensure that business operations, processes, and practices are in ac-
cordance with prescriptive (oen legal) documents” (Governatori and Scientic 2014) “as en-
suring that business processes, operations, and practice are in accordance with a prescribed
and/or agreed set of norms” [130].
“as the process of ascertaining the adherence of business processes and applications to
relevant compliance requirements, which may emerge from laws, legislation, regulations,
standards and code of practices (such as ISO 9001), internal policies, and business partner
contracts [46].
Whereas the rst denition provides a generic denition of compliance, the second,
third and fourth denitions consider compliance in terms of processes being in accor-
dance with legal documents. e h denition is specic to adherence to compliance
requirements. For the benet of this thesis, business process compliance is dened as; A
set of activities undertaken to ensure adherence of business processes to specic internal
and external regulatory requirements throughout its life cycle.
e new denition considers compliance as continuous process throughout the life cycle
of a business process i.e. design time, runtime and post-run-time. is is so because poli-
cies and regulations change over time, so should the new or existing business processes
relatively comply with the changes. To achieve regulatory compliance of existing and
new collaborative business process necessitates checking their behaviour at dierent
phases of their life cycle. However, checking and verifying compliance is not automatic
more especially where collaborative business processes are involved. As discussed in
section 1.3, collaborative business processes have more requirements to comply with;
organisation specic requirements, contractual obligations and other external regula-
tions. Compliance management involves a set of activities that compose its life cycle;
elicit, formalise, implement, check and improve compliance requirements of a specic
regulation. Figure 1.5 illustrates the phases over the compliance continuum.
Besides compliance life cycle management being part of the organisation strategies,
it also plays a central role to ensure that other strategies comply with relevant policies
and regulations. For instance, the soware development strategy has to comply with
the soware development standards and practices. Figure 1.6 presents the relationship
between compliance life cycle management and other organisational strategies.
9
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Figure 1.5: Compliance life cycle
Compliance life cycle 
management
Organizational change 
management 
Project  management 
life cycle 
Business Process
Management 
Software management 
life cycle 
Figure 1.6: Relationship of BPM and compliance
1.6 Compliance Verication for Business Processes
Business process verication involves various strategies; design time, runtime and post
runtime. ese strategies also apply to compliance checking and verication. Design
time verication is a preventive approach that aims at checking a process’s compliance
with requirements during its design. Design time verication is a detective approach
oen preferred for early time identication of errors leading to non-compliance or vio-
lation. Whereas, runtime verication strategy checks process compliance during its ex-
ecution. Post execution verication is an auditing activity involving manual procedures
to check process compliance aer its execution. e hybrid approach combines all or
more than one of the verication strategies. Figure 1.7 illustrates compliance verica-
tion strategies According to Hashmi et al., several dimensions of compliance checking
compose the business process compliance space [67]. As Figure 1.7 illustrates, the com-
pliance space has also been used to cast the research trend and state of art in compliance
verication for business processes. In this thesis, aention is paid to a hybrid strategy
leading to a compliance verication approach for collaborative business processes to fa-
cilitate checking of existing processes against new regulatory requirements or against
10
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Figure 1.7: Business Process Compliance Space [67]
changes in regulatory requirements. In a detailed fashion, we show how to support end
users to verify processes in a compliance continuum in Chapter 8.
1.7 Motivation and Researchestion
e current trend of business organisations shows a paradigm shi from closed business
environments to border-less interconnected ones [27, 25, 26, 9]. is further termed as
de-parameterisation where business processes are jointly oered to meet the dynamic
demands from service consumers especially where traditional single organisation busi-
ness processes cannot oer satisfactory services. is trend is enabled by technolog-
ical advancements like internet, cloud computing, service-oriented computing and e-
commerce. Collaborative business processes have consequently emerged. As earlier
stated, collaborative business processes have to comply with more regulatory require-
ments from various sources, and involve multi-partners. Achieving compliance at this
magnitude is complex especially for non-expert end users. In this work we postulate that
it is necessary to support such end users in order to realise compliant processes since
they are the subject maer experts. is leads to the question that this research seeks to
address.
How to support end users verify collaborative business processes for policy and
regulatory compliancy?
11
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e research is motivated by the need to support the verication of compliance of collab-
orative business processes with policy and regulatory requirements where multi parties
are involved as opposed to the traditional single party business processes. As the related
work in Chapter 2 indicates, most of the existing work like, [135, 56, 132, 39, 60, 142, 52]
address compliance verication situated in non-collaborative environments. Moreover,
compliance solutions in the industry are proprietary with a high level of rigidity, limited
interoperability and lack exibility when applied to dierent environments or dierent
compliance requirements [46]. Others require high expertise from the end users with
proven skills that ordinary end-users do not possess. Small scale businesses cannot af-
ford proprietary solutions let alone the required skills to operate and use these solutions.
Despite eorts undertaken in compliance and its enforcement, non-compliance and vi-
olations of regulations is still on the rise in the economic, medical, soware and social
industries. is could be aributed to a sea of regulatory requirements that organisations
cannot keep track with.
Moreover, changes and amendments in policies and regulations come frequently
from the regulators. Such changes directly impact on the local policies which drive
business operations. is implies that organisations have to check and review local poli-
cies and business policies fast enough to match the regulatory demands before assigned
deadlines to avoid nes or litigation. For example, the European Union amended the
general data protection regulation (GDPR) with a deadline for May 2018. e amend-
ments cost organisations time, resources and money to achieve compliance. Financial
Times reported a survey by Ernst and Young that implementing the requirements from
the revised GDPR would cost top companies up to $ 7.8 billion [89]. In another survey by
Veritas technologies, it was suggested that companies were likely to spend an average
of € 1.3 million on systems, hiring new sta and training to comply with the GDPR [41].
ere is need for a mechanism to support verifying of amended regulatory require-
ments with existing organisational business processes. Moreover, it is useful to have a
priori assessment of the likely impact of the changes of policies and regulations to the
process’s structure, resources and data so that modellers can get knowledge to inform
their decisions by analysing several scenarios before actual implementations. Based on
the outcome, recommendations, changes or reviews can be made, or use outcome to
12
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modify the processes to achieve compliance. A mechanism to support this kind of com-
pliance verication is lacking. An integrated exible solution is required to meet a set
of requirements for a compliance verication framework. Such requirements include;
1. To support the checking and verication of compliance of existing business pro-
cesses with amended policies and regulations. is is achieved by a mechanism
that supports identication of compliance violations at dierent levels of check-
ing. Segments of the business process aected by the amendments and verifying
them against modied policies. Aerwards the entire process is veried to ensure
that the entire business process remains compliant.
2. To support end users to design and verify collaborative business processes through
less complex compliance checking algorithms. e thesis presents dierent com-
pliance checking algorithms that have been designed respectively. Combinations
between dierent algorithms could lead to dierent compliance checks.
3. To Support business process optimisation based on changes in the policies and
regulations through simulation based analysis of dierent use case scenarios and
provide recommendations to support informed decision making. e simulation
should as well support the generation of traces from designed processes for sup-
porting process compliance checks.
1.8 Research Focus and Objectives
Following from Figure 1.7, the focus of this research is a hybrid strategy leading to sup-
port for continuous compliance checking of collaborative business process with reg-
ulatory requirements at any of the various phases of the life cycles of both business
process management and compliance management. With a hybrid compliance checking
approach, it implies that a process can be checked from scratch e.g. during design time
or specic checking against a specic change in policy or regulations, or checking for
compliance to a particular constraint. We show the elicitation, formalisation and check-
ing of the compliance constraints against the business process at dierent levels of the
life cycle. Using activity events and process instances, a business process is broken down
13
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into execution traces from which checking is conducted using the composed algorithms
put forward in Chapter 8.
From the compliance life cycle, the study addresses phases in which compliance require-
ments are elicited from source documents to their formalisation. e logical relationship
between process design and compliance checking is enforced by mapping the compli-
ance requirements on to the process model and verifying for compliancy of the model
to the specied requirements through application of formal model checking techniques.
e research presents a mechanism based on description logic through which users can
elicit and check compliance of processes without need for rigorous mathematics.
Regulatory
Requirements
Support
formalization
mechanism
Sources 
- Internal policies
- Contractual obligations
- External Regulations,
laws and standards
Compliance
Checking and
veriﬁcation - Checking mechanism
- Use of simulation
- Application of TLA+ on
collaborative business
process model checking 
- Policy deﬁnitions
- Constraint formalization and
mapping
- Mapping  
Business Process
Models
Figure 1.8: Research Focus
Figure 1.8 summarises the research focus while Figure 1.9 presents the research scope.
Compliance requirements are elicited from policy and regulatory documents, formalised
into constraints. While the business process are checked for compliance with verication
constraints using the verication algorithms. Feedback is provided once violations are
detected . Based on the research question and focus,the major objective of the study is
derived as follows;
To develop an approach that supports end users verify collaborative business
processes for compliance with policy and regulatory requirements.
14
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Figure 1.9: Research Scope
To achieve the desired outcome, more specic objectives are derived from major
objective as stated below;
1. To support the elicitation and translation of compliance requirements from source
documents into compliancy constraints.
2. To demonstrate the application of simulation and analysis as a technique to sup-
port:
(a) Assessment of the impact of policy and regulatory variations over existing,
new or re-designed business processes.
(b) Generation of traces from the new or re-designed business processes for com-
pliance verication.
3. Design a compliance verication framework for supporting compliance verica-
tion of collaborative business processes with policy and regulatory requirements
from control ow, data, resource and temporal perspectives through application
of algorithms that;
(a) Detect compliance violations.
(b) Report on the status of compliance.
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(c) Apply process driven authorisation and access control (PDAC), a novel mech-
anism for implementing privacy and authentication access control require-
ments.
4. Evaluate the designed algorithms using industry based use cases.
5. Propose architectures for practical implementation of PDAC and the overall col-
laborative business process compliance verication approach.
1.9 Research Dissemination
In addition to this thesis, the research has been disseminated through presentations at
various workshops and conferences as well publications in conference proceedings and
journals. e listed publications have been accepted, presented and published in confer-
ence proceedings while the journal paper is pending acceptance. e publications are
listed below with brief description of their contents.
Paper 1
Kasse, J.P., Xu, L. and de Vrieze, P., 2017, September. A Comparative Assessment of Col-
laborative Business Process Verication Approaches. In Working Conference on Virtual
Enterprises (pp. 355-367). Springer, Cham.
Paper 2
Kasse, J.P., Xu, L. and Bai, Y., 2018, September. e Need for Compliance Verication
in Collaborative Business Processes. In Working Conference on Virtual Enterprises (pp.
217-229). Springer, Cham.
Paper 3
Kasse, J.P., Xu, L. and Bai, Y., 2019, February. Process Driven Access Control and Authori-
sation Approach. In Fourth International Congress on Information and Communication
Technology (pp. . . ). Springer, Singapore.
Paper 4
Shuangyu Wei, Yuewei Bai, Xiaogang Wang, Liu Kai, Lai Xu, Paul de Vrieze and John
Paul Kasse: A New Method for Manufacturing Process Autonomous Planning in Intelli-
gent Manufacturing System. 1st International Workshop on Key Enabling Technologies
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for Digital Factories. CAiSE 2019. June 2019, Rome, Italy.
Paper 5
Kasse, J.P., Xu, L., de Vrieze, L and Bai, Y., 2019. Verifying Compliance with Data Con-
straints for Business Processes: Collaborative Networks and Digital Transformation. 23
- 25 September 2019 – Turin, Italy.
Journal Paper - Pending
Compliance Verication for Collaborative Business Processes. International Journal of
Simulation and Process Modelling.
H2020 FIRST Project Deliverables
1. D1.2: overview of service-oriented business process verication
2. D1.3: Overview of existing interoperability of virtual factories
3. D2.1: Manufacturing Asset/Service description languages
4. D4.1: On-the-y Service Oriented Process verication and implementation
1.10 Structure of the esis
e thesis is composed of ten (10) interlinked chapters as Figure 1.10 illustrates.
In chapter 1, an introduction of the thesis is presented including a background to the
discipline in which research is situated, an explanation of the motivation, highlight of
issues concerning business processes, compliancy and the need for verifying business
processes for compliancy with regulations, standards and policies. Further, the research
question which this research sought to address is presented upon which scope and ob-
jectives that guided the study were set. e chapter ends with research contributions
and publications. e rest of the thesis is organised as follows.
Chapter 2 presents the related work to this thesis starting with a technical and theoreti-
cal background to the key variables and concepts to the study like policies, regulations,
requirements and constraints categorisation inter alia. Further, analysis of existing so-
lutions is presented while pointing out limitations that informed the propositions to our
contribution. Chapter 3 presents the research methodology followed to accomplish the
goals of the research. A description of details about the method and tools employed is
described.
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Chapter 4 presents detailed discussion about policies, their formulations, elicitation from
general regulations to local policies. Further, the chapter presents the use cases that are
used for demonstration throughout the thesis. Simulation as a verication technique
is presented demonstrating the impact of policy variations over business processes. A
Bizagi simulation tool is used for demonstrations.
Chapter 5 presents constraints and requirements denition based on Description Logic
language. Based on the use case, we show how to extract compliancy requirements and
present them in a manner easy to understand by non-expert end users.
Chapter 6 provides the translation and formalisation of extracted constraints into lin-
ear temporal logic to facilitate reasoning over them for verication purposes. In this way,
formalised constraints are mapped with the process model and checked for compliancy.
Chapter 7 presents the verication approach to support compliancy verication between
constraints and business process model. Several sub algorithms are presented for veri-
cation and checking of the model at dierent levels or based on the dierent categories
of constraints.
Chapter 8 presents the compounded algorithms for both constraint checking and viola-
tion detection.
Chapter 9 is an evaluation of the verication algorithms based on the use cases and a
discussion of the outcomes and observations.
Chapter 10 is the conclusion of the thesis highlighting general observations, future work
and recommendations. A summary of the chapter outlines is shown in Figure 1.10.
1.11 Chapter Summary
e chapter provided a preamble to the rest of the thesis by introducing business process
management and compliance management as the disciplines under which the report is
situated. A background from the two disciplines is presented discussing existing chal-
lenges which motivated the study. Based on motivation the research question, objectives,
goals and scope of the study are specied. Additionally, the chapter presents the contri-
butions of the research to the eld of literature in terms of conference papers published
and pending. Contributions were also made to the EU FIRST project deliverable.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
“All I want is compliance with my
wishes, aer reasonable
discussion.”
Winston Churchill
2.1 Introduction
e chapter aims to explore and introduce various relevant concepts, work, potential
challenges and requirements related to verication of collaborative business processes
with policies and regulations. e motive is to provide understanding of the state of art
oered in the various methods, techniques, frameworks and their supporting tools. e
chapter is presented as follows: Section 2.2 introduces policies and regulations while
section 2.3 presents policies and regulations as sources of verication requirements and
constraints. Section 2.4 and 2.5 present policy implementation strategies, policy deni-
tion languages respectively while section 2.6 cites examples of policies and regulations.
In section 2.7 the common compliance requirements are presented from the state of art
while in section 2.8 the business process behaviour is presented. Section 2.9 categorises
the dierent forms of business process constraints in terms of control ow, data, resource
and temporal paerns. e concept of process verication is introduced in section 2.10
and, section 2.11 presents the state of the art in compliance verication. Verication
requirements for collaborative business processes are presented in section 2.12 while
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section 2.13 summarises the verication requirements from existing research and excit-
ing approaches for Compliance Verication. Section 2.14 presents the chapter summary.
2.2 Policies and Regulations
Policies embody action plans that guide decisions leading to logical outcomes. Cam-
bridge online dictionary broadly denes a policy in dierent ways;
”A set of ideas or a plan of what to do in particular situations that has been agreed to
ocially by a group of people, a business organisation, a government, or a political party”
”A set of ideas or a plan for action followed by a business, a government, a political party,
or a group of people”
From the denitions, a commonality that stands out is that the policy is a plan for a
course of action to be done in specic cases. In this thesis we therefore dene policies
as norms and behaviours agreed upon by parties (business, government etc.) as a formal
procedure to guide business operations. Whereas policies are internal to an organisa-
tion or its partners designed to guide its behaviour, regulations are normally external
instituted to guide entire sector or industry. A regulation can be understood as a rule
made and maintained by an entity which is an authority. Examples are national and in-
ternational laws regulating cross border operations, e.g. national and international tax
policies, national and international standards like accounting standards, best practice
e.g. medical practice.
ey are normally expressed as orders, directives, acts, laws, statutes, ordinances or
guidelines. Hence forth, we refer to policies as internal or local rules while regulations
as external rules and laws regulating operations of a business. Policies and regulations
form controls that specically restrict and constrain what should be done or what should
not be done.
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2.3 Policies and Regulations in Relation to Business
Processes
In relation to BPM, policy and regulatory requirements form guidelines and constraints
that restrict a set of permissible or forbidden behaviour over the structure and elements
of an organisation’s business processes. For some cases, regulations impose a legal re-
quirement which organisations are required to comply with by law. ese form manda-
tory requirements. Dierent regulations exist and present a myriad of requirements to
regulate behaviour of organisations in the industry. However, for compliancy purposes,
an organisation will identify requirements relevant to its business processes. erefore,
from a range of regulations and policies, an organisation will identify and select a set of
requirements mandatory for compliancy. A compliance requirement is a dened extract
from the general regulatory document concerning a specic regulatory guideline. A
collection of the requirements from dierent regulations and policies form a document
of relevant compliancy requirements to guide behaviour of a given business process is
composed. Extraction of requirements from source documents is not enough, they have
to be transformed and translated into a form that is enforceable to facilitate verication
over business process models
A compliance requirement is a dened specic extract from the general regulatory doc-
ument regarding a regulatory guideline. As a result, a document of relevant compliance
requirements to guide behaviour of a given business process is composed from dier-
ent regulations and policies. Extraction of requirements from source documents is not
enough, they have to be transformed and translated into a form that is enforceable to
facilitate verication over business process models.
2.4 Policy Implementations Strategies
In policy based systems, dierent strategies are implemented to evaluate and enforce
policies at various points. Examples of such systems are security systems or app for
implementing access control and authorisation. Implementation strategies adopted in-
clude;
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- Policy Decision Point (PDP) is a point at which policies are evaluated and decisions
taken concerning access and authorisation. e PDP evaluates an access request against
a policy and decides whether access is permied or denied.
- e Policy Enforcement Point enforces the policy decisions taken at PDP. PEP receives
the access request, forwards it to the PDP, receives the decision and enforces it by per-
miing or denying access. Based on the concept, extra information may be required for
evaluation to arrive at a decision.
- e policy information point provides extra external aribute information e.g. from the
user registry to support request evaluation to arrive at access or deny decision.
-ePolicy Administration Point (PAP) is a central point at which all policies are managed.
Figure 2.1: Policy Implementation Architecture based on XACML [140]
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate the policy implementation strategies and implementation
architecture respectively.
2.5 Policy Denition and Specication Languages
Various languages are used to specify and dene policies. Ordinarily policies are de-
ned as documents of policy statements in human understandable language. To avoid
the ambiguity associated with natural languages and support formalisation, policy de-
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Figure 2.2: Policy Implementation strategies illustration
nition languages like XML, XAML and SAMXL are used to dene and specify policies in
computer understandable form.
• XML: Extensible Markup Language is used to dene rules for encoding documents
in both human and machine-readable formats with simplicity, generality, and us-
ability across platforms. It supports message exchange to facilitate communication
and interoperability between systems and facilitates exchange of data and infor-
mation via the standardised XML schema.
• XAML: based on XML as a declarative language applied in initialisation of values
and objects.
• SAML: Security Assertion Markup Language is an XML-based open standard for
data exchange between parties or systems regarding authentication and authori-
sation e.g. identity provider and a service provider. Specically, SAML supports
specication of security leaning policies on which access control decisions are
based. e specication denes the roles of the principal, identity provider and
the service provider that make, authenticate and permit requests. ese are re-
ferred to as SAML assertions expressing a packet containing security information.
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2.6 Examples of Policies and Regulations
Depending on the domain, a business process is required to comply with several regu-
lations. Dierent regulations present dierent compliance requirements, for example;
1. e General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). e regulation from EU was re-
vised in 2018 with the revised version emphasizing data privacy and security. e
regulation species a set of requirements regarding personal data;
• Must be protected from intentional or unintentional misuse.
• Data owner must grant access to its use and must know who and where the
data is being processed.
• e regulation emphasises security by design principle where data privacy
requirements is built within the system. For example, privacy aware business
processes and information systems.
2. e Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 [139] (SOX 2002) and the Basel III Accord
(Basel 2018) are accounting regulations that target fraud prevention or detection
in business processes and workow systems. e key requirements from the two
regulations are;
• Separation of duty i.e. two activities are executed by dierent resources
• Binding of duty i.e. tasks that must be executed by the same resource.
3. e consumer protection act species requirements that empower customer rights
and protection.
• Right quality of goods and services
• Right to return unsatisfactory goods or services etc.
4. International Standards Organisation (ISO) presents dierent forms of certica-
tions with dierent requirements like 9001, 27001, 14001 among others
e cited regulations show a mix of requirements that a business process is required to
comply with. Compliance is not automatic but rather a non-trivial task for end users
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to accomplish. Moreover, compliance is not by choice but a legal requirement. A step
towards achieving compliance is to understand the compliance requirements from the
regulations relevant to a particular organisation. e next section presents some of the
key compliance requirements from some common regulations.
2.7 Common Compliance Requirements: State of the
Art
• Separation of duty (SoD) : SoD is a policy and regulatory requirement that dates to
decades ago. However, it is more pronounced by the SOX regulation [139]. SoD
concept refers to separation of concerns for both tasks and resources assigned
for their execution, where two disjoint tasks must be executed by the dierent
resources or roles. At least more than one role is required to complete a task in a
process [23, 143].
• Binding of duty: In contrast to SoD, BoD is requirement stipulates that execution
of two or more tasks should be executed by the same resource or role [23, 143].
e requirements of SoD and BoD are rooted in the SOX and Basel III regulations and
implemented as internal policies in business.
Illustration of SoD and BoD
An example of purchase order processing is used to illustrate the two requirements. A
requisition for printer cartridges is raised and approved. e cartridges are delivered and
goods received note is signed. e example shows three internal tasks; request, approve,
received. To enforce SoD and BoD requirements, the three tasks cannot be executed by
a single resource i.e. same user to writes the requisition and approve it, this is the case
of SoD. To exemplify the case with roles, to enforce SoD would require the oce clerk to
raise the requisition which is then approved by another role e.g. the line supervisor. e
duties of requisition and approval are separated and executed between the clerk and the
supervisor. Similarly to enforce BoD the clerk will receive and sign for the cartridges. In
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this way, requisition and sign for goods received tasks are executed as BoD by the oce
clerk.
• Security requirements – Modern enterprises run enterprise information systems
in which workow systems are a component or run independent workow sys-
tems. In SOX and Basel III regulations, SoD and BoD are specied as security
requirements to prevent or detect fraud and other errors that may compromise
the security of systems [110]. In workow systems, security is a major require-
ment to be implemented and complied with to information security and assurance.
Cherdantseva and Hilton dene information security and assurance as below [36]
“Information Security … is concerned with the development and implementation of
security countermeasures of all available types (technical, organisational, human-oriented
and legal) in order to keep information in all its locations (within and outside the
organisation’s perimeter) and, consequently, information systems, where information is
created, processed, stored, transmied and destructed, free from threats”. “Information
Assurance … aims to protect business by reducing risks associated with information and
information systems by means of a comprehensive and systematic management of
security countermeasures, which is driven by risk analysis and cost-eectiveness”
A security policy describes the representation of rules that enable the implementer to
determine if requests for access should be granted, given the values of the aributes of
the subject, object, and possibly environment conditions. e Subject describes a user
(human or application) identied by a set of aributes which requests access to perform
operations on objects. e Object refers to a resource for which access is requested and
upon which the operation will be conducted by the subject once access is granted. E.g.
les, records, tasks, processes, programs, etc. While Operation: describes the actions
like read, write, edit, delete, copy, execute, and modify conducted on the object by the
subject. Lastly the environment includes the prevailing conditions and context in which
access requests are made and granted like the current time, day of the week, location of
a user, or the current threat level [79].
Cherdantseva and Hilton describe a set of requirements that systems should comply with
to be secure;
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• Auditability; An ability of a system to conduct persistent, non-by-passable moni-
toring of all actions performed by humans or machines within the system
• Authenticity/Trustworthiness: Ability of a system to verify identity and establish
trust in a third party and in information it provides
• Availability; ensuring that all system’s components are available and operational
when they are required by authorised users
• Condentiality; ensuring that only authorised users access information
• Integrity; ensuring completeness, accuracy and absence of unauthorised modi-
cations in all its components
• Non-repudiation; An ability of a system to prove (with legal validity) occurrence/non-
occurrence of an event or participation/non-participation of a party in an event
• Privacy; system should obey privacy legislation and it should enable individuals
to control, where feasible, their personal information (user-involvement)
Since business processes must comply with the policy and regulatory requirements, their
behaviour is therefore driven to behave as the requirements specify. In the section that
follows, a further discussion of how the regulatory requirements relate with business
process behaviour is presented. In addition, categorisation of these requirements is dis-
cussed in relation to process behaviour.
2.8 Business Process Behaviour
Business process models provide a graphical means to describe normal or expected be-
haviour of the business process. e core business process perspectives depict the be-
haviour of a business process in terms of control ow, resource ow, data ow and tem-
poral perspectives [10]. To facilitate compliance to the requirements, a logical relation
is established to relate the policy and regulatory requirements with the behavioural per-
spectives of the business process. Establishment of such relationship benets process
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design following policies and regulations as design guidelines i.e. each process perspec-
tive is specied according to a set of rules and policies which constrain the process to
execute in a specic behaviours. Furthermore, following the categorisation, it enables us
to discuss the related work in the eld. e process perspectives present a unique way
Business Process
Perspectives
Control Flow
Perspective
Data Flow
Perspective
Temporal
Perspective
Resource
Perspective
Figure 2.3: Business Process Perspectives [10]
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to look at the business process behaviour from a structural setup. ey also present a ba-
sis upon which a logical interrelationship between the process and the constraints that
determine its behaviour. Using process perspectives a relationship is established which
facilitates derivation and categorisation of compliance requirements from the general
policies and regulations. Figure 2.3 shows the key business process perspectives whereas
gure 2.4 depicts the interrelationship between them.
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Control ow perspective is considered as a basis on which other process behaviour is
based. is implies that following the ordering of activities, resources are assigned; ac-
cess to data is authorised as well as the timing of events and activities of the process.
Upon gure 2.3 and 2.4, a category based diagram in gure 2.5 is composed to illustrate
constraint categories and how they relate to the business process perspectives. Control
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Figure 2.5: Relationship between process perspectives and constraint categories
ow and resource constraints are related by assignment relationship in which resources
are assigned to tasks. e relations between resource constraints and data constraints
are enforced by the access control and authorisation elements. e temporal constraints
are related to all constraints through scheduling activities, resources and period of access
to data. Direct and transitive constraint relationships are inferred from the perspective
based relationship in Figure 2.5. Direct relationships describe constraints explicitly inu-
encing the behaviour of a process without reference to another perspective. E.g. control
ow constraints directly relate to the activity, the assignment of a resource to a task. e
transitive relationships implicitly dene constraints whose inuence on the behaviour
of the process perspective is derived from another perspective. Temporal constraints are
an example in this case whose eect over a task is dependent on constraints governing
other perspectives. E.g. the occurrence of activity a will delay for 30 minutes, role r is
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scheduled to execute activity a at 10:15 hours, and access to data is authorised during
day working hours between 9:00 - 17:00 hours.
2.9 Generic Constraint Patterns
Constraints are derived from policy and regulatory requirements. Control ow per-
spective describes the ordering of activities in the process. us, the constraints under
this category are based on rules and policies concerning ordering of activities. Related
to control ow are functional constraints for guiding activity decomposition into exe-
cutable tasks and operational constraints which regulate application services. ese two
forms of constraint categories are concerned with constraining the execution behaviour
of activities. For that maer, they are discussed under control ow. e data category in-
cludes rules and policies that govern the ow of data in and out of the process in terms of
its access restrictions, control and authorisation. e resource ow constraints describe
the rules and policies that restrict the assignment and allocation of resources to tasks
[10, 2, 159] .
Several authors [15, 46] have used process perspectives to organise and categorise com-
pliance requirements into paerns. Various authors have employed the use of paerns
to represent common occurring permissible requirements that are used to express the
behaviour of an entity to facilitate checking and verication [45]. In the same way,
verication for compliance of a business process to policy and regulations is based on
compliance constraint paerns.
2.9.1 Control ow Constraint Patterns
Control ow constraints restrict business processes to behave in a specic in relation to
activity ordering. To this eect, this section presents control ow paerns and related
work is presented. Dwyer et al (1998) propose a set of property specication paerns
for nite states verication tools. e paerns are organised into hierarchies based on
their semantics as Figure 2.6 illustrates.
According to Dwyer et al, users can search for a paern matching the requirement being
specied, map it into a formalism suitable for a given tool and instantiate it by plugging
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Figure 2.6: Control ow Paern Hierarchy
the paern into state formulas. e paern hierarchies include Occurrence, ordering and
compound as top nodes. e paerns can then facilitate model checking by verifying
occurrence and ordering of an activity or chain of activities. Authors however do not
address validation and verication to ensure that the right paern is identied and its
correct mapping. is forms the rst requirement to be addressed in this thesis;
• Req1. Based on control flow constraints, verify for compliancy of collabora-
tive business processes
Relatedly, van der Aalst et al propose and implement control ow paerns similar to the
ones above. e authors use the proposed paerns as requirements to assess the suitabil-
ity and expressiveness of commercial workows languages[10]. e paerns proposed
have been very popular and induced strings of research. For example, Pesic et al. present
a constraints modelling mechanism to model business processes conforming with con-
trol ow requirements [119, 117]. e authors propose a exible approach to constraints
modelling to achieve several options of model behaviour from which the designer selects
the best option. Awad implements a formal approach in form of a BPMNQ tool for de-
sign time compliance checking. e tool is based on visual paerns to model compliance
requirements in terms of control ow, data ow and conditional ows [15, 16, 17]. In
another study in which a compliance management framework is proposed, control ow
paerns are extended and formalised into a compliance request language (CRL) [46].
CRL is based on property specication paerns by Dwyer et al, van der Aalst et al and
Hall et al., and expounded to include other hierarchies of resource and time paerns.
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2.9.2 Data Constraint Patterns
Data in workow systems relates to both control data required by the workow system
and process data required for task execution [10]. e former is of relevance to this dis-
cussion to derive data constraints from the policies and rules that guide operations. Data
constraint paerns express the common forms of data requirements applicable in work-
ow systems. ese are as well adopted to facilitate elicitation of compliance require-
ments from general policies and regulations. A number of data paerns are presented
by Russel et al from a review of commercial workow systems. ese are grouped to in-
clude; data visibility, data interaction, data transfer and data-based routing [127]. In table
16 are exemplied data constraints under the categories of data visibility and data inter-
action which are relevant to the study. In addition, we propose other data constraints
including validity, availability and accessibility. Besides, the GDPR prescribes articles
for data protection in which data privacy and protection must be observed [123]. e
law denes the data owner, data processor, data user and third party and stipulates their
roles, responsibilities and obligations, and requires organisations to observe privacy and
security by design to achieve compliancy. is way, privacy and security quality as data
paerns useful to capture related compliance requirements. Authorisation and access
control has emerged as a mechanism to enforce data access in workow management
systems due to rising security threats and breaches. e rise in cloud computing and its
application in business process management e.g. virtualized processes, BPM as a Service
(BPMaaS) and cloud storage has resulted into a paramount need for access control and
authorisation. To meet the security requirements, workow systems employee access
control mechanisms that compel BPM systems and their components to comply with
security requirements specied in policies. Such mechanisms are proposed in dierent
studies [148, 155, 170, 115, 79, 110, 13].
2.9.3 Resource Constraint Patterns
Resource ow constraints restrict how resources are assigned to tasks. Well known re-
source paerns are separation of duty, biding of duty sources and delegation which re-
strict the relation between the task and its actor. SoD and BoD constraints are also im-
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plemented as controls against fraud and collusion to commit crime. Personnel resources
are known to intentionally evade laws and rules for malicious intentions. Resource con-
straints regulate the scope of what resources can do on the tasks. When coupled with
time, a resource’s behaviour is restricted according temporal requirements. E.g., resource
availability based on work calendar. Striking a balance between optimal resource alloca-
tions to tasks is a challenge. For example, determining the resource requirements for dif-
ferent tasks in consideration of resource availability in relation to when tasks are ready
for execution. is, oen considered an NP Hard problem [40]. Various mechanisms are
used in implementation of resource constraints;
• Role based mechanism [22, 148, 172]. ese mechanisms automate SoD and BoD[24,
23] administers access control by granting access to a system based on user roles
in the organisation. RBAC renders a simple systematic and repeatable approach to
security administration, audit and correction in case of any breach. It is premised
on three key principals [50]; role assignment, role authorisation and transaction
authorisation.
• Task based Access Control mechanism Task based access control models present
an active authorisation management mechanism to model and specify security
policies and to dynamically enforce and administer their implementation at run-
time. TBAC approaches recognise the context in which the request for permis-
sions arise and participate in security management by relating to the progress
and emerging context within the tasks. Permissions are activated or deactivated,
granted or revoked automatically and coordinated with task progression solving
the overhead of administration [148]. e task authorisation framework presents
an authorisation step formed of trustee set and Protection state. e trustee set
bears the executor to authorise tasks with permissions from the executor permis-
sions. e permissions are enabled for a period at the enabled permissions com-
ponent.
• Aribute based Access Control Models. In ABAC mechanism access control and
authorisation enforced by following an evaluation of aributes of the subject, ob-
ject, requested operations against policy, rules, or relationships that describe the
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allowable operations for a given set of aributes [79], aer which access is granted
or denied.
2.9.4 Temporal Constraints
Temporal constraints specify the rules that regulate time requirements in a business
process as established in the policy guidelines, laws and regulations. Such policies may
in general specify an entire process total time or particularly specify time requirements
for each activity, resource availability or data access [35]. Temporal paerns include;
intervals, duration, delays and deadlines. E.g. execution intervals between tasks; taska
executes for a duration of tn units before taskb, period execution of a task, i.e. task start
and nish times. Individual task duration aggregate into total process cycle time.
e assignment of timing relations follows absolute or relative time. In absolute alloca-
tion time values are assigned in real time limits while relative time allocates time as a
single value. e challenge to achieving temporal constraints satisfaction is due to tem-
poral uncertainty where activity duration or its instance become known only during run
time [129]. Consider a scenario in which purchased goods are shipped. e duration for
shipment can only be known when a shipment agent is selected or when the address of
the customer becomes known at run time. Verifying for such kind of data available at run
time requires runtime process monitoring. Table 5.1 represents key temporal constraints
in literature [142, 122].
Against this background, it is worth to note that policy and regulations requirements and
constraints guide process behaviour. It is therefore imperative to ensure conformance of
the process to the expected behaviour expressed in terms of constraints that represent
policy and regulatory requirements through Business process verication.
2.10 Business Process Verication
In general terms verication refers to proof of correctness of a system. In reference
to BPM, process model verication refers to the means of proving existence of certain
design requirements in a process model. It provides a way to prove that the intended
behaviour at design time of the model is exhibited in the business process at execution
35
CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK
Table 2.1: Temporal constraints paerns
Constraints Description
Instance duration Period for which the rule must hold
Delay Period within which an activity can be delayed
Validity Period within which an activity can be executed
Duration e period for which an activity is scheduled to execute
form start to completion
Repetition Period between which an activity can be repeated
Overlap Period within which an activity can start and complete
with reference to another activity’s start and completion
period.
Deadline Describes the expected start or nish time of an activity
time. Verication is intended to check the connectivity of designed process models,
their correctness (absence of deadlocks and live locks in processes), compensation and
scalability (number of services a process model can support) and compatibility (between
process variants) [109]. Best practice recommends that model errors should be identied
early enough before implementation [164] . However, verication occurs at design time,
execution time and post execution.
2.10.1 Design Time vs. Runtime Process Verication
Runtime Business Process, also known as on-the-y verication involves dynamic analy-
sis and monitoring of running processes against a set of precisely specied properties
[138]. Compared to design-time verication, on-the-y verication is scalable enough
to permit analysis of evolving and executing processes. In this way, the state explo-
sion problem is minimised. Monitoring algorithms and tools are used to characterise
and specify properties which are then checked against the running systems [68, 90, 106,
47]. On the drawback, runtime verication is challenged in terms monitoring overheads.
According [154], commiing changes to running systems is destined to cause more er-
rors. Moreover it’s dicult to keep track of the errors, or resource wasting to correct
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them while the process is running. Runtime verication is applicable for verication of
designs with characteristics of nite traces and inappropriate to verication of mission
critical systems. It is however considered as a light weight formal way to verify designs.
Design-time Business Process Verication, also known as static analysis is conducted while
the business process is being designed. It employs techniques like model checking, theo-
rem proving and static analysis to analyse the behaviour of a system before its execution.
e proof is based on the design against a set of specications expressed and formalised
using temporal logic. Model checking is known to suer from state explosion prob-
lem limiting the scalability of the designs being veried [169], theorem proving calls for
manual eorts to discover the invariants while static analysis of code is not expressive
as a technique for a range of properties that can be checked [47]. Since model checking
is known for verication of mission critical system designs, this research partly focuses
on design-time verication of process models by means of model checking. Moreover,
it is much cheaper in terms of time and eort to correct errors during model design.
Furthermore, we emphasise design-time for collaborative business process models in a
vF seing where lile aention is realised or is lacking. e nature of verication for
inter-organisation business processes diers from that of single organisation processes
due to associated complexity in tracing where errors are in the models and sub models
[9]. More so errors would aect the entire VE as opposed to the single organisation. To
oer a scalable working solution, focus of the approach in this research is a hybrid solu-
tion that scales between design time, runtime and post execution to support compliance
verication in the process life cycle. Design time compliance is achieved through com-
pliance by design, a concept which facilitates the modelling of compliance requirements
and their propagation into business processes and supporting enterprise systems [131,
130, 114].
Post Execution verication involves a manual auditing activity through which log les
created during execution of a business process are archived and checked if the process
conformed to required behaviour. is is done through a process known as process
mining. is method is a corrective aer the eect method, errors are discovered only
benet next stage of the life cycle.
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Process Mining
Process mining is an eort geared towards business process discovery through auto-
mated model construction based on knowledge extracted from event logs to support
process analysis and improvement. e Prom framework [43] is at the fore of hosting
process mining techniques and tools classied into discovery, conformance and exten-
sion [105] as Figure 2.7 illustrates.
Figure 2.7: Process Mining Perspectives [105]
Discovery techniques are based on information mining from the event log data to
present the control ow and dependency relations among tasks without reference to
predened models. Extension techniques support business process improvement based
on discovered knowledge from the event logs. e interest of this study is in confor-
mance techniques that support verication between event logs and prescribed models.
e various forms of verication target dierent properties of the models. In the follow-
ing section, a brief discussion of such properties is presented.
2.10.2 Business Process Verication Properties
Properties describe the normal expected behaviour of a model as prescribed during de-
sign. As discussed in section 2.8, model behaviour is exhibited following process per-
spectives [10] and veried according to the following properties. e various forms of
38
CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK
verication target dierent properties of the models. In the following section, a brief
discussion of such properties is presented.
Soundness:
e notion of soundness property describes structural correctness of a workow net
[10]. e correctness of a workow is determined by the fullment of the syntactical
requirement of having each place or transition on a direct path from start to end. For a
business process model to be sound it must have all its states as reachable, no deadlocks
or live-locks, and should be able to terminate. ere are additional correctness properties
related to soundness, e.g. liveness, safety, Coverability and reachability. A summarised
description is provided here under but details in [111] and [149].
• Liveness - veries process models based on assumption that a process will execute
successfully i.e. only good things will happen.
• Safety - implies that a business process model will execute successfully, and no
bad thing is expected to happen.
• Reachability - each state in the model can be reached.
As a limitation to soundness as a verication property, only control ow perspective is
checked and no or less regard to other perspectives of resources, data and time. More-
over, known application has addressed verication of traditional single party business
processes, not much work has been realised from the point of view of multi-party col-
laborative business processes.
Compliance:
Compliance is a property checked over models to verify their adherence to design re-
quirements. Examples of such requirements are policies laws and regulations. In collab-
orative environments, compliance verication addresses variability checking i.e. veri-
fying that model variants are true members of a given business process family [63, 61].
Compliance checking is as well been applied in change propagation verication espe-
cially where modications are made from one end of the business partner or from the
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regulatory side [48, 49]. Models are checked to ensure that they remain compliant. In
this thesis, aention is focused on supporting compliancy verication. e rest of the
chapter presents related work in the area of compliance verication. We consider the
contribution from their work, limitations and how this thesis addresses some of the
concerns. To accomplish this target, a discussion of the state of the art in compliance
verication is presented in the next section.
2.11 State of the Art: Compliance
Verication Approaches
To support automated compliance verication, formal techniques, frameworks, methods
and tools are applied to both traditional business processes and collaborative business
processes. is section presents a cross section of the process model verication ap-
proaches selected on the basis of commonality, wide application and relevancy to the
study. e presentation follows a brief description of the approaches, categorised based
on formalism upon which they are based. However, a preamble is provided on the types
of formalism.
2.11.1 Formalisms
A formalism describes a standardised known method or technique on which the ap-
proaches are based. A detailed description of formalisms is presented in [87].
Petri nets
Petri nets are based on Net theory. ey describe means to provide descriptive, deductive
and conceptual devices. According to Petri [120], petri nets oers 3 purposes;
“Descriptive devices for demonstrating the structure of systems and of processes supported by a
system, in terms of axiomatically introduced concepts. Deductive devices for solving application
problems such as; synchronisation problems, concurrency problems, problems involving mutual
exclusion, conict, arbitration, sequentialization, safety, problems of deadlock avoidance and of
endless loop avoidance, problems in asynchronous switching logic, and last but not least problems
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arising in an area not generally known as yet, called formal pragmatics in which we are concerned
with the questions of the form ‘What, precisely, do we do?’, as opposed to formal semantics in
which we are concerned with questions of the form ‘What, precisely, does it mean?’; Conceptual
devices producing precise concepts on many levels or for promoting the communication between the
computer expert and other people;. . . ”
Petri nets are adopted into workow modelling to create workow nets. Due simplicity,
ease of access and formal mathematical foundation [1, 10], petri nets are a formalism
on which several approaches and tools are based which specify and verify process mod-
els. A petri net is a bipartite directed graph with two types of nodes; Place represented
as a circle, and Transition represented by a rectangle. Directed arcs connect places to
transitions. Figure 2.8 illustrates a petri net based process model. Places contain tokens
indicated using black dots while transitions have input and output places. Firing rules
dictate how tokens move from one place to another [91, 118].
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Figure 2.8: Illustration of a Petri net business process model
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Business Process Modelling Notation (BPMN)
BPMN is a modelling standard from Object Management Group with a wide application
because of its ease of use and intuitive graphical objects. BPMN graphical notations are
easy to comprehend and apply for non-technical end users, analysts ( responsible for cre-
ating the initial processes dras), process developers (responsible for implementing the
technology to perform the processes), business process managers and monitors [160].
Figure 2.9 is a simple order processing model illustrating use of BPMN notations. A cus-
tomer creates an order via the seller’s online system (e.g. via app) which is received and
processed. e goods can only be shipped aer the customer has processed the payment
which is also conrmed by the seller. BPMN limitations include; lack of standardised
semantics, and lacks expressiveness to support model verication.
Figure 2.9: Business process Model showing BPMN Notations
Temporal Logic
Temporal logic is a formal method founded on mathematics. Models are specied and
checked for correctness against a set of properties expressed as event orderings in time[97].
A set of temporal operators are used; Eventually (, F ), next-time (o), Always (), and
Until (U). Temporal logic has two branches i.e. Linear Time Logic and Branching Time
Logic. Model behaviour is specied while constraints and rules are expressed as logic for-
mulae and veried against each other for conformity. Wide application of TL is known
in concurrent, distributed, context aware and collaborative systems. With intention to
support logical reasoning, dierent tools are grounded on dierent forms of logic like
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Computation Tree Logic (CTL), Proposition Tree Logic and Timed Temporal logic [53,
18, 124, 69, 125]. However, temporal logic based tools are challenged by the state space
explosion problem. To remedy the challenge model abstraction techniques are applied
[51]. Another drawback of TL is the mathematical complexity associated with its use
and application especially for non-expert end users.
Logic Linear time
(path-based)
Branching time
(state-based)
Real time Require-
ments (continuous-
time domain)
LTL 3
CTL 3
Timed LTL 3 3
Table 2.2: Classication of the temporal logics
2.11.2 Compliance Verication Approaches
in this subsection, a description of a set of existing verication tools and approaches is
proled.
Yet Another Workow Language (YAWL):
YAWL is based on Petri nets and workow paerns [8, 6, 7] to support modelling and
verication by supporting early time detection of model errors. YAWL checks model
correctness based on soundness property. Reduction rules and abstraction techniques
are used to overcome state explosion [111, 145]. Modications to enhance verication
capacity were implemented to cater for cancellation regions and OR Joins [163, 153].
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Workow Analyser (Woan):
Woan is an independent model verication tool with capacity to give spot on diag-
nostic information to repair detected errors [152]. It integrates with WFMS like COSA,
Staware and Protos to verify models for structural and behavioural properties of sound-
ness [1, 149, 152] .
Coloured Petri Nets- CPN Tools:
e set of tools are used to specify and verify models for reachability, Liveness and
boundedness by employing state space methods and model checking. It considers time
to execute activities in the system and support simulation, performance analysis and
verication of models for soundness through computation of reachable states and state
changes of the model represented as directed graphs [81].
Declare:
An approach to design and verify exible and dynamic process models using constraints
based approach. As a declarative language, models are specied by stating rules to be fol-
lowed and support their verication. Dead activities, conicting constraints and changes
in models are veried based on control ow perspective. Declare also supports design
of declarative modelling languages including ConDec and DecSerFlow [117, 118, 119].
Challenges of Petri net Based Approaches
e above approaches are based on Petri net formalism to specify, model and verify
business process models. eir application has mainly been characterised by the fol-
lowing challenges; they profoundly support verication of control ow constraints, no
known application to collaborative business process model verication, their capacity
to support dynamic constraints checking is limited. Moreover, the approaches focus on
detective approach to compliance verication using process mining technique, i.e. given
a log and some property, check whether the property holds [4]. ese challenges call for
an approach that can leverage the limitations and capacity of YAWL, Woan and CPN
tools as petri net based approaches. In the next subsection, a discussion of temporal logic
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tools follows.
HYbrid TECHnology (HyTech):
A logic-based approach employing symbolic computation for automated verication of
models against properties specied in real time temporal logic. Symbolic computation
is a procedure for verifying ICTL formula over hybrid automata [14] where as a hy-
brid system is one composed of a discrete program embedded within a continuously
changing environment and interacts with the environment in real time [71]. E.g. Hy-
brid automata is a generalised nite state machine with both discrete and continuous
variables. HyTECH is applicable for verication of mission critical systems for reacha-
bility, Liveness, time boundedness and duration. HyTECH+ [70] which is an extension
to the classical HyTECH. Symbolic Model Verier (SMV): SMV uses binary decision di-
agrams to check models where states and transitions are in a single block than a single
state at a time [38]. NuSMV a later version expresses specications in LTL and CTL to
analyse and verify synchronous nite-state and innite-state systems for correctness,
liveliness, and safety [37, 85].
UPPAAL:
e approach employs automata logic is applied for real time simulation and check on
system behaviour for reachability, invariability, safety, non-zenoness and bounded re-
sponse in real time systems [94, 95, 21]. Diagnostic trace for property violation is gen-
erated.
SPIN:
Veries asynchronous system specications expressed in PROMELA against properties
specied as temporal logic formula and converted into Buchi automatons to compute
the product of the claims and the automaton representing the global state space. e
resulting automaton is then checked, if it is empty it implies the claim is not satised
otherwise it contains the behaviour that satises the original formula. Partial order
reduction method is employed to control state explosion [120, 76, 77, 75]. Safety and
Liveness properties are checked.
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e LTL Checker
LTL Checker is an event log-based tool for verifying conformance of a process to a set
of properties. Ordering and timing properties are formulated from the logs and checked
against the business process model to verify whether they hold or not [4, 20]. e tool
is implemented as a plugin into the ProM framework. Medeiros et al. propose semantic
process mining as a way to add meaning to labels and data used as the basis of log mining
to construct models and provide adaptable and reusable solutions understandable for
process analysts [105]. e LTL Checker is thus extended to perform semantic event log
mining.
TLA+:
Temporal logic for action is a concurrent system abstraction tool that supports model
specication and checking. It enables writing of algorithms, translating them into sys-
tem specication models and checking them for correctness against deadlocks, termina-
tion and invariants [11, 93, 158].
Business Process Variability Tool (BVP):
A declarative tool supporting design time preventative specication and verication of
business process model variants for conformance with the reference process. A reference
process is the core process from which variants are created through congurations and
customisation to meet specic requirements of dierent partners in the process. Using
basic principles, a business process template is created that is then used to create and
validate process variants. e reference process is expressed as a formal specication
while process variants as a system model; conformance is formally veried through
model checking [60, 62].
Compliance Request Language (CRL):
e language is built as part of a compliance management framework to simplify and
support abstract paern-based design time preventative compliance requirements def-
inition and enforcement on business processes. e language is grounded on temporal
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logic utilising formal reasoning to support compliance checking. e paerns formalise
the compliance requirements covering the traditional business process perspectives of
control ow, resources and temporal perspectives. Besides, compensation and mono-
tonic requirements are as well supported [52, 46]. To verify the requirements, the tool
relies on SPIN model checking tool which implies that the outcome is aected by state
explosion problem. Even then, conicts and inconsistencies may exist in the require-
ments that may bring the process to a deadlock [156, 157]. ese must be veried for
non-existence
Deontic Logic Languages
Deontic logic is a formal system used to specify obligations, permissions and responsibil-
ities among contractual parties. e logic is well known for supporting formalisation of
contracts and verication for compliance of parties and stakeholders to the obligations,
permissions and responsibilities. Deontic logic is the philosophical basis for PENELOPE
and Formal Contract language.
Formal Contract Language (FCL) FCL supports normative specication and verica-
tion of process models for compliance against obligation and permission constraints.
e normaliser and the inference engine facilitate reasoning over normative rules. e
normaliser explicitly derives and merges rules to their normative conclusions to remove
redundancy and identify conicts while the inference engine derives conclusions from
some input propositions. It also embeds defeasible logic a non-monotonic formalism for
constructive proofs to allow trace of derivation upon conclusions substantiating viola-
tions [131, 130].
PENELOPE Language – Process Entailment from Elicitation of Obligations and Permis-
sions: e approach is based on the notion of explicit denition and expression of busi-
ness policies and regulations as constraints imposed on business processes in a declar-
ative way at design time. Control ow perspective is emphasized i.e. the sequence and
timing of process events. e language is implemented as a supporting framework to
generate business process models compliant with policies and regulations i.e. the obli-
gations and permissions. e obligations and permissions are expressed using deontic
logic and used to generate a non-executable control ow based compliant process model
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applicable for verication and validation of violations in other models for properties like
deadlocks, livelocks, deontic conicts, temporal conicts, and trust conicts [56, 57, 55].
e logic based approaches presented in the above section have as well faced limited
application due to a set of challenges; state space explosion problem is a big challenge
that many model checking tools face. However, the application of abstraction methods
and techniques [51] mitigates the challenge. Other draw backs involve the associated
complexity for non-expert end users without competency in mathematical skills. At
this point, we the second requirement to be satised by our approach is derived.
• Req2. Compose a less complex mechanism (language) to support non-expert
end users to dene and specify compliance constraints based on general poli-
cies and regulations.
BPMN-Q:
BPMN-Q is a compliance checking language built as an extension to BPMN to query
models segments where modications have occurred, and verify their compliance with
ordering constraints of activities. Process designers can query business process models
based on their structure to derive paerns, variants as well as compliance to quality con-
straints specied by international standards and regulations like ISO and total quality
management. e authors further extend the language to cater for data and temporal
constraints. BPMN-Q however is a detective compliance monitory approach for sup-
porting adherence queries as opposed to the preventive approach [15, 17, 144].
SecBPMN-Q and SecBPMN:
Salnitri et al. extend BPMN into SecBPMN to support the denition and specication of
information systems, while BPMN-Q is extended to SecBPMN-Q to supprot expression
of security policies, requirements and constraints. e specications are then veried
via an engine [132]. As a security policy specication approach, checking other forms
of constraints is not implemented.
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Protos:
An approach that species models and supports verication through simulation based
analysis based on data, user, or control ow perspectives [58].
SeaFlows Toolset:
SeaFlow is a framework tool for compliance verication with support for model abstrac-
tion. Structural compliance verication derived from compliance rules is supported at
design time as well monitoring at runtime. While, behavioural compliance checking
caters for data constraints Compliance rule graphs are used to model compliance rules
[107, 98, 122, 92].
Conformance checker
e approach checks for conformance and tness between the process model and spec-
ied behaviour i.e. the extent to which the log traces can be associated with valid ex-
ecution paths specied by the process model, and appropriateness i.e. the degree of
accuracy in which the process model describes the observed behaviour [126]. e tool
is a detective approach and non-applicable for collaborative prevent scenarios.
As the discussion has revealed, a plethora of verication frameworks, methods, tech-
niques and tools are in existence. A summary of these approaches is presented in Table
2.3.
2.12 VericationRequirements forCollaborativeBusi-
ness Process
Unlike traditional business processes, Collaborative business processes span beyond bor-
ders of a single organisation. Due to their nature, Collaborative Business Processes
present unique characteristics and verication requirements that cannot be automati-
cally met by traditional business processes verication approaches. It necessitates con-
sideration of other factors to achieve with their verication;
• Need meet data requirements sourced from dierent partners to the collaboration.
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• Need to express interactivity and communication requirements among the collab-
orative business process eco-system. In most cases, dedicated communication and
interaction protocols are established for message exchanges between the partners
to engage in discussions and iterations before reaching a decision [86]. Due to dif-
ferent role interactions from partner organisations, it is important to clearly dene
organisational units, communication channels and reporting relations during ex-
ecutions [171]. e verication of organisational units, communication channels
and reporting relations prevents role conicts and makes work swi. A platform
independent model for specifying cooperation among workows is proposed by
[34]. A system implementing the model is as well presented allowing workows
to publish and subscribe to events and, denition of points in execution where
to send and receive events. e events are ltered, correlated and dispatched to
appropriate target workow instances. e model however does not guarantee
safety of interactions or cooperation among workow systems since no verica-
tion is conducted. Common forms of interaction adopted in collaborative business
processes include [9];
– Capacity sharing; resources are distributed but under one managerial control
– Chained execution; the process is broken into sub processes that are executed
by dierent partners
– Subcontracting; phases of the process are sub contracted to other business
partners
– Case transfer; work is balanced between partners
– Loosely coupled; the process is partitioned horizontally and each partner
runs one or more parts of the process over a dened protocol
• Dynamism, Flexibility and Complexity: Complexity results from various require-
ments from the stakeholders. ese usually must be satised by the process to
achieve compliance on top of other requirements from the external agencies. is
requires high exibility and dynamism of the process. e rate and speed at which
changes are veried, integrated and propagated to the necessary components is
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important to facilitate decision making. Short of this would be detrimental to the
collaboration and entire supply chain.
• Security and privacy requirements: Collaborating organisations do not entirely
share their workows but only necessary data or part of the workow are made
visible. Organisations desire to retain their autonomy [27]. is implies dening
the scope of the collaboration sphere and supporting interfaces, and verifying that
privacy is not compromised. For example, a Virtual enterprise coordinator ( VEC)
is proposed as an approach to control and maintain privacy, exibility and inde-
pendence of an organisation participating in a Cross organisational business pro-
cess. VEC supports mapping between interacting workow management systems
by dening interfaces that preserve privacy of shared workows. e approach
however disregards set up and distribution of agreements between collaborators
and does not verify the implementation.
• Semantic Notation Requirements: Collaborative business process models are of-
ten composed bu merging existing partner models into a single model. is way,
model semantic ambiguity arises due to the dierent ways in which each partner
has been designing their models or the supporting modelling languages used at
each end. Some modelling tools lack uniform semantics, e.g. BPMN tools. Unify-
ing the semantics to avoid misunderstandings is a requirement whose satisfaction
is achieved through semantic annotation verication.
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Table 2.3: A summary of general process verication approaches
Approach Properties Flexibility Arbitrariness Suitability Complexity Limitations
Woan Soundness and
Liveness
Veries completed
models
Single model veried
at a time
Specic to models
developed in par-
ticular language
Easy to use with
graphical interface
Non-collaborative
Complex outcomes
It is dicult to trace er-
rors
YAWL Soundness and
Liveness
Design time ex-
ception handling
model
Each model or sub
model is veried inde-
pendently
Veries control
ow based on
Resetnets and
transition invari-
ants
Not complex to use
and supports ex-
tension plugins
Graphical interface
Non-collaborative
FlowMake Structural conicts
like synchronisa-
tion,
Deadlocks,
consistency,
Liveness
Exception han-
dling.
Not scalable as
models grow large
Not domain specic
Sub models are ver-
ied independent of
main model
Lack data perspec-
tive which is very
essential for vF cBP
Graphical interface
makes it usable for
non-expert users
Non-collaborative
Based on control ow and
abstracts other perspec-
tives
It is dicult to trace er-
rors
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Coloured
Petri
Nets
Performance anal-
ysis
Coverability and
occurrence
Supports exception
handling
No support for veri-
cation of main and sub
models
Concurrent sys-
tems
Non domain spe-
cic
Graphical tool with
less complexity
Non-collaborative sup-
port
SPIN Correctness and
logical consistency
On Timeouts it
supports exception
handling
Wide application not
limited to particular
domain
e richness of
temporal logic can
make it viable for
vF cBP
Its syntactical
structure and
semantics make it
complex.
With XSPIN a
graphical interface
is provided
Non-collaborative
State explosion
Restricted to smaller sys-
tems
UPPAAL Bounded Liveness,
deadlock freeness
and deadlines
on-the-y verica-
tion but not scal-
able
Veries concurrent
systems but not
simultaneously.
No support for data
analytics
Supports diagnos-
tic trace leading to
source of errors
Non-collaborative sup-
port
KRONOS Reachability prop-
erties (Safety, Non
zenoness, Bounded
response
Exception han-
dling supported
No simultaneous ver-
ication models and
sub models
No known applica-
tion to vF domain
Graphical interface
usability
Provides counter
examples to aid
verication
Non-collaborative
Limited to smaller models
Co consideration for data
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SMV/
NuSMV
Correctness,
safety, and liveli-
ness
Support for excep-
tion handling
No support for simul-
taneous models or sub
model verication
Non domain spe-
cic
Scales to other ap-
plications
NuSMV - graphical
interface to ease
usability
Counter examples
provided
Non-collaborative
State explosion
HyTECH Reachability,
Safety, Liveness,
time-bounded,
duration
No exception
handling.
Not scalable
Specic application
for embedded and
hybrid systems
Lacks elements like
data which a key to
vF cBP
Complex tool due
to its syntactical
and semantic
requirements
Non-collaborative
State explosion
Supports to smaller sys-
tems
Woan Soundness, Live-
ness and Reacha-
bility
Lack of exibility Single model veried
at a time
Veries mod-
els from other
languages
Graphical interface
for usability
Non collaborative.
Output not easily under-
standable
ADEPT Semantic correct-
ness, deadlock and
Safety
Handle excep-
tions Flexible
verication
No support for si-
multaneous model
and sub models
verication
Applicable to
other domains
other than clinical
processes
Use of process tem-
plates to easily cre-
ate processes.
Lack of proven applica-
tion.
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2.13 Summary ofRequirements ofResearch and/or Ex-
citing Approaches for Compliance Verication
As the discussions have shown, verication of collaborative business processes relates to
various aspects categorised under control ow, resource ow, data and temporal group-
ings. We have noted that verifying for compliance of collaborative business processes
scales beyond the requirements for verifying traditional business processes due to the
unique characteristics of these processes. Further more, dierent approaches have been
presented that target compliance verication. However, these are limited in several ways
as indicated in Table 2.3. In [88], we justied the need to verify collaborative business
processes for compliance. Moreover, in section 2.2 policies and regulations were de-
scribed and their examples cited in section 2.6. e policies and regulations form sources
of compliance requirements and constraints to be satised by the business processes.
Based on the discussion and analysis of related work, the gaps identied formed propo-
sitions to the requirements necessary for an integrated compliance verication approach
for collaborative business processes. e gaps and requirements are summarised below:
• Limitation 1: Existing approaches and related work are based on either a single
constraint category or a combination of two categories. Profoundly, control ow is
well addressed as seen in work by [15, 16, 119, 117] shows. Others have addressed
resource constraints as a single category, e.g. [112, 30, 31] Ortega et al. 2013. While
others have addressed data specic categories [16] and [92], and temporal specic
approach [129]. In other cases, a combination of categories is addressed, e.g. in
[17, 98, 60] Awad et al address compliance of process changes in terms of con-
trol ow and temporal requirements, while Ly et al address process compliance in
terms of control ow and data requirements whereas Groefsema proposes a tool
for variability compliance checking based on control ow and data requirements.
Compliance to data and resource requirements is addressed by [122]. However
more related work aempts are made to address control ow, resource, data and
temporal constraint categories in single approach. For Example [52] implements a
compliance request language for specication and denition of constraints while
[142] all the constraint categories are used to illustrate how to achieve compli-
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ance. However, the all categories based compliance checking is not achieved from
the composed frameworks but outsourced to compliance checkers. for example
in [52], the composed CRL language is only applicable to in the denition and
specication of compliance requirements.
Requirement 1: Compose a constraint based compliance verication approach
supporting multi-level compliance checking.
• Limitation 2: In addition to the above, the cited related work addresses either de-
sign time, runtime or post execution compliance checking strategies. e design
time based approaches are limited to only data available at design time and ig-
nore checking scenarios that depend on running data. Runtime approaches and
post execution approaches are known to take place late aer a damage resulting
from non compliance has occurred. For example resource based compliance ap-
proaches in [80, 113, 96] are based on process mining of event logs to support
resource allocation [96] or to understand resource behaviour [113]. Whereas the
design time approaches like the one presented in [119, 117] are not exhaustive to
consider runtime data. Work from [52] and [142] cuts across strategies. However,
the limitation in this work has been discussed under limitation 1 above.
Requirement 2: To compose a hybrid compliance approach whose verication
and checking application is not limited to either design time, runtime or post ex-
ecution but supports all strategies. category of constraints.
• Limitation 3: Complexity associated with related approaches resulting from the in-
herent supporting logic on which they are based. For example CRL [46] is based on
a combination of logic involving LTL, Metrical Temporal Logic (MTL) and ForSpec
Temporal Logic. Work by Awad also employs LTL and past temporal logic [15]
while Goedertier and Vanthienen apply deotic logic to model and verify permis-
sions and obligations [56]. Despite the justication given by the authors, the logic
remains complex for ordinary users necessitating for a less complex mechanism
that subject maer experts who are not modelling experts can use to formulate,
specify and verify process models.
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Requirement 3: Compose a less complex compliance checking mechanism to
support non-expert end users.
• Limitation 4: Platform independence. Besides Woan which integrates models
from other workow systems like Staware, COSA etc most of the approaches
discussed above that translate into soware tools are not platform independent.
is implies that the modelling and verication can only be done with that spe-
cic tool resulting into model lock-in. A platform independent verication tool
enhances its portability and makes verication work exible and swi without ty-
ing users down to a specic tool. It is also easy to maintain and update requiring
less time and cost.
Requirement 4: Compose a verication environment that is platform indepen-
dent. One that accommodates and veries system models regardless of their design
or modelling environments. e implementation architecture is based on the ser-
vice oriented architecture to achieve a service based hybrid verication approach
which is not limited to a single strategy of design time, runtime or post execution.
2.14 Summary of Related Work
is section summarises the related work presented in sections above. e related work
shows compliance and BPM as two related elds who research is vast and still growing
in diering dimensions. e chapter discussed the concept of policies and regulations
as a basis for compliance requirements and constraints. in addition, the structural facets
of the business process were discussed as a means to study process behaviour and their
importance to provide a taxonomy under which the compliance constraints were cate-
gorised in relation to constraint paerns. ese groupings include control ow paerns,
resource constraint paerns, data constraint paerns and constraint paerns.
Further to the above, process verication was discussed under which the state of the
art was presented in lieu of collaborative business process verication. e outcome
at this level is the comparison assessment of compliance verication frameworks, tools
and techniques presented in section A.1 of the Appendix. From the analysis, gaps and
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limitations were identied which formed a basis upon which the requirements for our
proposed collaborative business process compliance verication.
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Methodology
3.1 Introduction
is chapter describes the methodology used to achieve the outcome of this report.
Guided by the research question and objectives stated in the chapter one, this chap-
ter presents the procedural steps, research approach and tools used to accomplish the
research. e chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 presents the conceptual frame-
work upon which the subject foundation is based. Section 3.3 is concerned with the re-
search approach applied in the study. An inductive approach was followed in this case.
Section 3.4.1 presents the research methodology while section 3.4 presents the research
design. In section 3.4.2 where, Design science method is introduced and described. In
Section 3.5 We show how design science was applied to achieve the artifacts of the re-
search by following the recommended steps presented in section 3.6. e chapter con-
cludes with summary in section 3.7.
3.2 Conceptual Framework
e conceptual framework presented in Figure 3.1 provides a conceptual foundation
upon which the concepts in the study are derived. Between business process manage-
ment and compliance management disciplines lies the compliance gap. e gap can be
bridged by having business processes that comply with policies and regulations. Achiev-
ing compliant business processes creates the need compliance verication mechanisms,
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methods or techniques that facilitate checking conformity of the business process with
regulatory requirements. Analysis of the gap, concepts and requirements from the two
disciplines enabled formulation of the research question, research scope, objectives and
aims of the research.
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Figure 3.1: Conceptual Framework
Besides the major concepts, a brief description of other concepts is provided [28]:
• Business Process Management (BPM); a holistic management methodology to de-
liver value to customers and stakeholders by managing ecient and eective busi-
ness processes.
• Business Process Modelling; a graphical representation of processes to enable anal-
ysis and improvement of the current process.
• Business Process Modelling Tool; a soware tool to create business process models.
Process Model; a graphical representation of a business process that exhibits the
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activities and their inter-dependencies that make up the business process to any
desired level of detail.
• Capacity Constraint Resources; where a series of non-bolenecks, based on the
sequence in which they perform their jobs can act as a constraint.
• Constraint; a condition restricting or regulating a process and usually constraints
are outside the control of the project team. Failure to meet a constraint may causes
an exception condition or other dened procedure.
• Compliance; an act of adhering to any standards, procedures, or processes estab-
lished as necessary for operational eectiveness.
3.3 Research Approach
A research approach describes a planned procedure involving a set of steps detailing
application of methods to collect, analyse and interpret data. Two broad categories of
research approach are deductive and inductive approaches. e distinction between the
two approaches lies in the fact that the deductive approach tests for validity of hypothe-
ses or theories whereas the inductive approach works towards emergence of new the-
ories and generalisations based research questions, goals and objectives [29]. In this
Observations Patterns Theory
Figure 3.2: An Inductive Research Approach [29]
thesis an inductive research approach was adopted to study policies and regulations,
compliance requirements and constraints as well as collaborative business process re-
quirements. ese were generalised and categorised into known constraint paerns,
formalised and represent as model logic upon which reasoning is applied. e reason-
ing outcome informs whether the process is compliant or non-compliant. A compliance
verication approach composed of verication algorithms is designed and presented as
an artifact to support verication of collaborative business processes for compliance.
Procedurally, the approach involved the steps as follows
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• Systematic analysis of both regulatory requirements and collaborative business
process verication requirements formed the initial step. e step provided an
understanding of the requirements, expectations and compliance concepts in ex-
plicit terms to support verication.
• Furthermore, a less complex mechanism to formalise requirements into compli-
ance constraints according to paern categories. Both description logic and tem-
poral logic. e outcome are formalised constraints.
• Verication algorithms are designed based on categories of constraints. ese are
applicable in verication to check for existence of required behaviour in the busi-
ness processes.
• Lastly, the verication algorithms are evaluated using industry based use cases.
Furthermore, architectures for practical implementation and evaluation of arti-
facts are presented.
3.4 Research Design
A research design forms the basis upon which the research plan is drawn. In this thesis,
the research problem was contextualised by breaking it down into dierent components
according to the two discipline studied (see Figure 3.1). e conceptual framework in-
formed the research approach. e research was compelled by some known compliance
related challenges as discovered from literature (chapter 2) and in practice that have
posed a knowledge gap worthy a research. Despite existence of probable solutions in
form of artefacts and tools from both industry and academia, some of the unresolved
identied gaps are addressed by the artifact we present as a solution to the research prob-
lem dened in chapter 1. With consideration of other research methods like grounded
theory [141, 54], design science [74] was deemed most appropriate to achieve the out-
come of the study.
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3.4.1 Research Methodology
Various research methodologies available for information systems (IS) research. For in-
stance, Grounded theory (GT) [29] which leads to discovery of theories from data sys-
tematically obtained from research. Besides its application in various IS research projects
to study dierent phenomenon, various studies have specically promoted the use of
GT in IS research. For example, Martins et al, demonstrate the application and use of
grounded theory in three dierent IS research projects and share lessons learned from
its use to provide well formed views about its use in IS research projects [102]. In an-
other study [103], the use of GT in IS research is promoted by investigating alternative
approaches. A clarication of the nature of grounded theory approaches in terms of
epistemology stance as a positivist or interpretivist is provided while recommending its
use in combination with other theories due to its multi disciplinary nature.
However, design science [74] was adopted as a suitable method to accomplish the goals
of this research with justication given in section 3.4.2.
e information systems eld deals with artifacts in an ecosystem environment where
socio-technical systems operate. Socio-technical systems (STS) express the interaction
between people and technology (e.g. computerised information systems) in organisa-
tions and further recognise the interaction between society’s complex structures and
human behaviour. Besides the behavioural aspect of the STS, design science also con-
siders STS from an engineering view making it suitable as a method for engineering
leaning research projects [73]. e choice and application of a methodology depends on
its usefulness in achieving the objectives and expected outcomes of the research project.
erefore choosing design science was based on the aims, objectives and expected out-
put of this study.
3.4.2 Design Science
Design science extends the human and organisation abilities to create and evaluate new
and innovative artifacts. e artifacts are in terms of constructs, models, methods and in-
stantiations created as solutions to existing problems in the community based on knowl-
edge and understanding of the problem domain [72] in a socio-technical environment.
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Constructs provide a framework within which problems and solutions can be dened
and communicated, e.g. a language, model or method. Models represent the reality e.g.
a world phenomenon used to support design of the problem and its solution space. Meth-
ods represent mechanisms used to dene solutions to problems, e.g. formal formulae,
mathematical algorithms, or informal textual descriptions like best practice approaches.
Instantiations facilitate the implementation of constructs, models, or methods as a work-
ing system and assessment of their feasibility and suitability to its intended purpose.
Design science overlays research in 3 interrelated cycles of Relevance, Design and
Rigour (3.3). e relevancy cycle seeks to improve the environment which is the prob-
lem space, by providing solutions relevant to existing problems in form of artifacts. e
artifacts are returned to the environment for evaluation. Design science recommends
rigorous testing of the artifact before its release. is way, multiple iterations take place
before the artifact goes to the relevance and rigour cycles. e rigour cycle refers to the
application of knowledge from well-known grounded scientic theories and engineer-
ing methods. Knowledge may come from experiences and expertise that dene state of
the art or existing artifact and processes. e relation to the knowledge base ensures a
new and innovative artifact is presented as a contribution. e design cycle promotes
the design and evaluation of the artifact. e evaluation provides feedback to ne tune
the artifact to its nal state of application [74]. Figure 3.3 illustrates the design cycles. In
Figure 3.3: Design Science Research Cycles [74]
specic iterative terms, we follow the described steps of design science (Figure 3.4 as de-
scribed by [116]. As stated above, the problem denition of this research is motivated by
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the need for a less complex compliance verication approach in practice, the objectives
of the intended solution are clearly dened as the initial steps. Aerwards the verica-
tion algorithms are designed, demonstrated, evaluated and results communicated.
Figure 3.4: Design Science Research Methodology (DSRM) Process Model [116]
3.5 Application of Design Science in BPM Research
BPM as a growing discipline creates contribution to the computer science community
through the artifacts created. According to [100], the maturity and relevance of the
BPM discipline is emphasised by reviewing and examining BPM work from dierent
publications and recommend to progress BPM as a Design science by;
• Creating taxonomies to structure the eld and relevant processes.
• Extend engineers techniques beyond process analysis and control ow perspective
to consider other perspectives and roles.
• Make use of scientic research methods like case studies and action research as
used in IS research.
• Develop explicit denition of hypothesis for the algorithms that BPM research
usually produces. E.g. on the benets intended to be achieved. Make benchmark
data publicly available.
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Following the recommendations, our research extends verication beyond control ow,
makes use of industrial use cases for evaluation and validation of the artifact, and the
designed algorithms are demonstrated to show their ecacy and applicability. e fol-
lowing section describes specic application of design science in this research.
3.6 Application of Design Science in our Case
Design Science was preferred over GT to achieve the outcomes of this thesis. As high-
lighted in previous sections, GT supports construction of new theories and knowledge
based on collection and analysis of data. Such methodical requirement limited its ap-
plication in this thesis where use cases were preferred as opposed to collection of data.
Design science was appropriate due to the nature of the research i.e. the research was set
to provide a solution to an existing problem space in the environment, and support the
rigorous evaluation and the application of knowledge using well known theories. e
following section illustrates how categorical procedure followed according to the design
science cycles and the six research activities. Peers et al [116] categorise IS research
into six activities as a way to establish commonly acceptable framework for conduct-
ing IS research based design science principles. Figure 3.4 presents a summary of these
activities which include:
e rst step is to identify the research problem to be addressed by the research and its
motivation.
Secondly, the objective of the solution is specied showing what the artifact would ac-
complish.
irdly design and development of the artifact follows, this is the actual implementation
of the solution which addresses the problem.
Fourthly, the suitability of the artifact to solve the problem domain is demonstrated.
e h activity concerns evaluation of the artifact to establish how eectively and ef-
ciently it solves the problem or how well it meets the design requirements.
Lastly, the sixth activity concerns the research outcomes and how they are shared, com-
municated and publicised to the community. is is achieved through scholarly and pro-
fessional publications.
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Based on these groupings, specic steps undertaken in the research process are illus-
trated with mapped Figure 3.5 showing the application of design science into our re-
search process and compliance verication approach. e description of how each step
was accomplished follows:
• Problem identication and motivation; the initial step towards the research pre-
sented in this thesis was to dene and specify the research problem. e problem
was motivated by the continuous compliance problems and challenges despite ex-
istence of several solutions. e solution targets non-expert end users like process
modellers and compliance ocers that need support to design and verify com-
pliant collaborative business processes. Existing compliance management frame-
work are not end user specic and do not target collaborative business processes.
In this case the problem space included stakeholders like business organisations
and regulatory agencies who specify collaborative business process and regula-
tions respectively, process modellers and compliance ocers.
• Objectives of the solution: e second step in the research process involved seing
the research objectives. ese were derived from the research question. e major
research objective and sub objectives guided the study by providing a direction,
research goals and scope towards the solution.
• Design and development: e third step involved solution design. To achieve the
design, an artifact in form of a compliance verication approach was developed
that includes among other components;
(a) A compliance requirements. elicitation and denition mechanism
(b) A mechanism to translate requirements into compliance constraints by
formalisation using model logic for automated interpretation and rea-
soning.
(c) Constraint specic compliance verication algorithms that detect con-
straints violations and deviations from desired behaviour.
• Demonstration: e fourth step involved solution demonstration. is way, Chap-
ters 8 and 9 present the demonstration of constraints specication and verication
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algorithms based on two industry use cases. In the rst case of demonstration in
section 8.4, a consolidated form of verication was demonstrated to check the en-
tire process for compliance violations using an overall algorithm 12 whereas in
Chapter 9 constraint specic algorithms are demonstrated based on use case 2. In
each case, the algorithms are used to reveal compliance status of the business pro-
cess, whether compliant or otherwise. If non-compliant, the source of violation is
reported.
• Evaluation: In the h step the algorithms are evaluated as Chapter 9 presents
assessing their applicability and eciency to verify process compliance. For eval-
uation, the second use case is specically used. e evaluation is conducted in two
perspectives;
a. Using MEM model to evaluate the ecacy of the algorithms. e outcomes are
reported in section 9.1.
b. Performance evaluation, the algorithms are assessed in terms of their ability
to detect violations and their performance capacity in terms of time and space
requirements.
e outcome of the evaluation showed the ecacy and applicability of the solu-
tion to solving the compliance verication problem. Moreover, the compliancy
algorithms are expressive enough to meet the verication requirements for the
use cases.
• Communication: e research has been communicated in both academic and pro-
fessional circles; conference publications, EU H2020 FIRST project, knowledge ap-
plication to the industry with GK soware Inc. GK is a soware company that
deals with data for its clients and thus must have conformance of its business pro-
cesses, products and services with data regulatory laws.
Figure 3.5 illustrates the application of the design science cycles (Relevance, Design
and Rigor cycles) as well as the research activities to achieve the outcomes of our re-
search. Based on the relevancy cycle, as well as the research activities identify problem
and motivate, and dene objectives of the solution, the problem of the study was de-
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ned and motivated. ese are described in chapters one and two in which we dened
the problem (chapter 1.11) and motivated with support from related work (chapter 2).
Using the design cycle together and following design and development activity, the re-
search artifact i.e. the compliance verication approach was designed based on inputs
from chapters 4, 5 and 6. e artifact is presented in chapter 7. e demonstration and
evaluation of the artifacts as further required by the research activity 4 and 5 was ac-
complished in chapters 8 and 9 using two industry based use cases. e major outcome
of the thesis, the compliance verication approach together with the components i.e. the
compliancy requirements elicitation and formalisation mechanism and the verication
algorithms aer rigorous evaluation and validation are useful contributions to the ex-
isting body of knowledge in business process management and compliance verication.
e requirements of activity six i.e. communication of the research are accomplished
through the presentations at workshops, conferences as well as publications in confer-
ence proceedings and journals.
3.7 Chapter Summary
e chapter presented the methodology followed to accomplish the goals and objec-
tives of this research. e research process started with a conceptual framework which
provided a technical foundation for the study’s BPM discipline and then followed an
inductive research approach. Design science was adopted based on analysis of other IS
research methods like the ground theory as the justication revealed. e research steps
that design science recommends were then followed to accomplish the study. As Figure
3.5 shows, these steps are mapped into our compliance verication approach indicating
research outcomes for each chapter.
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Compliance Requirements
Denition, Analysis and Simulation
“Control leads to compliance;
autonomy leads to engagement.”
Daniel H. Pink
4.1 Introduction
In chapter 2, related work presented the state of art in regulatory compliance verica-
tion. is chapter is concerned with requirements denition, variability and assessing
the eect of changes in policies and regulations over business processes. e chapter
is structured as follows: Section 4.2 introduces the pick and pack use case as business
process, and its applicable policy and regulatory requirements to be complied with. e
use case forms a basis to illustrate the dierent concepts in the chapter. For example,
the variability of policies in relation to process model variability. e variability of com-
pliance requirements according to constraint categories is presented in section 4.3. In
section 4.4, the second use case describing a car insurance trade process is introduced.
Section 4.5 presents the simulation analysis technique to assess the impact of changes
and variations in policy over the business process and how they can be exploited to ben-
et process optimisation. e simulation scenario outcomes support informed decision
making on the best coarse of action to take.
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4.2 e Pick and Pack Use Case
is section describes the details of use case 1 as a business process for demonstrating the
concepts. e business process as shown by the model in Figure 4.1 is based on a giant
supermarket with a chain of stores across Europe and parts of Asia. To create orders,
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Figure 4.1: Pick and pack business process model
customers register on the store’s online system. Once a customer order is received, a
notication is received at the store while the customer receives a conrmation. At the
Store stock levels are checked for item availability. Where stock is below threshold, a
purchase order is issued to the supplier, otherwise order processing progresses. A sta
selects an order, picks items and packs the order. Before packing, order is veried for
conformity with order details, and aer its handed over to customer service. One or
more sta may be assigned to an order depending on its size. For items that are out
of stock, the order is suspended for a period until stock is available. An item can be
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substituted with another (e.g. substituting fresh vegetable item with tinned vegetables).
Supervisors can contact customers to seek opinion either to wait, change or cancel order
in case items cannot be substituted. A customer can cancel an order delayed beyond a
specic time. Ready orders are either picked up by the customers or delivered by store.
For further understanding, the following assumptions are made;
a. e process model is adopted by stores of dierent size and capacity.
b. Stores are in dierent regions where dierent laws and regulations apply.
c. Stores vary the general model into variant models to suit local policies.
4.2.1 Applicable Policy Requirements
e pick and pack business process is subject to comply with a set of policies and regu-
lations which form constraints that restrict it to specic behaviour and determine how
the operations are conducted. e relevant policies are consolidated into a set of policy
requirements as exemplied in Table 4.1. ey are presented according to the constraint
categories discussed in chapter 2. e requirements are generic to permit variations by
individual stores.
Table 4.1: General Policy Requirements
Categories Requirements
Control
Flow
Some activities can be combined and executed to-
gether depending on store size. E.g. Pick items and
pack items.
Pack Order immediately follows verify order.
Ready orders are either picked by the customer or
delivered by the store.
Delays are communicated to customers.
Pick items is repeated until all items are picked.
Notify customer order details immediately aer sub-
mission.
Continued on next page
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Categories Constraints
Data ow Customers register on the system before creating or-
ders.
Users must be authenticated to access system.
System must be up to date with all relevant data.
Customers can track their orders via the System.
Access to customer data is restricted by privacy con-
straint. Bulky orders e.g. with orders above £5000
can pay by cheque.
Resource Resources are assigned to tasks.
Resources must be uniquely identied and authenti-
cated.
Where resources are assigned work based on shis,
access to data is also based on shis.
Resources like packers and pickers are binding of
duty constrained.
Some resources like pickers are restricted from exe-
cuting some tasks e.g. verify order.
Some resources like Veriers are Separation of duty
constrained.
Some tasks like Hand over order can be delegated.
Time based System must be available 24/7.
Each task is time bound and the total process dura-
tion is aggregated from task durations.
Some tasks cannot be delayed for more than one
hour.
Resources are allocated according to time shis e.g.
day shi or night shi.
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4.2.2 Applicable Regulations
Besides internal policies, the following relevant external regulations apply;
• e Sarbanes Oxley Act and Basel III with requirements for separation of duty and
biding of duty.
• e GDPR with requirements for security and and data privacy.
• e consumer protection Act 2015 UK species service level requirements to pro-
tect consumers.
• NIST - National Institute of Standards and Technology
e internal policies are established as operational guidelines. ey can be varied by
stores to suit specic requirements as long as they do not violate the reference policy
or regulations. To make the variations, a store considers its size in terms of number
of employees, average order quantities and size of stock. Some stores are extra-large
characterised by high order volumes, segmented departments and designated employees
for each department. Others are small convenient stores with fewer employees and fewer
volumes of orders. e variations cater for a store’s specic policy requirements suiting
operational capacity, business objectives, national laws and standards.
Policy variations lead to process variants congured from the general process model
into a process that meets specic operational requirements of a store. Overtime, a pro-
cess family results [12, 64, 61]. e general process must be exible and adaptive to
permit congurations and variations. For example, a variant process model for store
(A) is realised by conguring and individualising the general model to a specic model
expressing specic requirements for that store (A). To ensure that both the specic and
general requirements are exhibited in the behaviour of the process variant, it is nec-
essary to verify for compliance between both models. is is achieved using dierent
verication techniques such as simulation and model checking.
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4.3 Variability of PolicyRequirements andProcessVari-
ability
Following earlier categorisation of policies and regulations (Chapter 2), this sub section
describes how to achieve dierent versions of the extracted policy requirements (Table
4.1). e illustrations are based on Use case 1 to provide factors for variations;
4.3.1 Variations based on Control Flow Requirements
Control ow perspective species the ordering relations among units of work that com-
pose a business process which may be atomic or composite process activities or tasks
. A composite activity involves sub activities whereas an atomic one is a single action
activity. Variations in control ow policy requirements for the pick and pack process
are based the size of the store; Small stores where some activities deemed unnecessary
are skipped. Alternatively new ones may be added depending on the requirements and
context. Below are sample variations.
1. Policy requirement - item substitution: In case an item is not in stock, the following
requirements apply.
(a) Contact customer for consent to substitute item.
(b) Response must be received in 2 hours.
(c) Price of substitute item should match original item price.
(d) Substitution should not aract additional costs.
Variation: Above policies can be varied accordingly. For instance, a store may not
contact customer to substitute item but avail substitutes during order delivery or
order pick up. e customer can accept or reject substitute.
2. Policy requirement - item return: Items are returned to the store by the customer
only if; item is a defect e.g. broken or roen, item does not meet the quality speci-
ed or diers from what is described, less in quantity etc. Policies below apply on
returne item replacement or compensation;
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(a) Items should not have been tampered with e.g. electronic items.
(b) Item is returned in original branded pack e.g. Box.
(c) Required duration to return item diers for each category of the item e.g.
fresh items are returned in 24, clothing and shoes have a 30 days return pe-
riod. Other items are guaranteed for longer periods like 6 months up to a
year.
(d) e item is returned with original sales receipt or invoice.
(e) Items must be returned to the store from which they were picked.
Variation: e policy on return of items can be varied in dierent ways. Some
stores may have extended duration based on exceptional terms and item type.
For instance, bulky customers who are also re-sellers can return items past
ordinary return duration.
4.3.2 Policy Variations based on Data ow Requirements
Policy and regulatory requirements related to data and data ow constrain the infor-
mation entities consumed or produced during process execution. Data is collected and
managed in two forms i.e. data related to the process that supports the control ow of
the process, and data required for maintenance of the workow system. Policies consid-
ered here concern variable data that is accessed or produced during process execution.
Following the pick and pack process the following data policy requirements apply;
(a) Only registered customers can make orders.
(b) Users must be authenticated by the system.
(c) Order payment must be commied before order conrmation
(d) Privacy is observed for all customer data as required by GDPR
(e) Access to customer data must be authorised.
(f) Basic data is accessible and available for all users.
(g) Order catalogue is accessible to authorised users
(h) Ordering system should be up to date with data about stock.
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Variation: Variations should not violate or compromise security and privacy. For in-
stance;
(a) Stores can allow guest accounts for unregistered customers to make orders.
For example, unregistered customer can browse and pay for items as long
as they can provide addresses for delivery or can identify themselves while
picking the order.
(b) Payment processing method may be varied in relation to type of customer
e.g. bulky customers can pay on delivery while ordinary customer make
payments made upfront.
(c) Customers can only be contacted when item is unavailable or during delivery.
(d) Access control and authorisation variations are based on what data to access
and period of access. E.g. privacy on customer data
4.3.3 Policy Variations based on Resource ow Requirements
e resource perspective relates to the actors that execute process activities. ey are
expressed in form of roles of humans and applications. Policy requirements in this case
describe the assignment requirements of resources to tasks. e assignment require-
ments include;
(a) Binding of duty for select order and pick items activities.
(b) Separation of duty for pick items and verify order activities.
(c) Delegation of tasks between users
(d) Role hierarchy e.g. supervisors has access permission for all supervised ac-
tivities and users.
Variation: Like for control ow requirements, resource based requirements variations
are based on size of store, volume and frequency of orders, sales seasons e.g. peak sea-
sons like Christmas and Easter, job schedules e.g. temporally sta or permanent sta
assigned, duration of activities and sta schedules. Due to these factors, variations in
the policy requirements can be made in the following ways;
78
CHAPTER 4. COMPLIANCE REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION, ANALYSIS AND
SIMULATION
(a) Resources assigned for activities like BoD and SoD may be vary depending
on the competency and skills of the role player.
(b) SoD resource assignment may be based on the trust, experience and hierar-
chy of the role player.
(c) Access control and authorisation may be based on the trust and level of hi-
erarchy a resource holds.
(d) e principle of role hierarchy in view of access control and authorisation
may not apply.
4.3.4 Temporal Policy Requirements Variations
Temporal requirements relate to time requirements for executing activities, resources
and data access. Temporal requirements do not exist independently but track time con-
straints for control ow, resource and data requirements and relations between them.
e.g. when a task should be executed and for how long. Temporal requirements also con-
strain resources, e.g. reducing task duration may mean increasing resources or fewer re-
sources may have to be employed for extra hours to complete the task with for a longer
duration.e scheduling of duration species when tasks can start and end expressible in
minutes, hours and days as units. Stores can vary scheduling of both tasks and resources
based on local demands. For example, possibility to process an order in a duration of less
than six (6) hours, relaxation of item return deadlines, e.g. beyond 24 hours or 30 days
in exceptional cases, accepting customer order adjustments beyond the stipulated two
hours. Table 4.2 presents the general Pick and pack constraints derived from specied
requirements and organised according to constraint categories specied in Chapter 2.
It demonstrates a consolidated organised set of requirements from the dierent sources
and relations among them. is simplies the next step of simulation and analysis.
79
C
H
A
PTER
4.
C
O
M
PLIA
N
C
E
REQ
U
IREM
EN
TS
D
EFIN
ITIO
N
,A
N
A
LYSIS
A
N
D
SIM
U
LA
TIO
N
Table 4.2: General Requirements and Constraints for Pick and Pack Use Case
Category Requirements Constraints Dependency Related Policies
Control
ow
Every order is selected by the actor to
start order processing
Initial activity Select order Assign resources actors as BoD
Every order must be veried Existence of verify order Pick items Data and temporal require-
ments
Pick items is repeated until all items
are picked
Repetition Select order Data and temporal require-
ments
Notify customer order details immedi-
ately aer submission
Authorise contact to customer Receive Orders Temporal requirements on noti-
cations
Communicate delays to customers Authorise contact to customer Pick items Temporal requirements
Order pick up or delivery follows com-
pletion of previous activities
Chained precedence All Resource, data and temporal re-
quirements
Data ow Customers register on the system be-
fore creating orders
Privacy of customers Select order Security and data requirements
Resource actors authenticated to ac-
cess system
Authentication Login Grant data access accordingly
requirements
System must be up to date with all rel-
evant data
Data availability and accessibil-
ity
Identication and autho-
risation
Authentication and privacy be
observed
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Customers can track their orders via
the System
Data availability and accessibil-
ity
Customer notication Authentication and access re-
quirements
Access to customer data is restricted Authentication and data privacy Verify order Assigned resource actors
Bulky orders e.g. above £5000 can be
paid by cheque or other means
Conditional data constraint Select order Data ow requirements
Bulky order customers do not need to
pay upfront
Conditional data constraint Customer login Data ow requirements
Resource Resources actors are assigned accord-
ing to SoD requirements
SoD Accept tasks Authentication requirements.
Resources are uniquely identied and
authenticated
Authentication User identication and
authorisation
Data privacy requirements.
Resource assignment based on shis
data access is assigned accordingly
Authentication and data privacy Store Temporal resource assignment
requirements
System must be available 24/7 Availability and accessibility - -
Resources actors are assigned accord-
ing to BoD requirements
BoD Select order Temporal resource assignment
requirements
Time
based
Maximum order processing duration is
6 hours from submission.
Duration Select order Resource and data assignments.
Fresh items must be returned within 24
hours
Duration Complaint handling Resource and data.
Non-fresh items bear a 30 days return Duration Complaint handling Resource and data.
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Orders delayed beyond reasonable
time can be cancelled
Instance duration Select order Resource and data assignments.
Complaints are raised and handled
within 7 days
Validity - Resource and data assignments.
Complaints or returns submied aer
allowed period are rejected
Validity Order handover Resource and data assignments.
Customer order changes are permied
within 1 hour aer order submission
Validity order submission Resource and data assignments.
Store order changes are communicated
to customer in less than 2 hours
Validity Order submission System Resource and data assignments.
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4.4 Use case 2 - e Car Insurance Trading Process
e use case is a car insurance trading process adapted from [166]. e collaborative
business process is between 5 key partners i.e. policy holder, Euro Assist Company,
Lee consulting services, AGFIL and the garage. e actions of the stakeholders and the
process ow is summarised in Table 4.3 while Figure 9.2 is the illustrative process model.
Table 4.3: Actions of collaborating parties in the Insurance Trading Process
Party Actions
Policy
holder
1. e policyholder phones Euro Assist to re- port the car
damage.
2. e policy holder sends information to Euro Assist.
3. e policyholder needs to return the claim form to AGFIL
during reporting the car dam- age 10 days.
4. e policyholder must send the car to the garage during
reporting the car damage claim 1 day.
AGFIL
1. AGFIL need to send the claim form to the policy holder
during AGFIL knows the car damage claim 0.6 days.
2. AGFIL need to forward the claim to Lee Consulting Ser-
vices during the car damage claim receiving 1 day.
3. AGFIL pays the repair cost to the garage during the car
damage claim received 30 days.
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Europ
Assist
1. Europ Assist immediately assigns a garage for the policy-
holder.
2. Europ Assist immediately noties the claim to AGFIL.
Lee Con-
sulting
services
1. Lee Consulting Services contacts the garage during the car
damage claim received 1.5 days.
2. Lee Consulting Services assigns an assessor to inspect the
car if the repair cost more than USD 500 during the car
damage received 1.7 day.
3. Lee Consulting Services agrees the garage to repair the car
during the car damage claim received 3.5 days.
4. Lee Consulting Services forwards invoices to AGFIL dur-
ing the car damage claim received 6 days.
Assessor
1. e assessor inspects the car for Lee Consulting Services
during the car damage claim received 3 days.
2. e assessor sends a new repair cost to Lee Consulting Ser-
vices during the car damage claim.
Similarly, using the case details it is possible to make variations in policy requirements
for the insurance trading process to suit specic application. e case is revisited in
Chapter 9 and used to support evaluation of the designed verication algorithms.
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4.5 Changes in Policy and Regulations
Amendments in policies and regulations have direct eect on the business and its exist-
ing business processes. For example, an amendment in tax policy may specify new ways
through which organisations report tax compliance, or a revised requirement specifying
how companies should report their nancial status etc. Some changes may be internally
sourced as a way to improve workow, reach a new market or satisfy a particular market
demand. Such changes may cause an organisation to modify its entire process or part of
it to achieve compliance. Achieving regulatory compliance by re-engineering business
processes is a non-trivial task. In many cases, organisations have to hire new employees
like compliance ocers, this raises a nancial burden. For example, the revised GDPR
data privacy requirement emphasises roles new roles that should exist in organisations.
Regardless of the magnitude of the change or the size of the business process, it is im-
perative to follow a formal method to identify changes in the policy, the components of
the process that are aected by the amendments, commit the amendments and check
the process to ensure that compliance is aained.
Compliance documents are wrien in natural languages with associated ambiguity.
e ambiguity leads to false interpretations, misunderstandings and confusion. More-
over, regulations are stated in a prescriptive manner, i.e. they specify what is required
but are silent on how it should be achieved. As a consequence, organisations have per-
ceived compliance as a tedious burden and a complex task especially where skills or
automated compliance tools are not available to support enforcement and verication.
is thesis presents a compliance approach to support;
- Elicitation of new compliance requirements arising out of the changes in policy and
regulations
- Formalisation of the requirements into compliance constraints and,
- Checking and verifying compliance of the business process with the constraints.
An initial step towards compliance management is the ability to identify the relevant
policies and regulations that the business process should conform with. ese are de-
rived from the relevant regulations as the previous sections have shown. e identied
changes are formalised and used check the business process for conformity. Changes
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commied in the process can be a source of non-compliance. Checking the impact of
policy and regulatory changes over the business process is essential to determine its
compliancy. Verication techniques like theory proving, model checking and simula-
tion. ese techniques were introduced in chapter one section 1.4. In the following
section, simulation technique is used to assess the impact of the changes in policy and
regulatory requirements over the performance of the business process.
4.6 Simulation Based Analysis of Changes in Policy
and Regulations
4.6.1 Simulation
Simulation refers to activities undertaken to imitate operations of a system using a
model. e model is then studied through conguration and experimentation to un-
derstand the actual properties and behaviour of the system or its components. Besides
the general advantages of simulation like elimination of diverse bolenecks, exibility
and resource optimisation, simulation-based analysis for policies and regulations is use-
ful to assess the dierent options of implementing new or modied policies to a business
process by providing potential impact over its elements, inputs and outcomes to support.
is way, informed decision making is supported in a less costly means to improve and
optimise a business process. For instance, resource usage and allocation are optimised
by simulating dierent scenarios of allocation of sta by varying their numbers or other
parameters, and then assess the impact over service times in the process. rough mim-
icked behaviour of a process’s components and their interaction, it is possible to predict
and understand performance of the whole system, assess dierent alternatives to provide
resource capacity or innovative ways to improve performance of the process.
Simulation involves a set of steps; identify the problem, formulate the problem, col-
lect and process real system data, develop the model, validate the model, document the
model for future use, perform simulation runs and, analyse and present results [101, 33,
32, 150, 151]. Besides traditional simulation methods based on mathematical models,
several modern tools and soware are used to simulate processes in dierent industry
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sectors. Key examples in the business process management industry are tools like Bizagi
simulation studio, Simul8, Protos, Ingrid Cloud and AnyLogic among others. In manu-
facturing, tools like SIMPROCESS and FlexSim are used to simulate manufacturing and
engineering processes. ese tools present similar characteristics like graphical inter-
faces, graphical plots, animations and dashboards which makes them easy to use.
For illustration purposes, Bizagi simulation modeller is used as a simulation tool in this
thesis. Bizagi was preferred over other tools because it oers ease of use, exibility
in model design and it has wider online user community that provides rich knowledge
for support. To proceed with the illustration, a modied use case of the pick and pack
business process is reintroduced; Figure 4.2 is the abstracted model from the original one
in section 4.2 to t simulation illustrations due to space limitation.
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Figure 4.2: Abstracted Model of Pick and Pack Process
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4.6.2 Simulation Scenarios - Scenario 1
Scenario 1 Baseline Information
e simulation scenario begins from the point when orders arrive at the store. e fol-
lowing assumptions are considered as policies to guide operations:
• Stock is automatically replenished i.e. the store never runs out of stock.
• e store has three sections from which items are picked, i.e. Section 1, 2 and 3.
Sta are assigned to a single section.
• Sta who pick items do not verify order.
• Orders are processed as they arrive.
• Sta work for one shi a day with a single day o in a week.
• On average, 10% of the orders do not pass verication.
• Pick items in section 1 is allocated more processing time (50% of 30 minutes) due
to high item orders from that section.
• A big percentage (80%) of the orders are picked by customers, only 20% is delivered.
• e cost for the delivery van is xed at £2 for each delivery. Other resource costs
are charged hourly.
• It takes two hours to process an order from select order to Hand over.
Based on the above assumptions, data in Table 4.4 is used for simulation of scenario 1.
In this scenario, 1000 instances are simulated representing orders processed for a period
of 30 days. e intended objective is to analyse the business process using base line
data and project possible outcomes based on operational policies. e outcomes form a
basis upon which policy variations are bench marked and compared. Additionally, the
analysis enables identication of key performance indicators in resource utilisation.
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Table 4.4: Scenario 1 Base line Data
Activity Waiting
time (Min)
Processing
time (Min)
Resource Assigned
quantity
Default
antity
Hourly
Unit cost
Fixed
costs
Shi avail-
ability
Check order 0 10 Supervisor 2 2 15 - 1
Select Order 1 5 3 -
Pick Items Sec 1 3 16 1 -
Pick Items Sec 2 3 7 Pickers 1 6 8.5 - 5
Pick Items Sec 3 3 7 1 -
Pack order 4 15 Packers 2 4 9 - 3
Verify order 3 10 2 -
Hand over 1 5 Assist. Supervisor 2 2 12 - 2
Delivery sta 1 2 10 - 1
Delivery 10 40 Delivery van 1 1 2 1
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(a) Scenario 1 Outcome Analysis
Table 4.4 shows the detailed data required in simulation scenario 1 where
the activities are listed with their waiting time, processing time, assigned
resources, their quantity and costs. Based on this data, the simulation runs
of maximum arrival count =1000 (process instances) yield the model in Figure
4.3 and generate further data to support the analysis.
 
Figure 4.3: Model Output Summary
Presented in Figure 4.3 is a summarised simulation analysis model showing
executed instances for each activity and the total time spent to execute all
activity instances for all the 1000 cases simulated. To note from this gure is
the variance between the instances at both start event (1000) and end event
(889). e dierence of 111 cases is accounted for by the cases that are not
successfully veried. ese are looped back to Pick items 1 task (note the 111
instances at this task and in Table 4.6). Further analysis is described in the
next section based on varied inputs.
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(b) Scenario 1 - Resource Utilisation Analysis
Resources are assigned to tasks following policies and assumptions stated
previously. Output is presented in Table 4.5 showing the Assist. Supervisor
as the most utilised resource ( at 40.02%) with a cost of £6,916 per month.
However, the utilisation of resources is below average at about 40% high-
est and 7.55% for the lowest (delivery van). In addition, the scenario shows
that Pickers are the most cost intensive resource requiring £8688. Table 4.5
presents a summary of the of the complete outcome from the simulation of
resource utilisation.
Table 4.5: Resource utilisation data for scenario 1
Resource Utilisation Total
xed cost
Total
unit cost
Total
cost
Picker 25.43% - 8688.5 8688.5
Packers 21.82% - 5067.3 5067.3
Supervisors 29.24% - 5000 5000
Assist. Supervisor 40.02% - 6916 6916
Delivery sta 10.07% - 1450 1450
Delivery Van 7.55% 348 0 348
A further summary of the resource allocation and usage is presented in Fig-
ure 4.4 in which the Assistant supervisor is depicted as the most utilised re-
source followed by the supervisors. erefore, policies regarding allocation
and utilisation of these resources must be taken with regard to their capacity
or cost requirements.
With regard to temporal requirements, Table 4.6 presents time based simulation out-
comes. e data shows that it requires 94 minutes to process a single instance of an
order while 8,724,415.9 minutes to process 1000 orders given the same resource assign-
ments. e durations t well with the projections in the assumptions, e.g. 94 minutes
are less than the projected two (2) hours. e column for Min. time shows the least time
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Figure 4.4: Summary of Resource Utilisation for Scenario 1
spent executing an activity by a resource. For instance, the minimum time for Pick Items
from section 1 is 21 minutes, the maximum is 653.4 minutes (approximately 11 hours)
while the average is 49.5 minutes. e maximum time is the worst case scenario. e
total time required to execute all cases is 55030.1 minutes. is would be too much time
spent on order processing yet resources are not fully utilised. erefore, we proceed to
make adjustments in policies for assigning resources and then assess their impact on
the business process. is leads to the next simulation scenario where the inputs are
adjusted.
4.6.3 Simulation Scenarios - Adjusted Scenario with Policy vari-
ations
is scenario is intended to present an analysis of the impact of adjustments in policy
over the business processes. Following from the baseline data in scenario 1, policy vari-
ations regarding resource allocation, quantities and costs form input into the simulation
model. e output is analysed and compared with base line data. e variations in policy
are marked in Bold text:
• e store has three sections, sta can cross between sections.
• Orders are processed on rst come rst serve basis.
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Table 4.6: Task based output in relation to time
Name Instances
completed
Min. time
(m)
Max. time
(m)
Avg. time
(m)
Total time
(m)
Process 1 889 94 16607 8697.1 8724415.9
Check orders 1000 10 15601 7832 7831900
Select Order 1000 6 672 44 43635.9
Pick Items 1 1111 21 653.4 49.5 55030.1
Pick Items 3 1000 10 642 32.5 32588.2
Verify 1000 13 740 388.5 388587.8
Hand over 715 13 743 394.5 282091
Pick items 2 1000 10 648 38.9 38914.4
Order Packing 889 19 619 45.9 40836.1
Delivery 174 50 178 62.2 10832.1
• e store operates in two work shis a day. A shi is 8 hours.
• With the introduction of second shi more sta were hired
• A reduction in verify order errors to 5%.
• Picking items from section 1 is allocated more processing time (50% of 30 minutes)
perhaps because of the nature of goods.
• A 70% reduction in orders picked by customers while 30% is delivered.
• e delivery van cost is xed at £1. Other resources are charged per hour.
• A projected increase in sta minimum wage from £ 8.5 to £ 9.5 per hour.
Based on the assumptions above and adjusted inputs, data in Table 4.7 is used to generate
a variant simulation model to support further analysis. e aim is to support process
optimisation through what if analysis of dierent scenarios based on policy variations,
assess the outcome and its impact on the business process. e adjusted inputs result
into a simulation model in Figure 4.5 with cast data from 1,000 instances running for 30
minutes.
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Table 4.7: Adjusted Scenario Data
Activity Waiting
time (Min)
Processing
time (Min)
Resource Assigned
quantity
Default
antity
Hourly
Unit cost
Fixed
costs
Day
Shi
Evening
Shi
Check order 0 10 Supervisor 2 2 15 - 2 2
Select Order 1 5 2 8 9 -
Pick Items 1 3 16 1 -
Pick Items 2 3 7 Pickers 1 - 3 5
Pick Items 3 3 7 1 -
Pack order 4 15 Packers 2 5 9.5 - 2 3
Verify order 3 10 2 4 13 - 2 2
Hand over 1 5 Assist. Supervisor 2 -
Delivery 10 40 Delivery sta 1 2 10 - 1 1
Delivery van 1 1 1 1 1
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Figure 4.5: Process Model for Adjusted Scenario
Based on the adjusted inputs, simulation outcomes regarding resource utilisation are
presented in Table 4.8 and graphically in Figure 4.6. Both the table and the gure show
that the increase in resource quantities has reduced the utilisation percentages and costs
for some resources where for others there is an increase. E.g. in Table 4.8 the utilisation
percentage has reduced to 17.8% compared to 25.43% in Table 4.5, the same applies to
their costs reducing from £8688.5 to £6495.2. Further utilisation reductions are realised
for the Assist. Supervisor (from 40.02% to 29.60%) and related costs. e rest of the
resources have increased utilisation percentages and the related costs. E.g. the increase
in the utilisation of Supervisors from 29.24% to 38.20%. Details of these variances are
presented in Tables 4.5 and 4.8 while section 4.6.4 presents detailed comparison between
the two scenarios.
Figure 4.6 graphically summarises resource utilisation and indicates supervisors as the
most utilised (38.19%) report whereas the pickers are shown as the least utilised (17.80%).
Simulation of time requirements for the adjusted scenario yields data presented in Table
4.9. With the increase in successful instance executions from 889 (Table 4.6) to 927 (Ta-
ble 4.9), the average execution time increases to 18522.9 minutes from 8697.1 minutes in
scenario 1. Besides, the average required execution durations variably increase or de-
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Table 4.8: Adjusted Scenario 1 Resource Utilisation
Resource Utilisation Total xed
cost
Total unit
cost
Total
cost
Picker 17.80% 0 6495.2 6495.2
Packers 27.30% 0 6214 6214
Supervisors 38.20% 0 8250 8250
Assist. Supervisor 29.60% 0 7375.3 7375.3
Delivery sta 22.30% 0 2141.7 2141.7
Delivery Van 29.80% 257 0 257
Figure 4.6: Adjusted Scenario 1 Resource Utilisation Chart
crease as presented in table 4.9 increase in processed instances or increase in assigned
resources. e general implication from the adjusted data following from the variations
in policies is that the increase/ decrease in resources or their allocation directly aects
the number of activities or tasks that would be completed as well as the time that will
be spent executing them. is must be considered when policies are to be changed.
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Table 4.9: Adjusted Scenario 1 Process Time Sheet
Name Instances
completed
Min. time
(m)
Max. time
(m)
Avg. time (m) Avg. time waiting
for resource (m)
Process 1 927 338 23311.1 18522.9 -
Check orders 1000 10 9976 4975.3 4965.3
Select Order 1000 6 71 19.9 13.9
Pick Items 1 1073 7 71 19.2 12.2
Pick Items 3 1000 7 65 16.3 9.3
Verify order 1000 283 9983 8958 8945
Hand over 670 6 8753.9 4007.1 4001.1
Pick items 2 1000 7 67 19.2 12.2
Order Packing 927 19 4103 1621.1 1601.96
Delivery 257 50 593 206.6 156.56
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4.6.4 Comparison Between Scenario 1 and Scenario 1 with Ad-
justed Data
To understand the impact of policy variations on the business process, resource utili-
sation graph and resource cost graphs are used to make comparisons between baseline
data and adjusted data. e graphs in Figures 4.7 and 4.8 are used for comparison pur-
poses. e utilisation of resources between the two scenarios in Figure 4.7 does not
show a signicant dierence except for a slight increase in the utilisation of supervisor
resource. Figure 4.8 shows the contrary with a sharp increase in the resource cost for the
adjusted scenario. erefore the adjustments have not indicated any positive outcome
since the policies have led to increase in resource costs and more order processing time
without signicant increase in number of orders processed. Because the outcomes are
not realistic yet, we proceed with another scenario further adjusting the policies relating
to resource allocation and while doubling the number of orders over the same period of
time (30 days)
Figure 4.7: Comparison Resource Utilisation Graph
4.6.5 Simulation Scenarios - Scenario 2
In this section, a new simulation experiment is drawn with new data based on dierent
policies. e purpose of scenario 2 simulation is to analyse and optimise the same busi-
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Figure 4.8: Comparison Resource cost Graph
ness process using dierent assumptions from scenario 1. In this case, the 2000 instances
are used to simulate and project process performance for 30 days. Other assumptions in
the scenario 2 follow;
• All sections have equal order requirements i.e. same item quantities are processed
for all the departments of the store.
• Same stang levels are maintained as in scenario 1. However, they are allocated
as follows;
– sta cross between sections to pick items.
– Sta work all days of the week and an increase of £2 for each sta category
is administered.
• Customers are encouraged to use store delivery at a reduced charge of £1. A new
delivery van is acquired for the purpose. e percentage distribution between
store pickup and store delivery is set at 60% and 40% respectively.
• Errors during verication are projected to reduce to 3% since the supervisor role
will be participating (one supervisor).
• Two (2) packing sta can help during the peak hours of hand over.
Based on the above assumptions, the data in Table 4.10 is used to support the simulation
and analysis of outcomes of scenario 2.
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Table 4.10: Scenario 2 Data table
Activity Waiting
time (M)
Processing
time (M)
Resource Assigned
quantity
Default
antity
Hourly
Unit Cost
Fixed
Costs
Shi Avail-
ability
Check order 0 10 Supervisor 2 2 17 - 2
Select Order 1 5 3 6 10.5 - 6
Pick Items Sec 1 3 16 1 6 10.5 - 6
Pick Items Sec 2 3 7 Pickers 1 6 10.5 - 6
Pick Items Sec 3 3 7 1 6 10.5 - 6
Pack order 4 15 Packers 2 4 11 - 4
Verify order 3 10 Assist. Supervisor 2 2 14 - 2
Verify order 3 Supervisor 1 2 14 - 2
Hand over 1 5 Assist. Supervisor 2 2 14 - 2
Hand over 2 Delivery sta 2 2 12 2
Delivery 10 40 Delivery van 2 2 - 1 2
100
CHAPTER 4. COMPLIANCE REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION, ANALYSIS AND
SIMULATION
Scenario 2 Model analysis
Data in Table 4.10 shows the order of activities, their execution duration as well as as-
signed resources. e simulation is run based on this data for a period of 30 days. e
instances are increased to 2000 cases of order processing (instances). e simulation
model in Figure 4.9 results and provides a basis for scenario 2 analysis. From Figure 4.9
it can be noticed that using the stated assumptions, 2000 orders cannot be served within
30 days period.
 
Figure 4.9: Scenario 2 model with incomplete instances
Figure 4.9 shows that by the end of projected period (30 days); only 777 orders out
of 2000 orders would be processed as seen at the end event. is can be aributed to
stang levels and allocations, task wait times and execution errors. Besides it could as
well be to unrealistic projection period. To optimise order servicing to acceptable levels,
the simulation period is adjusted to 55 days. To that eect, another simulation model
results in Figure 4.10 are realised.
Even with the adjusted duration, Figure 4.10 shows that maximum projected orders to be
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Figure 4.10: Scenario 2 model with adjusted period
serviced cannot be achieved. By the end of 55 days, about 1572 orders would be serviced
with a low margin of errors at verify order. Analysis of the resource allocation and usage
based on Table 4.11 and resource graph in Figure 4.11 reveals constrained resources. is
is a boleneck limiting the achievement of target. It is advisable to proceed and create
another scenario for resource allocation to achieve optimum allocation. In section 4.6.6,
we illustrate resource adjustment scenarios. Table 4.11 presents resource utilisation data
further summarised by the graph in Figure 4.11
4.6.6 Resource Adjustment Scenario
Analysis of the resource data in Table 4.11 and graph in Figure 4.11 reveals an overly
utilised resource of ’pickers’ to almost 100%. A decline from 2000 instances of orders at
select order task to 1651 instances at pick items is noticed from the simulation model
4.10. is sharp drop is potential pointer to the source of the problem and perhaps
explains why all orders cannot be serviced within the projected period. e issue can be
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Figure 4.11: Scenario 2 Resource Utilisation Graph
Table 4.11: Scenario 2 Resource utilisation Graph
Resource Utilisation Total xed
cost
Total unit
cost
Picker 99.99% 0 83150
Packers 22.41% 0 13015
Supervisors 38.59% 0 17319
Assist. Supervisor 33.77% 0 12482
Delivery sta 40.09% 0 12700
Delivery Van 40.09% 635 0
approached with various alternative solutions;
- To reallocate sta from other sections to the picking section especially at pick hours
since they are used at less than half capacity as the percentages show.
- Hiring more picking sta.
- Creating 2 or more working shis since the scenario is based on a day shi cal-
endar of 10 hours. Increasing the simulation duration alone is not a solution since the
aempt in previous section did not yield much outcome towards the target. Moreover,
we are stretching beyond 30 days which was the initial service target period. is would
mean sales are maintained but problems relating to customers are not solved. Aer sev-
eral adjustments and simulations runs involving increase in stang for the pickers to a
quantity of 10 and allocating all of them to full time availability and reducing the waiting
103
CHAPTER 4. COMPLIANCE REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION, ANALYSIS AND
SIMULATION
time for the picking activities, a more feasible outcome is achieved in 26 days servicing
1938 instances. Figure 4.12 shows the model with adjusted resources and model results.
However, the process execution time shoots high to 7 hours and 12 minutes. Moreover,
utilisation of pickers has been balanced with increased 4 sta though it remains above
average as Table 4.12 and Figure 4.13 show. From this analysis, we can note that picking
activity is crucial to the execution of the process and achieving its objectives and targets.
 
Figure 4.12: Realistic model from scenario 2
4.6.7 Resource Usage Comparison Between Scenarios 1 and 2
Comparison between scenarios 1 and 2 is based on resource actors, their cost and time as
Table 4.13 shows. e disparity between the scenarios is traced back to the adjustments
made on resource data for Pickers. e increase in resource quantity (sta numbers)
facilitated a reduction in task waiting time and processing time for the Pick items task
as well as in the entire processing time of the business process. For instance, the increase
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Table 4.12: Scenario 2 adjusted output data
Resource Utilisation Total xed
cost
Total unit
cost
Picker 57.62% 0 79859.5
Packers 27.58% 0 16018.2
Supervisors 41.67% 0 18700
Assist. Supervisor 41.49% 0 15337
Delivery sta 50.13% 0 15880
Delivery Van 50.13% 794 0
Figure 4.13: Adjusted Resource utilisation Graph for scenario 2
in processed instances from 1752 to 1938. erefore, informed decision making can be
supported using;
– Key performance indicators (KPIs): KPIs refer to measurable values that are
used to evaluate and show operational success of a given entity. Based on the
simulation experiment above, the key performance indicators for the pick
and pack business process resources include the Pickers. is is more espe-
cially at peak times when Items are picked, at task waiting times and task
processing times.
– Increasing resource quantities at critical tasks/ activities is essential to im-
prove the performance of the process in terms of more instances or orders
processed, and overall task execution durations.
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Table 4.13: Scenarios 1 and 2 Data
Resource Scenario Utilisation Total xed
cost
Total unit
cost
Picker Scenario 1 25% 0 143.5
Scenario 2 57% 0 79626.8
Packers Scenario 1 22% 0 87
Scenario 2 28% 0 16280.4
Supervisors Scenario 1 29% 0 83.3
Scenario 2 42% 0 18700
Assist. Supervisor Scenario 1 40% 0 116.6
Scenario 2 42% 0 15501.7
Delivery sta Scenario 1 10% 0 23.3
Scenario 2 48% 0 15080
Delivery Van Scenario 1 7% 336
Scenario 2 48% 754
– Cost correlatively increases with the increase in resources (e.g. stang costs).
Process designers and implementers should be able to base their decisions
on cost vs benet analysis. For example, the cost for pickers overshot from
£143.5 for scenario 1 to £79,626.8 in scenario 2 while the xed costs for adding
another van while reducing the delivery charges rose from £336 in scenario
1 to £754 in scenario 2, of course bearing in mind that laer gure covers
longer period.
Simulation provides exibility and predictability based on what if scenarios which sup-
ports process thinkers, designers and analysts to easily modify variable process elements
and simulate output to support informed decisions on the best courses of action. How-
ever, simulation has a set of associated limitations.
• Simulation cannot reveal intricate errors in the business process. In cases where
experiments are based on assumed data, the results may be treacherous and unre-
liable especially when they dier from actual environments.
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• Moreover, simulation provides no proof that what is experimented will exactly
happen the same way in reality.
Based on the limitations, robust analysis and verication is recommended to reveal fur-
ther errors in business process models. In the next chapter (Chapter 5), another veri-
cation technique i.e. model checking is used to verify process model errors that scale
beyond simulation analysis.
4.7 Contractual Requirements Generation
In collaborative environments, several partners combine resources to design and execute
collaborative business processes. Besides the partner specic policies and external regu-
lations, collaborative business processes are as well governed by contractual obligations
i.e. rules established to guide the collaboration clearly indication partner responsibil-
ities. erefore, a collaborative business process choreography will have three views
of policies and regulations i.e. 1) the local view which describes policies governing in-
ternal business logic of private processes, public view describing policies at involving
contractual obligations, and 3) the global view composed of regulations guiding process
behaviour industry wise [99, 48]. e compliance challenge at this level concerns the
propagation of changes from one level across the dierent levels to ensure consistency,
validity and integrity of the process choreography. Some of these challenges are being
addressed by [99, 48] through proposed change propagation algorithms.
4.8 Chapter Summary
e chapter demonstrated the impact of changes in policies and regulations over busi-
ness processes. Changes in policies and regulations are inevitable and happen over time
requiring adaptation or modication of existing business processes. In this chapter we
have shown how to check and analyse impact of changes in policies and regulations
over the performance of a business process. We have used policy variations of the pick
and pack use case to arrive at dierent simulation scenarios. e specic chapter out-
comes are as follows; - It introduced the use cases and their requirements as proposition
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elements for compliance constraints formulation. - Based on the use cases, the chap-
ter showed how the policies and regulations can be varied over data, time and resource
constraints using several scenarios managers. - Using simulation analysis technique,
the eect of the changes in policy and regulatory requirements over the business pro-
cesses have been analysed, outcomes assessed against key performance indicators and
presented using summarised graphs showing comparisons. e chapter also points out
on the dierent levels of policy and regulatory views typical of collaborative business
process choreography.
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Chapter 5
Expression and Specication of
Compliance Constraints
5.1 Introduction
is chapter presents concepts related to compliance requirements, their expression and
translation into constraints. Based on requirements from use case one (Pick and Pack)
and citing of examples, an illustration of elicitation and categorisation of requirements
is presented in the chapter. To achieve expression and representation of compliance re-
quirements, description logic is introduced and used, whereas the translation of require-
ments into constraints is enforced by integration of description logic and linear temporal
logic to achieve formalised constraints to which reasoning can be applied to achieve com-
pliance verication. e Chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 presents the con-
straints described with illustrative examples, while section 5.3 describes the constraints
specic for collaborative business processes. In section 5.4, the expression of unary con-
straints according to their categories is presented using description logic while in section
5.5 composite expressions are presented. e chapter is concluded with section 5.6.
5.2 Constraints
Constraints restrict processes to specic behaviour as required by policies and regu-
lations. Without the restrictions models would execute any desired behaviour or end
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users would be at liberty to undertake any desired operations. However, the existence
of constraints creates restrictions on process behaviour. A constraint is a rule prescrib-
ing behaviour as conditions that a business process must conform with. Mandatory
constraints must be satised by the execution of the model otherwise a violation occurs.
e optional constraints may be satised or not, their lack of satisfaction does amount
to a compliance violation. e choice to execute activities with optional constraints may
depend on availability of time, computation complexity requirements like time or addi-
tional value that may be derived to the business or customer.
During process execution, the constraint conditions become active and are evaluated
by the process engines to guide further execution. Compliance is achieved when the
constraint conditions are fullled i.e. the outcome of the process behaviour matches
the prescribed behaviour. For instance, the ow and ordering of tasks matches their
observed occurrence and positioning aer execution.
Example 1: A policy species that activity D occurs before activity B and, between ac-
tivities C and E. Any process model would be compliant if it conforms to the specied
conditions i.e. activity D precedes B but occurs between C and E. Despite the specied
ordering relations, implementation can benet from the exibility of constraint based
modelling [117]. For instance, the rule is not specic as to whether B and E are par-
allel or sequential. In Figure 5.1, one way of expressing the order relations between
activities A,B,C,D and E is illustrated using a BPMN model. e model captures the
sequence of activities through ordered transitions such that the rule is complied with.
Figure 5.1 represents a complex policy requiring composite control ow constraints be-
A C D
B
E
F
Figure 5.1: BPMN Model expressing ordering constraint
tween activities. Expression of constraints of this nature requires high exibility oered
by constraint based modelling paradigm [117]. Constraint based modelling oers the
modeller freedom to represent models in various constraint satisfying ways. For exam-
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ple, variant 1 model in Figure 5.2 represents activities A and C modelled as exclusive
activities. Non occurrence of activity B in the model does not aect occurrence of D.
e constraint is still satised based on activities D,C and E.
C
D
A
FE
Figure 5.2: Variant 1 of the constraint model
Variant 2 in Figure 5.3 shows activities A and C modelled as exclusive activities. Activity
D precedes B and it is between C and E thus conforming with the constraint.
A
C
D EB F
Figure 5.3: Variant 2 of the constrained model
Variant 3 in Figure 5.4 represents activities A and C as parallel while activities F and E
as exclusive. Still the constraint is satised with D preceding B and between C and E.
A
C
D
E
B
F
Figure 5.4: Variant 3 of the constrained model
However, any executions violating the constraint are not permissible; they exist when;
activityD does not occur at all, when it occurs aer activityB or when it occurs outside
activities C and E.
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5.3 Constraints for Collaborative Business Processes
Following the discussion from chapter 2 relating to the description and categorisation of
constraints, it was emphasised that due to the characteristics of collaborative business
processes, they are bound to comply with constraints from various external regulations.
In this section, a formal structure of categories of constraints binding to collaborative
business processes is summarised in Figure 5.5 based on constraints categorisations de-
scribed in [159, 5, 6].
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Figure 5.5: constraint categories based on structural perspectives of the business process
Furthermore, Figure 5.5 is a constraint relationship model illustrating logical relations
between collaborative business process constraint categories. At the core of the model
lies the control ow constraints which form a basis for all other internal constraints. It
borders with the temporal, functional, operational, resource and data constraints which
all form internal constraints. Beyond the internal constraints are contractual obligations;
these integrate policies from partners. Next are constraints originating from the external
regulatory agencies outside business environment. External constraints are regulations,
standards, best practices and laws that to regulate the behaviour of the process beyond
its borders or contractual obligations. Exemplied category based description of the
constraints follows.
112
CHAPTER 5. EXPRESSION AND SPECIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE CONSTRAINTS
Temporal constraints and Examples
Table 5.1: Exemplied Temporal constraint paerns
Constraint Description Example
Instance duration Instance duration A set of activities from a. . . .n must
be executed within one (1) hour
from the time execution starts. E.g.
the processing of an order should
last for one (1) hour from the time
the order is submied.
Delay Period within which an
activity can be delayed
Activity bwill execute aer exactly
two (2) hours once execution of ac-
tivity a is complete. E.g. aer cus-
tomer payment, shipment will be
delayed for two (2) hours until pay-
ment is conrmed or reected on
the system.
Validity Period within which an
activity can be exe-
cuted
Activity b will execute between
12:00 and 14:00 hours every day
of the week. E.g. the shipment
of goods takes place between 12:00
and 14:00. Or customer care ser-
vice is available only during normal
working hours.
Duration e period for which
an activity is scheduled
to execute from start to
completion
Activity a will execute for 45 min-
utes. Or activity a execution takes
between 20 and 50 minutes.
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Repetition Period between which
an activity can be re-
peated
Aer initial failed execution, activ-
ity a can be repeated for twice, oth-
erwise it is restarted aer 1 hour.
E.g. log on can be tried for three (3)
successive times, if it still fails it is
restarted aer one (1) hour.
Overlap Period within which
an activity can start
and complete with
reference to another
activity’s start and
completion period.
Activity b is scheduled to start 30
minutes aer activity a has started
but can complete together, how-
ever b should not complete before
acompletes. E.g. pack items can
start 3 minutes aer verify order
has started but cannot complete be-
fore verify order completes.
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Table 5.2: Exemplied Control ow Constraint categories
Pattern
/condition
Description Purpose for checking Example
Existence An activity must occur in an in-
stance or otherwise
Occurrence or absence of an
activity
Activity C must exist in every instance of the pro-
cess. E.g. every order must be veried.
Bounded
Existence
An activity must occur for a spe-
cic number of times
Multiple occurrence of activi-
ties
Activity B executes several times until a required
condition is fullled. E.g. the pick items activity is
repeated until all items are picked.
Dependency Execution of an activity based on
occurrence or non-execution of an-
other
Occurrence or absence of de-
pendent activity
For activityC to occur, activityB andAmust have
executed successfully or otherwise. E.g. shipment
of the goods depends on conrmation of payment.
Parallel A set of activities must occur in
parallel
Activities that are bound to
occur in parallel
Activities C and D are mutually exclusive. E.g.
upon order conrmation, invoice is sent to cus-
tomer while the order is being processed.
Bounded
Sequence
Number of times a chain of activi-
ties must occur
Number of occurrence of
chained activities or other-
wise
Activity B and C execute several times until re-
quired condition is fullled
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Precedence An activity must occur before an-
other. is also true for chained
precedence for limiting a chain of
activities.
Order of occurrence i.e. ac-
tivities that must occur before
other(s)
Activities A and B are followed by C . E.g. every
account balance checking is preceded by success-
ful Login of the account holder
Response An activity that must occur due to
occurrence of another. is also
true for chained response for lim-
iting a chain of activities.
Order of occurrence i.e. ac-
tivities that must occur aer
other(s)
Activity E will occur if activity C occurred. E.g.
payment by cheque activates the cheque process-
ing activity
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Resource Constraints and Examples
Table 5.3: Resource Constraint categories with examples
Constraint Description Example
Segregation of
duty
Requires separate execution of high risk tasks
by dierent actors
Cheque processing is executed by two dierent actors.
Binding of Duty Requires 2 or more related tasks to be executed
by same resource.
e Doctor who diagnoses a patient must also prescribe
drugs.
Delegation Share or transfer permissions and associated
responsibility from one actor to another.
Supervisor can delegate verify order to pickers.
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Table 5.4: Data Constraint categories
Constraint Description Example
Data Visibility Denition of data elements based on structure
of the process and scope of accessibility of data
Task data; Describes data elements accessible by the task
or by each of the components of the corresponding tasks
blocks.
Scope Data; Data elements dened which are accessible by
a subset of the tasks in a case or dened according to sev-
eral tasks that are coordinated.
Multiple Instance Data; Tasks that occur multiple times in
a case can dene data specic to an individual execution
instance
Case Data; Data accessible by all components during exe-
cution of the case.
Workow Data; Data elements are accessible by all com-
ponents in each case of the process and its context.
Environment Data; Process components have access to ex-
ternal data
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Data interaction
i.e. internal & ex-
ternal
Denition of data elements based on how data
is exchanged between process components and
how their characteristics determine data ow
Data Interaction between
- Task to task
-Block Task to Sub Workow decomposition
-sub-Workow Decomposition to Block Task
-Multiple Instance Task
Data validity Denition of data in a state that is useful and
meaningful for task execution
Controls necessary to keep data up to date
Data availability Denition of data in format that is ready for use
and application
Dening which data has universal access and ensuring its
universal availability
Data accessibility Denition of data elements that make data ac-
cessible.
Access control and authorisation, regulation and legitimi-
sation.
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Data privacy Denition of data elements that preserve pri-
vacy of data
Permissions: Represents a set of permissions granted to
users to access data such as Permied, Forbidden, permit-
ted if condition is true. Permissions are linked to actions
performed only if one has the permission to do so.
Also, purpose is linked to permission; permission cannot
be given unless a purpose is specied. It is also used to
represent user consent.
Conditions: Conditions that must be true to allow an action
to be performed on data.
Data Retention: Denes the period data is kept at the re-
quester end.
Two – ree-
Four-way match-
ing
Requires values of two dierent data objects to
match
Received goods must match payment invoice.
Authenticity Requires Identication management for con-
trolling data access
All users are identied and authenticated by the system.
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Table 5.5: Temporal Constraints and Combinations with other Constraints
Temporal
constraints
Delay Validity Duration Repetition Deadline
Control
ow
Existence
Precedence
Response
Existence Parallel Dependency
Bounded Exis-
tence
Bounded Se-
quence
Existence
Precedence
Response
Resource
ow
Authentication Authentication SoD
Binding of Duty
Two – ree -
Four-way match-
ing
Authentication
Privacy
SoD
BoD
Data ow Data accessibility
Data validity
Data availability
Data accessibility
Data availability
Data visibility
Data privacy
Data interaction Data accessibility Data accessibility
Data availability
Data visibility
Data privacy.
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Tables 5.1 – 5.4 present set of general compliance paerns as observed from litera-
ture [45, 162, 46, 142]. For example, Table 5.1 presents temporal constraints described
with examples namely Duration, instance duration, delay, validity among others. Table
5.2 presents exemplied control ow constraints paerns including existence, bounded
existence, dependency, precedence, response inter alia. In Table 5.3, resource constraints
are listed and exemplied including separation of duty, binding of duty and delegation.
Lastly Table 5.4 describes data constraints with examples. Data constraints include data
visiblity, data validity, availability and accessiblity, privacy among others. Because tem-
poral constraints do not exist independently, Table 5.5 is a matrix matching temporal
constraints with other constraints to benet combination of constraints during their ex-
pression and specication. In subsequent sections, the constraint paerns are described
formally by deriving logical relations using description Logic and LTL.
5.4 Constraint Expressions
Dierent forms of logic have been implored to dene, express and specify constraints.
For instance, studies by [117, 46, 60, 142] use dierent forms of logic that compose their
proposed languages. However, these formalism remain dicult to comprehend by ordi-
nary end users like compliance oces and other stakeholders who are the subject maer
experts yet lack technical knowledge of dening and specifying constraints. In this the-
sis, application of descriptive logics (DL) is adopted and adapted as a less complex con-
straint expression formalism, upon which we base to compose a mechanism to express
and specify constraints. e motivation to use DL is based on its rich syntactical and
semantical vocabulary, which is yet easy to understand and use by ordinary users due
to its closeness to natural language. Constraints expressed and specied in DL are easy
for human intuition, understanding and interpretation. Besides, DL remains expressive
enough to support reasoning over constraints and their eventual checking.
5.4.1 Description Logic
DL is a language used for formal representation of knowledge by facilitating formal ex-
pression and specication of requirements of knowledge base systems. DL extends into
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dierent types like spatial, temporal and fuzzy logics with dierent features to support
various forms of expressivity and reasoning complexity. A DL diagram features concepts
which represent sets or classes of a system, and role representations which establish re-
lationships between concepts. Roles have value restrictions which impose constraints
or limitations or upper bound or lower bound on the types and values that ll the role.
Existential restrictions and value restrictions facilitate characterisation of concept rela-
tionships, while set theoretic notations are adopted like intersection, union and comple-
ment as concept conjunction, disjunction and negation respectively. e concepts under
the domain of discourse are dened by characterising their relationships and properties
with other concepts. It is not in this interest of the thesis to discuss full details of DL.
However, we highlight concepts relevant for application to policy and regulatory re-
quirements denition. In Figure 5.6, a set of DL applicable syntax and semantics are
given.
Figure 5.6: DL Syntax and Semantics
e following section therefore presents and illustrates language application to derive
formal constraint expressions.
5.4.2 Constraint ExpressionMechanism -Application ofDescrip-
tion Logic
In the adaptation of DL to our environment the business process is the domain of dis-
course while activities and constraints are concepts. Role representation is used to estab-
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lish a link between the constraints and the activities while the role restrictions impose
specic existential and value restrictions of a constraint over the activity. We use unary
predicates to represent sets of individual constraints while binary predicates denote re-
lationships between combined individual constraints, e.g. existence and response, i.e. an
activity occurs in response of another activity that occurred. We further use Composite
predicates to denote relationships between constraints from dierent paern categories.
E.g. e assignment of resources to execute an activity for a given duration. e combi-
nations and adaptations yield a mapping illustrated with Figure 5.7.
Resource Constraints
Temporal Constraints
Data Constraints
Activities/Tasks Constraints 
Control Flow
Constraints
Business Process
Domain
Figure 5.7: Modied DL Diagram
Based on this gure, it is possible to derive and express constraints, properties and re-
lations among constraint. In this way, expressions are specied for control ow like
response, existence, bounded existence, dependency and parallel constraints in Table
5.2 and resource constraints like Segregation of duty, binding of duty and delegation
listed in Table 5.3, as well as data constraints like validity, access and availability, and
authentication in Table 5.4 with temporal constraints in like duration, validity, repetition
and overlap in Table 5.1. e sections that follow present the constraint expressions.
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5.4.3 Control Flow Constraint Expressions
In this section, the presentation of constraints is categorised according to DL unary,
binary and composite predicates. Unary predicates represent atomic constraints while
binary and composite predicates represent combinations between constraints.
Unary Predicate Expressions for control ow Constraints
Control ow unary predicates are used to represent control ow-based constraints ex-
pressing ordering relations involving atomic activities or tasks. To full the ordering
relations, LTL operators and quantiers are used for the purpose. e expressions are
presented in Table 5.6.
Activity combinations are required to express relations between one or more activities.
Such relations are represented by forming combinations between constraints using com-
binations of predicates known as binary predicates.
Binary Predicate Expressions for Control Flow Constraints
Two additional logical symbols are composed to achieve purposeful and meaningful ex-
pressions. ese are; ← to represent ‘precede’,→ to represent ‘leads to’, ||to rep-
resent parallel, and 7→ to represent dependence. Table 5.7 presents binary expressions
specifying constraints dened with examples from use case 1.
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Table 5.6: Unary Expressions for Control Flow Constraints
Paern DL Representation Description Example
Existence Exist.Activity Activity occurrence in a trace Exist.a
Exist.∀Activity Every activity occurs in trace Exist.∀(a, b, c)
Exist.∃Activity Some activity occurs in trace Exist.∃c
¬Exist.∃Activity Some activity excluded from occurrence ¬ Exist.∃ a
Bounded
Existence
BoundedExist.Activity An activity can occur several times BoundedExist.a
BoundedExist.k(n−1)∀Activity Every activity can occur for specic number of
times
BoundedExist.k(n−1)∀(a, b, c)
BoundedExist.k(n−1)∃Activity Some activity occur for specic number of
times
BoundedExist.k(n−1)∃(a, b, c)
¬ BoundedExist.∃ Activity Some activity cannot occur more than once ¬ BoundedExist.∃b
Dependency ∃ Activity 7→ Depends Activity Some activity depends on occurrence of an-
other
b 7→ a
∃Activity ¬ Depends Activity does not depend on another a¬ Depends or ainit
Parallel ∃ Activity→ Parallel Activity Some activity is parallel to another activity b||c
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Bounded
Sequence
∃ Activity→ BoundedSequence A chain of activities occurs in sequence ∃(a, b, c...n → Bounded Se-
quence)
Precedence Activity Precede Activity An activity is preceded by another a← b
∃ Activity→ Precede Activity Some activity is preceded by another activity ∃a← b
Activity ¬ Precede An activity has no preceding activity a¬ ← or ainit
Table 5.7: Exemplied Binary Expressions for Control Flow Constraints
Paern Requirement DL Expression Example use case 1 Example
Existence Non- occurrence of an activity
leads to absence of another
¬ Exist.Activity → ¬
Exist.Activity
¬b→ ¬c ¬Verify order→ ¬Hand over
Non-occurrence of an activity
causes a complement activity to
occur. E.g. case of XOR
¬ Exist Activity → ¬
Exist.Activity
¬ b→ ¬ b’ ¬ Customer pickup → ¬
Store delivery
Existence and
Response
Activity occurs in response to
occurrence of another
Exist.Activity u Re-
sponse.Activity
a u → b Verify Order u → Hand Over
Existence and
Precedence
Activity occurrence is preceded
by occurrence of another
Exist.Activity u Pre-
cede.Activity
a← b Pick items← Verify Order
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Bounded Ex-
istence and
precedence
A chain of activities precedes an
activity
BoundedExist.∃Activity
uPrecede.Activity
∃(a, b, c)← d ∃(Select order, Pack
items)←Verify Order
An activity precedes occurrence
of a chain of activities
Precede.Activityu
BoundedExist.∃Activity
(a)← ∃(b, c, d) ∃(Verify order)←(Pack items,
Hand Over)
Bounded Exis-
tence and Par-
allel
A chain of activities occurs in
parallel to each other
BoundedExist.∃Activityu
Parallel.∃Activity
∃ u (a, b, c) →‖
∃(d, e, f)
∃ (Pick Items, Verify Or-
der) →‖ ∃ (Contact Cus-
tomer,Change Item)
Bounded Exis-
tence and De-
pendency
Chain of activities occur de-
pending on execution of another
chain of activities
BoundedExist.∃Activityu
Depend.∃Activity
∃(d, b, c) 7→
∃(a, d, e)
∃(Pack Items, Hand Over,
Delivery)7→(Pick Items, Verify
Order)
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5.4.4 Resource Constraints Expressions
For simplicity and convenience, abbreviations are adopted for use in expressions rep-
resenting resource constraints as follows: Available - Avail, Segregation of duty - SoD,
binding of duty - BoD and Delegation - Del.
Unary Resource Constraint Expressions
Unary expressions representing resource constraints and their implications using de-
scription logic are as follows:
• Resource.SoD – Resources constrained with SoD constraint
• Resource.BoD – Resource is constrained with BoD constraint
• Resource.Del – A resource that can be delegated
Binary Resource Constraint Expressions
Binary combinations between resource constraints is possible under guiding principle
that no combination between BoD and SoD for same activity executions at the same time.
is comprises the access control restrictions, i.e. a resource cannot be constrained as
BoD and SoD at the same time of allocation to an activity. is could otherwise result into
deadlocks. Similarly, a resource cannot be available and unavailable at the same time.
ese restrictions must be observed at design time and veried to prevent violations that
result into non compliance or deadlocks. Some of the realistic constraint combinations
are;
• Resource.Avail u SoD – Resource available for assignment as SoD.
• Resource.SoD uDel – Resources constrained with SoD and can be delegated.
• Resource.BoD uDel – Resource is constrained for BoD but can be delegated.
• Resource.Avail u Validity [time] – Resource’s availability is valid for a specic
time.
129
CHAPTER 5. EXPRESSION AND SPECIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE CONSTRAINTS
5.4.5 Data Constraint Expressions
Unary Data Constraint Expressions
e section presents data constraints expressions based on Unary predicates using de-
scription language;
• Data.visible – Data items visible for each activity.
• Data.¬ visible – Data items not visible
• Data.interactive – Data items that can be interacted with.
• Data.valid - Valid data items
• Data.available - Available data items
• Data.¬available – Data items unavailable
• Data.accessible - All accessible data items
• Data.¬accessible – Data items inaccessible.
• Data.Privacy – Data items classied as private data
• Data.2-3-4WM – Data that requires matching to enable execution.
• Data.Authentication - Data items that require authentication.
Data constraints restrict the creation and access of the data by activity tasks and re-
sources (roles and applications) over time.
5.5 Composite Predicate Constraint Expressions
is section presents composite predicate combinations involving all constraint cate-
gories to full compliance requirements. ey include the following;
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5.5.1 ExpressionsBetweenControl FlowandResourceConstraints
Combination between control ow and resource constraints express conditions restrict-
ing assignment of resource actors to activities. e expressions specify activity be-
haviour in relation to their actors. e DL based expressions are represented as follows;
• Exist.Activity→ Resource.Avail - e occurrence of an activity is assigned to an
available resource actor. For example;
Ho → Resource.[Avail] is a valid expression assigning any actor that will be
available to execute the activity. Such activities assigned to any available actor are
non critical or, they are already within the category of authorised actors.
• Exist.Activity → Resource.SoD - e occurrence of the activity is assigned to a
resource actor constrained by separation of duty. For example;
V o → V erifier.[SoD] is a valid expression assigning the actor of role Verier
constrained by SoD to Verify order activity.
• Exist.Activity1u Activity2→ Resource.BoD - e occurrence of the activity is as-
signed to a resource actor constrained by binding of duty. For example;
Sou Pit→ Picker.[BoD] is a valid expression assigning the actor of role Picker
constrained by BoD to execute Select order and Pick items activities. is implies
that the actor executes both activities.
• Exist.Activity → Resource1.Del:Resource2 - e occurrence of the activity is as-
signed to a resource actor that can delegate to another actor. For example;
Po → Packer.[Del] : Picker is a valid expression assigning the actor of role
Packer who can delegate to actor Picker. erefore, a given activity Ho can be
delegated to several actors such that Ho → ⊔[R1, R2, ...Rn] implies that Hand
over order is assigned to R1, R2 and R3
• Exist.∀Activity→ Resource.SoD - e occurrence of a set of activities is assigned
to a set of resource actors constrained by separation of duty. For example;
V o,Mo,CallCustomer → V erifier, Supervisor,DutyManager.[SoD] is a valid
expression assigning resource actors of role Verier, Supervisor and Duty Man-
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ager constrained by SoD to a set of activities Verify order, modify order and call
customer.
• BoundedExist(n+1)=k.Activity → Resource. Several occurrences of an activity is
assigned to same resource. For example;
BoundedExist.(n+1)=kPick Items→ Picker. All the number of times within an in-
stance of pick items are executed by same actor of picker role.
• BoundedExist(n+1)=k.Activity→Resource[SoD] – e number of times an activity
can occur it is executed by a dierent resource activity is assigned to same resource
actor. For example;
BoundedExist.(n+1)=kVerify order→ (Verier1u Verier2).[SoD] - All the number
of times the event instance of verify order is executed by a dierent actor (verier1
or verier2) of the assigned role (Verier).
• BoundedExist.(n+1)=k∃Activity → u∃Resources.[BoD] – Several occurrences of
activities are assigned to same resource constrained as binding of duty for all oc-
currences.
• BoundedExist.(n+1)=k∃Activity → u∃Resources.[SoD] – Several occurrences of
activities are assigned to same resource constrained as separation of duty for all
their event instances.
• BoundedSequence.k∃Activity → ∃ Resources.[SoD] - Activities occur as a chain
for a number of times are assigned to dierent resources constrained by separation
of duty.
• BoundedSequence.k∃Activity→ ∃ Resources.[BoD] - Several activities occur as a
chain for a number of times are assigned to a resource actor constrained by binding
of duty.
Other expressions for control ow and resource constraints can be dened and specied
following the same syntax and semantics. e above expressions are for illustration
purposes.
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5.5.2 Expressions for Data and Temporal Constraints Combina-
tions
is section presents some of the expressions to illustrate composite predicate combi-
nation between data and temporal constraints. e relevant and applicable temporal
constraint is the duration which is used to specify the period within which data can be
available for access and use.
• visible.data u [Duration] – Data items visible for a given duration
• interaction.datau [Duration] – Data items that can be interacted with over a period
of time.
• valid.Datau [Duration] - Data that is valid for use for a period of time.
• Accessibility and Availability.Data u [Duration] - Data that is accessible and avail-
able for all tasks and resources for specied duration.
• Data.Authentication u [Duration] - Data accessible by authentication over given
duration for tasks and resources.
• Data.Privacy u [Duration] - Private data accessible through authorisation of tasks
and resources for a specic duration.
More combinations of data and temporal constraints are possible following the illus-
trated expression mechanism.
5.5.3 Expressions for Control Flow, Resource, Data and Temporal
Constraints
is sections presents predicate combinations for all constraint categories. e combi-
nations represent means for complete constraint specications that is close to natural
language. is way, non expert end users can extract compliance requirements from
source policy and regulatory documents and represent them as constraints to be com-
plied with by the business processes.
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• Exist.Activity → Resource.[SoD] u Data.[available]uTime.[Duration] - e ex-
pression species that an activity is assigned to some resource constrained by
separation of duty, and data access as available for a specic duration.
• Exist.Activity→ Resource.[BoD] u Data.[Private]uTime.[Duration]. e expres-
sion species that an activity will occur, assigned to a resource constrained as
binding of duty, with data constrained with privacy for a duration of time.
• BoundedExist(n+1)=k.Activity→Resource.[BoD]uData.[Authentication]uTime.[Duration]
- e expression species an activity that will occur several times, with each time
to be executed by a resource constrained by binding of duty, and to access data by
authentication for a specic duration of time.
• BondedSequence.k∃Activity→Resource.[Del]uData.[Authentication]uTime.[Duration]-
A set of activities to be executed for a number of times in sequence are assigned
to resources which can delegate and share execution rights to other resources.
e expressions represented in the above sections do not cover all the constraints but
only illustrate the mechanism to specify and express constraints in a formal less com-
plex manner. Further illustrations are presented in subsequent chapters based on use
case examples. However, while working with temporal constraint combinations it is im-
portant to note the categorisation in Table 5.5. ese categories show the compound
relations between temporal constraints and other constraint paerns and how the com-
binations are achieved. For example, availability and privacy as constraint examples
from data constraints relate with the duration paern implying that access to private
data or availability of data are modelled and veried for a specic duration. e se-
mantics adopted are intended to be as close as possible to natural language to achieve
simplicity for non-expert end users like compliance ocers. e syntax adopts use of
logical quantiers and operators from rst order logic to achieve language expressive-
ness as well as support for reasoning about the model behaviour to achieve consistency
and soundness.
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5.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, the compliance constraint categories were listed with examples and rep-
resented as DL expressions. e chapter further introduced the DL language as a formal
logic for constraint expression yet intuitive enough for easy understanding and appli-
cation by ordinary users to formally gather requirements and constraints from their
sources. is is so because of its closeness to natural language. e next chapter presents
the formalisation and mapping of constraints into LTL.
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Chapter 6
Formal Modelling of Compliance
Constraints
6.1 Introduction
is chapter presents an approach for translation of policy and regulatory requirements
into an interpretive format upon which enhanced reasoning can be applied to support
compliance verication. A mechanism based on description logic and basic temporal
logic syntax is presented using use case examples. e rest of the chapter is structured
as follows. Section 6.2 presents the constraints denition procedure while in section
6.3 constraint specications are expressed as formal logic. In section 6.4, formal deni-
tions are given while in section 6.5 the validity and satisability of process behaviour is
illustrated. Section 6.6 concludes the chapter.
6.2 Constraints Denition Procedure
Rules, policies and regulations are translated from ambiguous natural languages into
formal constraints. ese are then veried against business process models for com-
pliance. Rules and policies specify what should be done in form of required behaviour
or prohibited process behaviours by decribing conditions under which actions are per-
mied or forbidden [65]. ese are interpreted by the process engine to automatically
guide process execution. To achieve automatic interpretation, rules and policies must be
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well-formed and formalised. is way, misinterpretations and misunderstandings are
prevented which would otherwise lead to constraint violations. A procedural approach
is adopted in which control ow constraints are dened before other constraints. e
underlying assumption is that a model must satisfy control ow constraints to before
satisfying resource or data constraints. Activities must occur in the correct prescribed
order to make it possible to check if they occurred at the right time or if they were ex-
ecuted by the assigned actor. Against this background, the subsequent sections present
specications of terms and concepts necessary for formalisation of constraints.
6.3 Representation of Constraints as Formal Logic
Following policy and regulatory specications using description logic in section 5.4.2,
formal denitions and specications are presented in this section based on basic tem-
poral logic constructs. Linear temporal logic (LTL) enables specications of formulae
expressing the future state of the system. In subsection 2.11.1, temporal logic was in-
troduced as a formalism upon which various process verication tools are built. To
formulate our formalisation logic based language to specify constraints, we borrow a set
of operators from the LTL semantics and syntax. Some of the operators representing the
language syntax are as follows [18];
If P and Q are path formulas representing events, then P, P ∨ Q,P ∧ Q,XP, FP,GP,
PUQ, PWQ and PRQ are path formulas of atomic propositions. e formulas are use-
ful for expression of events in a trace upon which reasoning is applied. e combination
of formulas follows the syntax and temporal operators given below and temporal for-
mulas in Table 6.1 are used to express temporal requirements given f and g as temporal
formulas.
σ |=!f⇔ (σ 6|= f)
σ |= fg⇔ (σ |= f) ∧ (σ |= g)
σ |= f|g⇔ (σ |= f) ∨ (σ |= g)
σ |= f→ g⇔ (σ 6|= f) ∨ (σ |= g)
σ |= f Xor g⇔ ((σ |= f) ∧ (σ 6|= g) ∨ (σ 6|= f) ∧ (σ |= g)
σ |= f < − > g⇔ ((σ |= f) ∧ (σ |= g) ∨ (σ 6|= f) ∧ (σ 6|= g)
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Table 6.1: Temporal Operators
Operator Syntax
Next Xf
Eventually Ff
Always G f
Strong Until f U g
Weak Until f W g
Weak Release f R g
Strong Release f M g
6.3.1 Constraint Specications and LTL Denitions
To facilitate reasoning and analysis, the constraints previously specied (section 5.6)
are translated into LTL to benet from enhances reasoning. e translations show both
atomic and composite constraints. Atomic constraints relate to a single constraint or
representation of relation between single constraints category. In the previous chapter
atomic constraints were represented as unary constraints. Table 6.2 presents the exem-
plied LTL constraint expressions based on DL control ow expressions earlier specied.
Composite representations constitute combinations between constraints from dierent
categories e.g. Control ow and resources. To compose the translations, the following
denitions are considered.
Role Actor/ Activity Assignment
e concepts actors and users are used synonymously. Actors belong to roles whereas
the roles are assigned to execute process activities as follows;
Role – Actor Assignment = UXR where R refers to roles with r ∈ R and U refers to
a set of actors with u ∈ U such that (u, r) is a valid assignment of an actor to a role.
Activity - Actor assignment = A XU where A refers to a set of Activities with ac ∈ A
and U refers to actors with u ∈ U such that (u,ac) is a valid assignment of an actor to
an activity. Table 6.3 presents detailed formalised specications of task and resource
assignments exemplied with use case one.
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Activity / Data Assignment
Activity execution requires access to data. For example, to execute the task ‘order deliv-
ery’ in use case 1, customer data in form of customer address should be accessible and
available for this task. Further still, the type of actions that the user can do with the data
must be pre-authorised i.e. action to read, write, modify or a combination of any or all.
erefore task data assignment is composed of a task type, data object (o), value v, and
action (a˚).
Task data assignment TD= task type, data object value and action. e assignment is
achieved by a function
f : ac→ o, v, a˚
which maps data and its aributes to a task to be executed by a subject.
Figure 6.1 illustrates task/ activity assignment and the required aributes for its execu-
tion. e assignment of data required for execution of delivery task is as follows;
Task Data Assignment
Attributes
Data ObjectTask/Activity Actions Data Value
E.g. Customer  
Address
E.g. Deliver  
Order
E.g. BH14AA E.g.  
Read/Write/Modify
Figure 6.1: Task and data assignment aributes
• Task = Deliver order
• Data object = Customer addresses
• Data values = BH14AA
• Action = Read
Using DL, the expression below species task data assignment;
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TD = ac→ (o u v, u˚a)
TD = [DeliverOrder → (Customer − address uBH14AA uRead)]
Using LTL, the expressions above are formalised as;
TD = a→ (o ∧ v ∧ a˚)
TD = [DeliverOrder → (Customer − address ∧BH14AA ∧Read)]
To formalise and enforce activity -data constraint assignments, Table 6.4 presents exem-
plied assignments, whereas Table 6.5 presents exemplied activity- temporal assign-
ments. e two tables are composed of formal expressions for specifying constraints
with examples from use case one.
Table 6.2 presents control ow aributes or elements based on LTL syntax and semantics
listed in Table 6.1 that are useful for enforcing relations between control ow constraints
to enable expressing of ordering relations that meet control ow requirements.
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Table 6.2: Requirements and Constraint Formalisation
Constraint
Requirement Formalised expres-
sion
Description Applicable Example
Existence Activity starts every process in-
stance
ainit ∈ σ Activity a is an initial activity for each
instance
Select order is the starting activ-
ity
Activity (a) exists in every trace G(a) Activity (a) Always occurs Every order must be veried
An activity can be executed
many times
GF (a) Activity occurs many times Verify order is repeated execu-
tion as long as order details are
not yet satised
Activities can be skipped in the
instance
G(¬a) Activity (a) will not occur Contact Customer is skipped.
Until Activity can occur for a specic
number of k times
G((a)F (a′(n=k)) Activity (a) loops until a condition is
fullled
Pick items repeats until all items
are picked Verify order is re-
peated until it passes satisfac-
tion.
Precede Activity occurs before another (a)⇐ (b) Activity (a) must execute for (b) to ex-
ecute
Verify order precedes Hand
over.
Next An activity execution immedi-
ately follows aer another
(a)XF (b) Activity (b) must hold at the next state Pack order follows Verify order.
141
C
H
A
PTER
6.
FO
RM
A
L
M
O
D
ELLIN
G
O
F
C
O
M
PLIA
N
C
E
C
O
N
STRA
IN
TS
Release Activity (a) and (b) exist in the
same instance
(a)R(b) Activity (b) will be true until and in-
cluding the point where (a) becomes
true and remains true
-
Table 6.3: Formalisation of Activity and Resource assignments
Constraint Requirement Description Formalised expression Applicable Example
Assignment Activity (a) is assigned to role
actor r1
G(a, r1) roughout the model Activity r1
executes (a)
G(Pick items,[Pickers])
Exclusion Activity (a) will never be as-
signed to actor r1
G(F (a, [r1])) roughout the model Verify Order
is never assigned to Pickers
G(F¬(Verify Order,[Pickers]))
Binding of
Duty
Activities (a) and (b) are exe-
cuted by same actor r1
G(a ∧ b, [r1]) Select Order and Pick items tasks
are executed by Pickers
G(Select Order ∧ Pick items, [Pick-
ers])
Separation
of Duty
Activities (a) and (a’) are exe-
cuted by dierent actors r1 and
r2
G(F (a, [r1]) ∧
(a′, [r2])
Verify Order is executed by both
Veriers and supervisors
G(F(Verify order, [r1])∧(Verify Or-
der’, [r2]))
Repeated
execution
assignments
Activity (a) occurs several times
each time executed by dierent
actors
F ((a, [r1]) ∧
((an, [rn])
k))
Activity (a) is repeated with dier-
ent actor for each execution
F(verify order,[verier] ∧ ((Verify
order’)n, [V erifier′n])k)
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Table 6.4: Formalisation of Activity - Data Assignments
Constraint Description Requirement Formalised expression Applicable Example
Accessibility
and Availability
Activity (a) has data item
(d) assigned whose value
is (v)
Order item list is accessi-
ble and available for pick
items and verify order ac-
tivities
G(a, r1) → (AA :
(d.[value,Action])
G(pick items ∧ verify order)→ ((or-
der.[order list, Read])
Authentication Activity (a) and its ac-
tor need authentication
to access data item (d)
with value (v)
Access to product order
data requires authentica-
tion
G((a, r1)→ (Authenticate: (d.[value,
Action]= [True/False]))
G((Pick Items, [Picker]) →
(Authenticate:(Order.[item list,
Read]=[True]))
Privacy Activity (a) and its actor
need authorisation to ac-
cess private data item (d)
with value (v)
Access to customer data
needs authorisation
G((a, r1)→ (privacy: (d.[value, Ac-
tion] = [True/False]))
G((delivery, [agent]) →(privacy:
(customer data. [Address, Read] =
[True]))
Table 6.5: Formalisation of Activity - Temporal assignments
Aribute Description Requirement Formal Expression Applicable Example
Within Activity (a) occurs Within
time duration k
Pick items is executed
within one hour
G(a)→ t(≤k) G(Pick items)→ Duration(≤k)
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Between Activity (a) occurs be-
tween k time duration
Verify Order is executed
between 20 and 30 min-
utes
G(a)→ t(k∧k) G(Verify Order)→
Duration(20∧30)mins
Aer Activity (b) will execute
k1 duration aer execu-
tion of (a)
select order executes
atleast 40 minutes aer
order submission.
G(a).t ≥ k → b G(Order Submission).Duration≥ 40
mins→ Select order
Repetition
Intervals
Activity (a) occurs several
times aer k duration be-
tween each occurrence
e duration of Delivery
1 hour but repeated in in-
terval of 2 hours
G((a)→ t(=k) ∧ F (a′n)→ t(=k)) G((Delivery) → Duration(=1hr)
∧ F(Delivery’n→ interval(=2hrs)))
144
CHAPTER 6. FORMAL MODELLING OF COMPLIANCE CONSTRAINTS
6.3.2 Activity /Task and Temporal Assignments
Temporal assignments to tasks are used to schedule time periods when the tasks are to be exe-
cuted or when they are to occur. To achieve the assignment, temporal constraints are mapped
with control ow constraints over activities. e temporal paerns are used to capture temporal
rules and their instances in the business process executions and facilitate tracing for their com-
pliance or identication of violations. Table 6.5 presents examples of control ow and temporal
constraints formalised as LTL.
6.4 Formal Denitions and Expressions
is section presents a set of formal denitions and expressions for the required concepts nec-
essary for later application to reason about constraint compliance and process behaviour.
6.4.1 Preliminary Denitions
Denition 6.4.1. Business Process (BP)
Business processes are made up of activities and relations between them. Where;
BP = ac,R such that;
ac= A non-empty set of activities and R = RXR are activity relations.
Activities are executed as events representing the dierent states of an activity at a given time
e.g. when an activity event is triggered to start, it initiates and transits into execution state.
When the event completes or is cancelled, the state changes to complete or fail respectively. For
instance, select order activity from use case 1 can be represented in terms of event states; start,
execute complete. Figure 6.2 illustrates the states an event can take whereas Table 6.6exemplies
the event states for select order activity.
Start
Execute  
Fail
Cancel
Complete
Figure 6.2: Activity event states
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Table 6.6: Illustration of Event Status for Select Order Activity
Event State Description
Select order.Start Started Select order event started
Select order.Complete Completed Select order completed successfully
Select order.Fail Failed Select order failed
For convenience and simplicity during illustrations, Use case 1 activities are abstracted to short
forms as follows; select order (So), pick item (Pit), verify order (Vo), pack order (Po), handle over
(Ho) and Customer pick up or delivery (Cpd). Table 6.7 presents examples of possible event states
for activities in the use case. e representation of failed event states is a useful pointer to the
likely source of problem in case of a deadlock by looking out for specic events that failed during
execution.
Table 6.7: Illustration of Event Status for Use Case 1
Activities Event states
Start Complete Fail
Select order So.Start So.Complete So.Fail
Pick Items Pit.Start Pit.Complete Pit.Fail
Verify Order Vo.Start Vo.Complete Vo.Fail
Pack Order Po.Start Po.Complete Po.Fail
Hand over Ho.Start Ho.Complete Ho.Fail
Customer Pick up or Delivery Cpd.Start Cpd.Complete Cpd.Fail
Denition 6.4.2. Trace:
A trace, denoted as σ is the sequential occurrence of events. e traces are useful for checking
process behaviour based on executions. In our approach simulation is used to generate sample
traces to be used in constraints compliancy checking and verication. Related to the trace are
the start and end events;
einit ⊆ σ = Subset of events which start a trace. It denotes activity events that must always
start in an execution of a process instance.
eend ⊆ σ = Subset of events which end a trace. It denotes activity events that must always
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end in an execution of a process instance.
n ∈ N= e length of the trace and
|n|= Trace cardinality ranging from 0−nth event. E.g., σ = (e1, e2, . . . . . . , en) is a complete
trace.
{}= Represents an empty trace
ei = i
th Event in a trace
Denition 6.4.3. Process Instance (Pi):
Pi describes a set of events in prescribed order of execution. It may be formed of a combination
of events from dierent traces whose execution shows accomplishment of a case. Events in a
process instance are synonymous to logged behaviour describing occurrence of events during
process execution. Table 6.8 presents examples of events occurring in dierent traces whose
combination is based on some requirements (unspecied for now because they are not relevant).
Each completed case represents a process instance. Examples given are for illustration purposes.
Table 6.8: Exemplied Events, Traces and Process Instances
Traces Events Process In-
stance (Pi)
e1 e2 e3 e4 e5
Trace 1 3 3 3 Pi1
Trace 2 3 3 3 Pi1
Trace 3 3 3 3 Pi2
Trace 1 3 3 3 Pi2
Trace 4 3 3 3 Pi3
Trace 2 3 3 3 3 3 Pi3
e table (6.8) shows dierent events from several traces making up process instances which in
this case represent event occurrences.
Denition 6.4.4. Ordering relations:
Ordering relations describe the associations between process activities. Associations are indica-
tors of the ow of operations and thus facilitate trace generation. An activity can occur before,
during or aer another activity or chain of activities determining its position. Similarly, with
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relation to timing constraints, an activity can be scheduled with a delay or specic period during
which to occur. In all cases, the occurrence and position of an activity is determined relative to
other activities and time. e occurrence and ordering of activities is specied following con-
straints. e ordering relations are further discussed with the control ow paerns in Chapter
4.
Denition 6.4.5. Constraints
Constraints impose restrictions over the behaviour of activities and thus determine how and
when they execute. A constraint is a tuple
C = (ct, δ)
i.e. a set of conditions and rules that form constraints a process complies with. Such that c ∈ C
and |c| = φ. Where:
ct= Constraint type to denote a specic constraint as specied by the rule or policy e.g.
occurrence of activity a.
δ = condition aributes specied by the policy as a requirement to be fullled. E.g. invoice
amount >£ 600.
e constraint type represents constraints as per the categories discussed in Chapter 4 while the
condition aribute species the specic data object and its value which is evaluated for each
specied constraint.
Denition 6.4.6. Constraint Mapping to Activity
e mapping between constraints and activities is the assignment of the constraint to an activity.
A function
f : ac→ C
is an assignment function where a constraint c ∈ C is mapped on to an activity ac. E.g.
ei = (a→ (SoD.Supervisor) u (Customerdata.[Address]) u (Duration.[6units]))
is an assignment of resource, data and temporal constraints to event ei of activity a. e mapping
involves events for activity a assigned to supervisors with separation of duty constraint granted
access to customer addressed and to be executed for duration of 6 time units.
Further illustration; Based on use case 1, before an order is processed it is selected from
pending orders which signals its change of status from pending orders to work in progress. Aer
select order, items are picked. Constraints in this case are as follows;
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c1 = (einit) → Selectorder) - A constraint assigning events for select order task as the
initial event for every order processing instance.
c2 = ((PickItems) → Response(Selectorder)) - A constraint specifying the Response
event Pick items aer execution of select order.
Both constraints c1 and c2 illustrate control ow relations between activities in use case 1.
For convenience, fc(a) is used to refer to constraints that meet mapping requirements for
activity a in order to achieve its compliancy at execution time. In other words, it refers to con-
straints that activity a should conform with. A collection of dierent activities and their con-
straints yields a constrained model.
Denition 6.4.7. Constrained Process Model
A constrained process model Cpm is composed of activities and integrated constraints. Any
activity bound to a constraint is considered as a constrained activity. When a collection of con-
strained activities belong to a single model then such a model is referred to as a constrained
model composed of a set of activities and their relative constraints.
Cpm =
⋃
ac→ C
Cpm is a union of all activitie s and assigned constraints. Constrained process model conse-
quently leads to a compliance-aware process model in which the workow Satisability problem
can be partially solved i.e. where constraints assigned to the workow activities meet the execu-
tion requirements specied in the business process policy and regulations to achieve a compliant
business process.
Denition 6.4.8. Execution Behaviour
Behaviour is described from two fronts; i.e. prescribed behaviour and executed behaviour. Pre-
scribed behaviour refers to behaviour dened at designed time while executed behaviour is one
observed from process logs during or aer runtime. e comparison between the two behaviours
is an indicator of compliance or non-compliance. If both behaviours match on some aspects, then
compliancy is achieved and the reverse is true for unmatched behaviour. Process execution be-
haviour for a constrained process model describes a set of process instances involving events of
constrained activities. A process instance Pi expresses behaviour involving one or more events
involving constraint aributes. A collection of several related process instances yields execution
behaviour of the process for a particular case.
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Let a set of process instances be (Pi1, ...P in) with Pi = ei → ci as an activity event with
assigned constraints. Process execution behaviour therefore involves several process instances
representing various activity events and assigned constraints. us,
PB = e1 → c1 ∪ ... ∪ en → cn
.
Illustration: e expression species process behaviour based on a process instance involving
several events for various activities with constraints for resources, data and time. Some events
are triggered by same users. Table 6.9 presents same information showing events for events for
activities and constraints.
PB = e1 → [((SoD.user1)u(CustomerAddress)u(Duration[6])), e2 → ((BoD.user2)u
(CustomerOrderlist)u(delay[10])), e3 → ((SoD.user1)u(orderList)(Between[10]−[20])), e4 →
((user3)u(ProductList)u(Duration[15])), e5 → ((user4)u(ContactList)u(Duration[20])), e6 →
((SoD.user1) u (CustomerAddress) u (Duration[10]))]
Table 6.9: Exemplied Process Instance Events for a Process Behaviour
Event Activity Constraints
Resource Accessible Data Time (units)
e1 Select order SoD.user1 OrderList Duration [ 6]
e2 Hand over order BoD.user2 Customer orderlist Delay [10]
e3 Select order SoD.user1 Orderlist Between [10]
e4 Pick items User3 ProductList Duration [15]
e5 Deliver order User4 Contactlist Duration [20]
e6 Select order SoD.user1 Customer address Duration [10]
Denition 6.4.9. Valid Process Behaviour
A process behaviour is valid if the execution process behaviour matches its prescribed process
behaviour. In other words, the execution behaviour of the process complies with the specied
policy and regulatory constraints. i.e. for every process instance, there exists a set of traces that
exhibit the behaviour specied by the constraints.
VPB = ∀Pi ∈ PB∃σ|ei≤1≤j |= fc(a) ∈ Cpm
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A process behaviour is valid if for every process instance, there exists a trace in which events or
set of events meet the constraint requirements specied in the constrained model. We denote a
set of all valid process behaviour as Ω.
Denition 6.4.10. Satisable Execution
Satisable process behaviour is the situation where for every process instance, all events or set
of events in the traces meet the constraint requirements specied in the constrained model.
VSat = ∀Pi ∈ PB∀ei≤1≤j ∈ σ |= fc(a) ∈ Cpm
A process behaviour is satisable if all events in the process instance match all events or set
of events of the constraint requirements specied in the constrained model.
6.5 Application of Validity and Satisability of Pro-
cess Behaviour
Process behaviour validity and satisability is an important for identifying potential process
behaviour violations. It benets end users to identify bolenecks and violations involving ac-
tivities, constraints and their executions early enough in the design as well as identication of
design aws to inform process design before actual process execution. For example; they facili-
tate identication of;
1. Necessary and potential constraints to be satised for a given execution behaviour, i.e.
what are the key constraints required to full a compliant execution behaviour given a set
of activities?
2. Potential constraints that must be considered for execution to achieve compliant behaviour.
Identication of such constraints helps to avoid violations during execution.
3. Potential activity events required for constraints satisfaction for compliant behaviour to
be achieved, i.e. what activities must be executed to comply with requirements of specic
constraints?
4. Potential constrained model activities necessary to achieve compliant behaviour satisfying
key constraints
5. Critical constraints for a constrained model
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e above indicators are useful for process designers as indicators for potential sources of vi-
olations or requirements to achieve compliancy by design. e section that follows presents
expressions to achieve valid and satisable compliance indicators.
6.5.1 Expressions for Compliance Indicators
a. Indicator: Potential constraints for key activities e.g. potential constraints for activ-
ity
Purpose: to support identication of potential constraints required for an activity’s execution to
achieve compliant behaviour. Such constraints form necessary and sucient conditions for the
compliant process execution. e operation considers activity events as input and returns the
required constraints that must be fullled by the execution of the activity.
P(a→c) = (c(VPB) |= fc(a)
e potential constraints for key activities are derived from a set of constraints required for valid
process executions such that those constraints identied full the execution requirements for
activity a to be compliant.
b. Potential constraints fullling the conditions for execution of a compliant pro-
cess behaviour
Purpose: to analyse, identify and return a set of potential constraints required for valid execution
of a set of activity events in a constrained model.
P
PB→c=(
∑ ∀c∈C|=(PBsat))
e potential constraints to execute a compliant process behaviour are derived from a summa-
tion of all relevant constraints applicable for valid process behaviour such that the identied
constraints are necessary to achieve a compliant process model.
c. Potential activity instances for execution to satisfy constraints
Purpose: To describe activities or their instances that must be part of every execution in order to
achieve compliant process behaviour satisfying the constraint requirements. e operation takes
in constraints and returns a set of activities necessary for execution to achieve conformance to
specic constraints. is operation is useful is to provide a priori knowledge to the end users to
ease identication of important constraints that must be complied with by the business process.
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For example, every order processing instance must include events for verify order activity before
the order is handed.
CA = (fc(a) ∈ σ(Pi)→ PBsat)
e expression species activity a as a critical that must be part of instance execution to achieve
compliant process behaviour. e operation identies all constraints and relevant activities in
process instances relevant for valid execution and satisfaction of constraints.
d. Critical activity instances for a constrainedmodel Purpose: To identify those activity
instances that must be executed or be part of a process execution if such execution is to be
compliant with the requirements of the constrained execution model.
e critical activities are identied from the events in the process instances which are elements
in the constrained process model not including non-critical events marked as primed events from
primed process instances.
e. Critical constraints for a constrained model
Purpose: To identify a set of all critical constraints necessary for satisfaction by all process in-
stance executions in order to achieve process compliancy. e operation considers a process
model and all possible constraint assignments and returns the most critical constraints to be
complied with.
c = (∀c ∈ C → PB|fc(a) ∈ (Cpm))
e expression species all critical constraints necessary to achieve compliant process be-
haviour for a constrained business process model.
6.6 Chapter Summary
e chapter introduced constraints expression and specications and their translation into a
formal language. e outcome are formal constraints upon which reasoning can be applied to
facilitate compliance verication.
Moreover, various denitions for concepts are provided which are necessary inputs for the
next chapter (7). Lastly, the chapter introduced specications for constraint validity and satisa-
bility for process behaviour and their application in identifying critical constraints that must be
complied with by the process behaviour as well as critical activities that must be part of every
execution instance to achieve constraints compliance.
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Compliance Verication Approach
7.1 Introduction
is chapter presents the overall compliance verication approach. As an integrated approach,
the chapter presents the remainder of the components of the approach besides those discussed
in the previous chapters. For example, compliance requirements elicitation and simulation based
analysis were discussed and presented in chapter 4 while chapter 5 presented the logical expres-
sions and formalisation of the compliance requirements. In chapter 6, the formal modelling of
constraints is presented. Chapter 7 therefore concentrates on verication algorithms and how
verication of collaborative business process models is achieved. e rest of the chapter is pre-
sented as follows; Section 7.2 introduces the overall compliance verication approach, In section
7.3, we show how to support verication of control ow constraints, resource constraints veri-
cation in section 7.4 and data constraints verication in section 7.5. In each section, the relevant
compliance verication algorithms are presented. Section 7.6 presents the overall compliance
verication algorithm while section 7.7 presents the process driven authorisation as an access
control mechanism. Section 7.8 summarises the chapter with discussions.
7.2 Overall Compliance Verication Approach
Figure 7.1 presents an overall compliance verication approach showing three main steps. e
rst step is compliance constraints specication, the related formalisation techniques are ex-
plained in Chapter 4. e second step is compliance verication, the related algorithms are in-
troduced in this Chapter. e third step is the feedback on the verication results. Section 7.2.1
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further describes the steps.
7.2.1 Verication Steps
The rst step: In this step the relevant rules and policies are extracted from source documents
and compiled into a set of compliance requirements, dened to guide process behaviour . e
set includes all requirements relevant for an organisation’s business processes to comply with as
sourced from all policies, contractual obligations and external regulations.
To support reasoning, model logic is used to translate the requirements into formal com-
pliance constraints. In this case both Description logic and linear temporal logic are used. In
section 6.3 of chapter 6, a mechanism for translating and formalising constraints is presented
and illustrated in section 6.5.
The Second step: e business process model is veried for its compliance with formalised
constraints. e goal is to check and ensure that the business process conforms with the required
policies and regulations. Relatedly, in this step simulation analysis is used to illustrate the impact
of change and variation in policy and regulations over the business process.
The Third step: e outcome of the verication forms the feedback reports displayed for
users about compliancy or violation of the constraints. Outcome from simulation analysis shows
the scenario reports and key performance indicators.
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e related work in chapter 2 shows the state of enormous academic and industrial work
towards business process compliance verication in form of techniques, methods and tools.
Notwithstanding, this thesis aimed at an abstract yet hybrid compliance approach to guide non-
expert end users to verify collaborative business processes for compliance with policies and reg-
ulations through identication and detection of compliance violations. Achieving this goal re-
quired a set of artifacts iterative in nature, these are put forward in form of constraint specic,
less complex and reusable compliance verication algorithms. Constraint specic in such a way
that any given constraint can be checked by using a specic algorithm, and iterative in such a
way that they can be applied at any stage in the business process life cycle. e next section
describes how verication is supported.
7.2.2 Categories of Constraint Verication
e verication component of the compliance approach is formed of 2 types of checking i.e.
1. e Simulation component: Simulation is undertaken to generate traces to facilitate analy-
sis and verication. the analysis involves predictive performance assessment of the busi-
ness process based on variations in policy and regulations. Diering scenarios are gen-
erated and outcomes are analysed to support informed decision making. e details are
discussed and presented in section 4.6 of Chapter 4.
2. e Verication algorithm component: is component is formed of algorithms that iden-
tify and detect compliance constraints violations. Various algorithms are composed for
categorical constraint verication applicable in dierent ways, e.g. if a policy changes,
users may want to check for compliance of existing processes with the changed policy.
is way, only the relevant algorithm applies. An alternative is using the overall veri-
cation algorithm that combines all categories. Procedurally a business process is checked
for compliance with all relevant constraints. is applies to new business process or those
that have been modied signicantly. In either case, the checking procedure in Figure 7.2
is followed. A business process is checked by detecting compliancy or violations to re-
quired behaviour expressed as constraints. Further, details of the checking are described
in the algorithms presented in subsequent sections.
Figure 7.2 illustrates the compliancy verication procedure. e existing or new business pro-
cesses are checked for conformance with dened constraints. If the process model is compliant,
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Deﬁne Constraints Business Process
Verify for Compliance
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Detect Violations
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Constraint 
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Control ﬂow
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Figure 7.2: Compliance verication procedure
feedback is given, otherwise detection of non-compliant behaviour proceeds. Where the algo-
rithms detect non-compliant behaviour, specic or general feedback is given about the violations
according to the categories dened in chapter 2. To enable independent constraint checking,
algorithms are composed according to same categories to permit constraint specic checking
without need to follow a step wise procedure every time. e following section presents the
algorithms according to their categories.
7.3 Control Flow Verication
e compliance verication algorithms that will be introduced later facilitate business process
designers to check for the well-connectedness of the models to ensure that there are no errors
like; 1) deadlocks, 2) improper termination, and 3) live locks. A well connected model facilitates
checking for other system model properties like safety and liveness. Safety is a notion that noth-
ing will go wrong in the model while liveness principle states that something good will happen.
is section presents the denitions and specications for the functions that are used by the
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verication algorithms. e denitions follow the constraint categories.
7.3.1 Control ow Verication Requirements
Connectedness of the process model: Verication of how a process model is well connected
is based on the modelling constructs like Sequence, AND, XOR and OR. It is important for the
model to be well- formed from the design point of view even before other properties can be
checked. is way, if a model’s structural requirements are satised, then its soundness is con-
sequently achieved [1, 161, 164]. At this level, verication targets to check how structurally well
formed a model is in terms of sequence, parallelism, exclusive and inclusive choice constructs.
In this section the structural requirements are dened and later we show how to verify for their
conformance.
(a) Sequence: checking sequential connection between model objects. Based on de-
nition 6.4.1 (business process) and denition 6.4.8 (Behaviour), a valid sequence is
given by;
Sequence= σi(a1 + ...+ an) ∈ Pi
A sequence is a trace of activities from the initial to the nth activity in a process
instance satisfying a predened order.
(b) Parallelism: checking connection between objects representing two or more tasks
executed simultaneously and the possibility to converge at another object.
AND = σi((a1 − a2) ∧ (a1 − a3)) ∈ Pi
For a given trace in a process instance, any two interleaving tasks with no partial
order relation conform to execution constraints if both tasks execute as per the con-
straint requirement.
(c) Exclusive choice: checking connection between objects representing disjoint tasks
where one of them should execute.
XOR = σi((a1 − a2) ∨ (a1 − a3)) ∈ Pi
For a given trace in process instance, any two disjoint tasks with no partial order
relation conform to execution constraints if either of the tasks executes as per the
constraint requirements.
(d) Inclusive choice: checking for connection between objects representing tasks where
one or more alternative tasks can execute from a set of alternative paths.
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OR = σi((a1 − a2) ∧ (a1 − a3)) ∧ (a′1 − a′3)) ∈ Pi
For a given trace in process instance, any two joint tasks with no partial order re-
lation conform to execution constraints if one or of the tasks executes as per the
constraint requirements.
Checking semantic consistency: Annotations are additional labels aached to model ob-
jects to represent constraints, data and additional artifacts as a way to provide more understand-
ability of the model. Changes in policies aect model semantics. is may result semantic incon-
sistencies over similar models or model variants especially where there is lack of uniform appli-
cable semantics [137] . Based on a collection model annotations over time, the goal of checking
semantic consistency is to verify and improve model soundness, correctness and understandabil-
ity to avoid model ambiguity, conicts and inconsistencies. Figure 7.3 is an example of a BPMN
process model annotated with data and conditional requirements.
Receive
Order
Sort
Orders
Amount
<£500
Amount
>£500
give
discount
pack order
sales
order 
order
list 
sales
order 
2% 
Sales
Invoice 
Figure 7.3: Annotated BPMN Model
Illustration:
Given 2 sets of semantics representing states S1 and S2 in a trace with literal sets such that S1 =
φ,$, δ, α and S2 = ϕ,¬$,∞, ϑ,$ respectively. A consistent set should not include a member
and its negation within the same set. Consider set S2 with $ and its negation ¬$. is yields
a conict which should not exist. erefore, a set where members conict results into an empty
set. i.e. $
⋃¬$ = Φ To update or create new states from existing ones e.g. change to state
3 s3, a set of operations are involved. e subset involving a likely negation from each set is
validated to a null and updated with a non-complementary subset to form a new state without
conicts. e scenario involving S1 and S2 to form S3 would yield S3 = (φ, ϕ,$,∞, ϑ,$, δ, α).
Suppose the set is formed of events, it is alright for them to repeat if they are non-conicting, e.g.
. To achieve the combination would use a formula involving a concatenation. S1 + S2 −→ S3
S3 = S2(⊆ ($) −→ Φ) + S1 erefore: S3 = (φ, ϕ,$,∞, ϑ,$, δ, α)
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e conicting members set in S2 are isolated into an empty subset while the non-empty set is
concatenated with S1 to achieve a consistent set S3 i.e. without negating members. Checking
for conicts enables isolation and prevention of states that permit and at the same time prohibit
event occurrence. is prevents deadlock and a live locks.
7.3.2 Specication of Control Flow Constraints
Control ow constraints include among others, existence and bounded existence, dependency,
bounded sequence and precedence. Compliance to these constraints is veried in relation to
temporal constraints to ensure that task ordering and occurrence follow time requirements. To
facilitate the checking, we make the following denitions;
Specication for Existence (and Bounded Existence)
Existence constraint restricts an activity to occur in a specic order or time within a trace of
a process instance. It also species ordering relations where specic activity events must start
(einit) or end (eend) an instance. is way, the validity of an instance can be checked. To this
eect denition 7.3.1 refers.
Denition 7.3.1. Existence (and Bounded Existence)
1. Existence for process instance validity.
Check.Exist : (e.ac = init) u (e.ac = end) ∈ σ Where: e.ac= event of an activity. e
expression species a function to check initial and end activity events in a trace.
2. Existence of an activity within a process instance checked in reference to the control struc-
tures
(a) If (e.ac = AND) Return
⊎
((a1, a2) u (a1, a3))
(b) If (e.ac = XOR) Return unionmulti(a1, a2) unionsq (a1, a3)
(c) If (e.ac = OR) Return unionmulti(a1, a2) u (a1, a3) u (a1, a4)
Application of the function
To illustrate the application of the function above, data in Table 7.1 is used to check the constraint
requirements.
for each σ ∈ Pi do
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Check.Exist : (e.ac = init) u (e.ac = end)
end for
Return
e.ac = init 6∈ seen /*Initial event is not in ’seen’ events of the instance */
e.ac = end ∈ seen /* End event is in ’seen’ events of the process instance. */
Using data populated in Table 7.1 with events, activities and process instances, we show the
application of existence constraint specication and checking for its compliance or violation.
Figure 7.4 shows resultant state graphs generated from the constraint checking of existence and
bounded existence for all structural constructs (sequence, AND, exclusive and inclusive choices).
e following verication requirements are addressed:
Requirement 1: All process instances start and end with activities a and z respectively.
Requirement 2: Between activities a and z, a set of other activities execute as part of the process
instance.
Table 7.1: Sample events, activities and process instances
(a) Process Instances P1 − P3
Instances Pi1 Pi2 Pi3
Events e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 e8 e9 e10 e11 e12 e13 e14
Activities a b e z a e c z a b f g h z
Time 2 4 3 5 2 3 6 5 2 4 6 4 8 4
(b) Process Instances P4 − P5
Instances Pi4 Pi5
Events e15 e16 e17 e18 e19 e20 e21
Activities a i m z a z m
Time 3 4 3 5 3 3 3
Requirements 1 and 2 in above section can be checked in the following way using the specied
expressions.
for σ ∈ Pi do Check.Exist : (e.ac = init) u (e.ac = end)
Return
init = a∀Pi /*Returns activity a as initial activity for all process instances*/
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end = z∀Pi /*Returns activity z as end activity for all instances*/
end for
Based on the expressions, it follows that activity a is the initial activity for each process
instance, so is activity z for end activity in each process instance. In terms of soundness, it
shows compliance to termination is achieved by the possibility that each instance can start at a
and end with z. However, the checking is not complete until we check for any possible violations
of the behaviour.
a b e z
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a b
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z
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Exclusive Choice
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e2 e3 e4
Pi1
Pi2
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e10
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e14e12
e13
a
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zParallelism
e15
e16
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Figure 7.4: Resultant State graphs
Constraint Satisfaction Checking
we adopt to predicate functions for representing constraint satisfaction or violation.
• seen - Represents running activity events. If it is True that an activity event or set of
activity events is in seen (e.ac ∈ seen), then the constraint is satised (True |= C).
Otherwise it is violated (True 6|= C).
• nished - Represents executed activity. If it is True that an activity event or set of activity
events is in nished (e.ac ∈ finished), then the constraint is satised (True |= C).
Otherwise it is violated (True 6|= C) events.
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Detecting violation to existence constraint
Violations to existence constraint are detected by checking for instances in which activities a
and z are not initial and end activities respectively, and where the initial time assignments are
not observed for all events. Circumstances leading to violation are checked from:
(a) Process instances where activity a is not the initial activity in a set of process exe-
cutions, i.e. a 6∈ seen
From Table 7.1, it shows that events (e15, 3, P i4) partially satisfy the constraint
since a is the initial activity for all instances. However, in terms of the temporal
requirement the activity executes for longer time than scheduled, i.e. 3 units of time
instead of 2 units.
(b) Process instances where activity z is not the end activity in all process executions,
i.e. z 6∈ finished
From Table 7.1, it shows that trace (e20, 5, P i5) involves constraint violating event.
Activity z is not the end activity for the constraint. ere is a variance in execu-
tion duration where less than time is used 3 units are used compared to what was
scheduled 5 units). is saves time as opposed to being a violation.
Specications for Precedence and Dependence Constraints Verication
Precedence and dependence constraints are veried for activities whose existence has been con-
rmed. To verify that activity b is preceded by a and that the occurrence of b determines oc-
currence or non-occurrence of another activity c, we check for occurrence of b and return its
preceding activity as well as the activity that occurs aer its execution as its dependent activity,
in other words activity c occurrence depends on activity b. e constraint is specied as the
expression below;
Denition 7.3.2. Precedence and Dependence
Check.Precede =(a← b) /*checks for precedence of a over b */
Check.Depend =(c 7→ b) /*checks for dependence c on b*/
e expressions dene activity a as a preceding activity to b, while occurrence of activity c is
dependent on b such that c occurs if and only if b has occurred [167, 165]. e denition is used to
specify constraint checking expression for the dierent control structures which are aerwards
used in the algorithms. e checking involves;
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(a) Checking if an activity has occurred in the trace e.ac ∈ σ.
Return error if e.ac 6∈ σ. Stop checking.
(b) Check for precedence and dependence constraints and returns outcome based on
the routing constructs;
While e.ac ∈ σ do
((e.ac = a) → Precedes(e.ac = b)) ∧ ((e.ac = c) → Depends(e.ac = b)) :
(∃c)↔ (∃b)
Return (e(i<=j)) ∈ Pi /* Returns events satisfying or violating the constraints
e.g. c occurs if and only if b occurs. Otherwise it is a violation*/
i. If AND /*output based on AND construct */
 ∩ei<=je.ac(aPrecedesb) ∈ seen = True |= C∩ei<=je.ac(aPrecedesb) 6∈ seen = False 6|= C

While verifying precedence constraint for activities based on AND construct,
the checking returns a false if there are no seen events where activity a precedes
activity b.  ∩ei<=je.ac(cdependsb) ∈ seen = True |= C∩ei<=je.ac(cdependsb) 6∈ seen = False 6|= C

While verifying dependence constraint for activities based on AND construct,
the checking returns a false if there are no seen events in which activity c de-
pends on b
ii. If XOR construct */output based on XOR construct
 ∪ei<=je.ac(aprecedesb) ∨ (aprecedesb′) ∈ seen = True |= C∪ei<=je.ac(aprecedesb) ∨ (aprecedesb′) 6∈ seen = False 6|= C

*/Outcome for events satisfying or violating the precedence constraint on dis-
joint activities b and b’ over activity a. A violation occurs when activity a is
not seen among activities preceding activity b for all instances. ∪ei<=je.ac(cdependsb) ∨ (c′dependsb) ∈ seen = True |= C∪ei<=je.ac(cdependsb) ∨ (c′dependsb) 6∈ seen = False 6|= C

Set of events satisfying or violating the dependence constraint for disjoint ac-
tivities c and c’ over activity b. A violation occurs when activity b is not in seen
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activities where activities c and c’ are seen among activities for the process
instances.
iii. If OR /*Outcome based on OR construct*/ ∪ee+1e.ac(aprecedesb) ∧ (aprecedesb′n) ∈ seen = True |= C∪ee+1e.ac(aprecedesb) ∧ (aprecedesb′n) 6∈ seen = False 6|= C

e occurrence of activity b is preceded by activity a where more than one
alternative paths are permissible. If events of activity a are in seen and nished,
then the precedence constraint is satised. Otherwise it is violated. ∪ee+1e.ac(adependsb′n) ∧ (adependsb′n) ∈ seen = True |= C∪ee+1e.ac(cdependsb) ∧ (c′ndependsb) 6∈ seen = False 6|= C

e occurrence of activity b is preceded by activity a. If events of activity a are
in seen and nished occurring before activity a, then the dependence constraint
between a and b for all alternative paths is satised. Otherwise it is violated.
iv. If Sequence: constraint checking based on sequence construct is checked in the
same way as specied expressions illustrated above.
Denition 7.3.3. Other control ow constraints
e illustration involved the denition and specication of existence, bounded existence, prece-
dence and dependence constraints. However, Other control ow constraints like Response, bounded
response inter alia can be extended into denitions and specications in the same way as illus-
trated in sections above. For time and space limitations not all control ow constraints are spec-
ied. Aer the denitions and specication of constraints and checking functions, control ow
compliance checking algorithms are composed.
7.3.3 Control Flow Verication Algorithms
Based on the above discussions, specications and function denitions, a set of control ow
based algorithms are composed to check compliance of the business process with control ow
constraints. To make the algorithms self-contained and independent the denitions below are
used for all algorithms. e general assumption is that events are ordered in a total order over
time.
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Predicate Functions
• Business process: =BP
• Process Instances: Pi = {σi, ..., σn}
• Trace( σ): Logical activity events.
• Events in a trace = started, seen, nished where;
– started = {} − Set of started activity events.
– seen = {} − Set of seen or running activity events.
– nished = {} − Set of nished activity events.
• e.ac: Activity Events
Verifying for Basic Process Instance Validity
Sub-algorithm 1 checks for the basic validity of the model based on activity events that start and
end a process instance. e algorithm checks for activity events designated to start or end a
process instance. If start events are not in a set of ‘started ’ events (e.ac 6∈ started), it implies
the activity has not started. If it is not in ’seen’ activities (e.ac 6∈ seen), or ’nished’ (e.ac 6∈
finished), it implies that the activity is not in execution or not completed. e same principle
applies for the end activity events. In this case a violation is reported for activities not started,
not in seen and not in nished.
Verifying for Compliance with Existence constraint
e existence constraint refers to constraints that restrict the occurrence behaviour of an activity.
e algorithm veries for occurrence of activity events in a process instance as per required
behaviour specied by the policies governing operations. e events are fully ordered by time.
It is intended to address the following verication requirements;
Requirement 2.1: Check for activities scheduled to occur but never start.
Requirement 2.2: Detect deadlocks by checking activities that start but never complete exe-
cution.
Based on algorithm 2, violation of the existence constraint is detected if any of the event activity
states is not among the events that are started, executing or completed within the seen and
nished event sets.
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Algorithm 1 Basic Process Instance validity
1: Input:
a. All Pi
b. Constraints
2: for each Pi ∈ BP do
3: e.ac = e.init, e.end
4: if e.ac = e.init 6∈ started, seen, finished then
5: ”Violation of validity for initial activity event”
6: end if
7: if e.ac = e.end 6∈ started, seen, finished then
8: ”Violation of validity for initial activity event”
9: end if
10: end for
11: No violation of basic process instance for the given business process
Verifying for Compliance with Precedence constraint
Precedence constraints restrict the ordering relations between activities based on occurrence of
a previous activity. In collaborative business processes characterised by multi-party executions,
checking the precedence of activities benets transparency in partner responsibility by knowing
which activities must occur before others and who should execute them. In case of deadlocks, it is
possible to point to the source of the problem. To facilitate verication of compliance with prece-
dence constraints for activities, algorithm 3 is composed and presented addressing the following
requirements;
Requirement 3.1: Detect activities that are potential sources of precedence violation.
Requirement 3.2: Use compliant behaviour to determine any likely violations based on the
routing constructs
e algorithm checks precedence condition activity event over an action event. Violation
occurs where the condition does not lead to the action or where the action occurs without the
condition activity. For example activity a1 is the precedence condition for occurrence of activ-
ity a2. e occurrence of a2 before occurrence of a1 is a precedence constraint violation that
algorithm 3 identies.
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Algorithm 2 Existence Constraint Checking
1: Input :
a. All Pi
b. Constraints
2: for each Pi ∈ BP do
3: e.ac.State ∈ Started, Executed, Completed
4: if e.ac.State 6∈ Started, Executed, Completed then
5: ”Violation: Existence constraint violated. Activity never occured”
6: end if
7: end for
8: No violation of existence constraint for the given business process
Verifying for Compliance with Response constraint
Response constraint restricts execution of activities based on evaluation of a condition on the
current activity. e activity will then execute in response to the outcome of that condition e.g.
If a cheque is approved, then it can be issued. Issue cheque is a response activity from approve
cheque. Execution issues arise if the condition is not evaluated or evaluates falsely leading to
deadlocks or live locks. Algorithm 4 in this section checks for compliancy with response con-
straint over a set of activities. e following verication requirements are addressed:
Requirement 3.1: Detect activities likely to lead to response-based violations. Requirement
3.2: Detect deadlocks resulting from non-responsive activities.
Algorithm 4 checks for Response constraint between activity events where an activity con-
dition (e.ac.Condition) responds to an action activity event (e.ac.Action) where, occurrence of
the action activity in the seen and nished events not as a response from the conditional activity
event violates the response constraint.
7.4 Resource Compliance Verication
Verication for compliance with resource constraints aims at checking for the fullment of the
resource requirements by the business process such that no violations exist in its behaviour.
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Algorithm 3 Precedence Constraint Checking
1: Input :
a. All Pi
b. Constraints (Precedence)
2: for Pi ∈ BP with Precedence constraints C do
3: Prec = e.ac.Condition⇒ e.ac.Action
4: if (Prec 6∈ seen, finished) then
5: Violation (“Precedence constraint violated”)
6: end if
7: end for
8: No violation of Precedence event in the business process
7.4.1 Specication of Resource Constraints
is section species the resource constraints as formal expressions and functions applicable in
the resource verication algorithms to detect violations. e constraints are separation of duty,
binding of duty and delegation.
• Separation of duty: Requires two disjoint activities (a1, a2) to be executed by dierent
resource actors (r1, r2). Such assignment is based on preliminary specication for actor
(user) and task assignment as dened in section 6.3.1; In light of the above, SoD specica-
tion for r1, r2 over (a1, a2)) is dened as;
Denition 7.4.1. SoD
6 ∃r1 ∈ U : ((a1, a2), (r1)) ∈ RP
e assignment of SoD constraint serves as a guard preventing a single actor in a role
from executing two disjoint activities. It follows therefore that there should not exist any
assignment of an actor r1 to execute both activities (a1) and (a2) in a user task assignment.
e contrary is a constraint violation.
• Binding of duty: BoD requires two tasks (a1, a2) to be executed by the same resource
actor (r1). BoD verication checks to ensure compliance to this requirement the contrary
of which is a violation. Following preliminary denitions above, specication for activities
(a1) and (a2) as BoD i.e. BoD(a1, a2) is given by the denition;
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Algorithm 4 Response Constraint Checking
1: Input :
a. All Pi
b. Constraints
2: for all Pi ∈ BP with Response constraints C do
3: Response = e.ac.Action⇒ e.ac.Condition
4: if (Response 6∈ seen, finished) then
5: Violation: ”Response constraint violated”
6: else if e.ac.Action⇒ e.ac.Condition 6= Response ∈ seen, finished then
7: ”Violation, condition activity occurred without induced action activity”.
8: end if
9: end for
10: No Violation of response constraint on the provided business process instances.
Denition 7.4.2. BoD
r1 ∈ RP : ∀((a1, a2), r1) ∈ RP
For each actor assignment involving activities (a1) and (a2), one actor should be assigned
for their execution. Contrary to the assignment is a constraint violation.
• Delegation: For tasks designated to specic resource actors, delegation enables sharing of
execution rights with other actors. Two scenarios result where; the delegator shares and
retains execution rights to the object or completely delegates and retains no execution
rights to the delegate. Delegation is a practice in business operations to ensure business
continuity. It also guards against activity dead locks that result from over constrained
resources that create time lags and delays, or improper implementation of constraints like
the four-eye principle.
Specication of the delegation constraint requires information about subjects (users who
delegate and those delegated to), and objects. erefore, given two (2) users r1 and r2
where r1 delegates activity a to r2, the expression below species the delegation con-
straint;
Denition 7.4.3. Delegation
(a, r1) ∈ UT |r1 → Delegate(a, r2) : (a, r1 ∧ r2)
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User (r1) with rights to activity a delegates rights to user r2 but retains execution rights
such that both users are now assigned to activity a. (a, r1) ∈ UT |r1 → Delegate(a, r2)
Similarly, the above specication indicates that User (r1) with rights to activity a delegates
to (r2) by passing on all the execution rights such that the delegator can no longer execute
the activity.
7.4.2 Denitions for Resource Constraints
To facilitate the checking of compliancy to resource constraints the following denitions are rel-
evant. Given a trace σ ∈ (a1, a2, a3) and a set of two users r1 and r2 of instance Pi1, the follow-
ing functional denitions are employed by the algorithm during resource constraints compliance
verication.
While σ ∈(a1, a2, a3), (r1, r2) =Pi1 do
Check.SoD =((a1, r1) ∧ (a2, r2)) /*checks compliance to user assignment over activities
a1 and a2 based on SoD constraint*/
Check.BoD =((a1, a2), r1) /*checks compliance to actor assignment over activities a1 and
a2 based on SoD constraint */
Check.Delegate =(a, r1 ∧ r2)/* checks compliance to delegation constraint for activity a be-
tween actors r1 and r2 */
Return is used to generate the outcome from compliance checking showing whether com-
pliance or violation is achieved based on the dierent structural controls i.e. AND, Parallelism,
OR and XOR.
7.4.3 Resource Compliance Verication Algorithms
e resource verication algorithms apply the specications and denitions in previous section
to check process behaviour. e previous denitions are applicable for algorithm 5;
Algorithm for SoD Constraint Verication
Verifying for this constraint involves checking traces of the process instances to ensure compli-
ancy to its requirement. e SoD algorithm is composed for this purpose. Where non-compliant
behaviour is detected the algorithm returns a violation. e following verication requirements
are addressed;
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Requirement 4.1: Identify and detect resource assignment violations that lead to role conicts
based on SoD.
Requirement 4.2: Identify and detect roles and tasks upon which SoD violations are likely to
occur.
Algorithm 5 SoD Constraint Verication
1: Input:
a. All All Pi
b. Constraints (SoD)
2: for all actors (r) where C= SoD do
3: (r1, r2).SoD→ (a1) = (a1, r1), (a′1, r2) ∈ e.ac
4: if (e.ac) ∈ seen, finished 6= ((r1, r2).SoD) then
5: Violation: SoD constraint violated for r1 and r2 over (e.ac)
6: end if
7: end for
8: Return No violation of SoD constraint for the provided processes.
while running, algorithm 5 checks for all users constrained by the SoD constraint SoD(user) and
are assigned to a set of activities. e execution of activities (e.ac) by the constrained resource
actors must observe the SoD constraint requirements. e activity events of (c.ac) should exhibit
the behaviour to satisfy the constraint. On contrary, if the activity events in the process instances
are not the same as the activities described in the behaviour, then the SoD constraint is violated.
e behaviour is not seen (SoD user is missing). Otherwise no violation if the same user executed
activity event e.ac.
Algorithm for BoD Constraint Verication
Verifying for BoD constraint involves checking the traces in the process instances to ensure com-
pliance with its requirements by the business process. A BoD checking algorithm is composed to
detect non- compliant behaviour. e following verication requirements are addressed by the
algorithm;
Requirement 5.1: Identify and detect resource assignment violations that may lead to role conicts
based on BoD.
Requirement 5.2: Identify and detect roles and tasks upon which BoD violations are likely to occur
173
CHAPTER 7. COMPLIANCE VERIFICATION APPROACH
to prevent deadlocks.
Algorithm 6 BoD Compliance Verication
1: Input:
a. All Pi
b. Constraints (BoD)
2: for all actors (r) with C= BoD do
3: (r1).BoD→ (a1, a2) = (a1, r1), (a2, r1) ∈ Pi
4: if (e.ac) ∈ seen, finished 6= (r1).BoD then
5: Violation: ”BoD constraint violated for r1 over (e.ac)”
6: end if
7: end for
8: Return No violation of BoD constraint for the provided processes.
Similar to SoD, if the constraint assigned as part of the activity, the events of that activity should
exhibit the behaviour to satisfy the constraint. If the behaviour is not seen (constrained user is
missing) then the constraint is violated. Otherwise no violation if the same user executes the
assigned activities.
Algorithm for Delegation Constraint Verication
For a role to delegate to another it must have exclusive rights to the activity. Verifying for delega-
tion constraint involves checking the traces in the process instances to ensure that all delegated
actors have assumed their responsibilities to prevent task and resource redundancy where re-
sources or tasks become idle, or deadlocks resulting from no resources assigned to execute tasks.
A delegation checking algorithm is composed to check non-compliant behaviour. e following
verication requirements are addressed by the algorithm;
Requirement 6.1: Verifying that all delegated roles assume their execution responsibilities.
Requirement 6.2: checking for violations likely to lead to role conicts or idle roles as well as
permission leakages.
Delegated users become valid users to execute activities not initially assigned. If a delegated
user is not part of the valid user set, or if such users are not the ones that executed the running
activities or nished activity set, then the delegation constraint is violated.
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Algorithm 7 Delegate Compliance Verication
1: Input:
a. All Pi
b. Constraints (Delegate)
2: for all actors (r) where C = Delegate do
3: (a1, r1).Delegate (r2) = (a1, r1 ∧ r2) ∈ e.ac→ r2 ∈ Valid Users
4: if (e.ac) ∈ seen, finished 6= ((r1, r2).Delegate) then
5: Violation: Delegate constraint violated for r1 and r2 over (a)
6: else if r2 6∈ Valid Users then
7: Violation: ”Delegated role not existing”
8: end if
9: end for
10: Return No violation of Delegate constraint for the provided Business processes
7.5 Data Compliance Verication
Verication of compliance with data constraints checks for how a model conforms with data
requirements. Such requirements include; data availability and accessibility, Authentication and
Privacy. Other requirements forming data constraints include; visibility, interaction and validity
security requirements [127, 128]. For convenient checking and verication enforcement, the
dierent paerns are compounded into the sub categories discussed below;
1. Data availability and accessibility (AA) constraints: Besides exclusive access requirements,
data should be available and accessible to a basic level to facilitate work progress. Besides,
data should be available and accessible whenever required. Verication of AA constraint
requires checking for compliance with availability and accessibility data requirements.
2. Data Privacy constraint: the requirement to observe privacy of data justies the establish-
ment of access control and authorisation. Privacy constraint originates from the GDPR
data privacy principle where organisations are required to build data privacy as part of
their systems. verifying for data privacy involves checking for enforcement of privacy
controls over data.
3. Authentication constraint: Authentication is a constraint to achieve basic security of data
and systems by requiring users to be identied and given access. Authentication involves
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the process of validating the identity of a registered user before allowing access to the
protected resource. As a data constraint, authentication restricts access to data by requir-
ing prior user login and prole authentication. It is based on identity management where
digital identities are managed based on organisational security policies to ensure that only
necessary and relevant data is shared using user identity and prole data as well as data
governance functions.
Similar to privacy, compliancy to security constraint is demanded by many regulatory
standards like GDPR and Anti money laundering. Specically, GDPR emphasises secu-
rity by design. Integrating security constraints and checking for their compliance in the
process model is therefore important to meet policy and regulatory requirements.
7.5.1 Specications for Data constraints
Boolean conditions are used to evaluate data access conditions are true or false. Depending on the
outcome, access is granted or denied. If a trace is true to the conditions specied, then it satises
the constraint. Otherwise it is false and violates the constraint. To that eect, the following
specications and denitions are useful for the data checking algorithm. Given a set of activities
a1, a2 and a3, assigned to resource actor (r1) and requires access to product catalogue data (Pcd).
Access to this data is constrained by access and availability, i.e. only ’Read’ action can be granted.
If the assignment is true according to the executed behaviour, then the trace (σ) satises (|=)
the constraint.
Denition 7.5.1. Accessibility and Availability (AA)
σ ∈ (((a1, a2, a3), r1) : (Pcd.[Read]) : AA)
If (σ = True) then σ |= AA
e denition species accessibility and availability constraints for Pcd data object with ac-
tion read granted to r1 for execution of activities a1, a2 and a3. During verication, the data
compliance verication algorithm checks for compliance to the constraint for the data object,
action by the user and tasks. If the outcome shows that the trace is true to the constraint re-
quirement, then the trace satises the availability and accessibility constraint. Otherwise, its a
violation detected for the AA constraint.
Denition 7.5.2. Authentication
σ ∈ (((a1, a2, a3), r1), (Pcd.[True/False]) : Authentication)
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If (σ = True) then σ |= Authentication
e denition species access control by authentication granted for accessing Pcd data with
actions to read and write for role actor (r1) who executes activities a1, a2 and a3. Satisfaction
of the authentication constraint is achieved if the trace of the executed events show exhibit the
specied behaviour. Otherwise, a violation is detected for the authentication constraint.
Denition 7.5.3. Privacy (Prv)
σ ∈ (((a1, a2, a3), r1), (Pcd.[Read]) : Prv)
If (σ = True) then σ |= Prv
e denition species Privacy constraint for accessing Pcd data where action to read private
data is to be granted to the resource actor r1 who executes activities a1, a2 and a3. During ver-
ication, the privacy compliance verication algorithm checks the constraint for its satisfaction
before access can be granted to read private data. If the trace is true for the specication, then
the constraint is satised and thus compliance achieved. Otherwise, it is a violation detected for
the privacy constraint.
7.5.2 Algorithms forVerifyingCompliancewithDataConstraints
For independent checking, algorithms 8 to 10 are composed for each constraint based on pre-
dened specications and denitions in section 7.5.1. e algorithms also consider function
denitions in previous sections.
Algorithm for Access and Availability Constraint Verication
Verifying for data access and availability Constraints ensures that basic non-exclusive data is
accessible and available with less restriction to enable accomplishment of basic tasks. algorithm
8 is composed to the eect. Violation occurs if role actors or tasks are denied access to data con-
strained by AA or where the permied action type diers from the initial assignment, e.g. modify
action type instead of read action type. e verication requirements addressed by algorithm 8
are;
Requirement 7.1: Ensure that required data is available and accessible for all tasks and role actors
as required by AA constraint. is prevents events from executing without access to data. is
prevents deadlocks where running events have no access to data or data is not available and
events keep waiting for it.
Requirement 7.2: Identify and detect AA constraint violations likely to lead into data access denial.
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Algorithm 8 Access and Availability Compliance Verication
1: Input:
a. All Pi
b. Constraints (AA)
2: for all data with constraint C = (AA : [Read/Write/Modify]) for actors (r) do
3: Assign = (r, e.ac)→ AA:Data Item.[Read/Write/Modify]≡ True
4: if (Assign ∈ seen, finished 6≡ True ) then
5: Assign 6|= AA
6: Violation: ”Deadlock due to denied access to data. AA constraint violated”
7: end if
8: end for
9: Return No violation of AA constraint for the provided processes if Assign ∈
seen, finished |= AA
Violation of AA constraint as per algorithm 8 exists when tasks or their actors (r, e.ac) are denied
access to data whose constraint is AA. is violation leads to a deadlock or livelock. Deadlock
occurs if running activities are denied access to data necessary for the process to continue in
execution. Whereas, the livelock occurs when a task is denied access to data stays in waiting
mode stagnating process execution. e other form of violation may occur when the activity
nishes execution without necessary data. is leads to wrong outcomes which do not comply
with specications.
Algorithm for Verifying Compliancy with Authentication Constraint
Authentication verication algorithm 9 veries for compliance by checking that role actor cre-
dentials match the credentials stored in a database of authorised actors as well as the database
for access privileges over tasks. e algorithm checks for three forms of Authentication errors
which are the sources of authentication related violations:
• Access leakage which occurs when non-authenticated users gain access to data.
• Deadlocks which occur when users are authorised to execute activities but access to data
is denied for technical or logical reasons e.g. improper congurations.
• Authentication breach which occurs when non-authenticated activities or users intention-
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ally gain access to data. is is traced from running or nished events.
e following verication requirements are addressed by the algorithm;
Requirement 8.1: Prevent security lapses or leakages by checking actor identify and detect unau-
thenticated access to data by task executors or roles.
Requirement 8.2:. Detect authentication violations upon tasks based on access types.
Algorithm 9 Authenticity Data Constraint Checking
1: Input:
a. All Pi
b. Constraints (Authenticity)
2: for all data where C.Auth = Data item.[Permit/Deny] do
Assign =r, e.ac→ Auth:Data Item.[Permit]≡ True
3: if (Assign ∈ seen, finished 6≡ True ) then
4: Assign 6|= Auth
5: Violation: ”authenticated access denied to restricted data.”
6: if ∃ actor rn ∈ Assign: Auth≡ False then
7: Violation: ”Access leakage, non-authenticated actor rn accesses data. ”
8: end if
9: end if
10: end for
11: Return No violation of Authenticity constraint for the provided business process.
Actors are permied or denied access to data by authentication. Where data constrained by
authenticity is accessed by non-authenticated actors, it implies access leakage i.e. data is accessed
by actors without authentication.
Similarly, where access to data is is denied to authentic actors, it leads to a deadlock since they
cannot execute the current work in progress.
Authenticity compliancy checking algorithm checks for permied or denied access to restricted
data based on actor identities and roles. Where the assignment to data does not match the pre-
scribed access policies, a violation is detected. Similarly, violations are identied from traces
where transactions have occurred if the assignment does not match the traces (Assign 6|= Auth).
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Algorithm for Verifying Compliancy with Privacy Constraint
Privacy constraint is enforced by means of access control and authorisation. Authorisation in-
volves the process of validating that the authenticated user is granted permission to access the
requested resources. Privacy as a data constraint restricts access to data regarded private as de-
ned by GDPR. Data that is not available to the public is accessible by fullling authorisation
requirement. Violation to privacy constraint is checked targeting two forms of errors; deadlocks
and privacy breach.
• Deadlocks occur when the executing events authorised to access data are denied access
for technical or logical reasons e.g. improper congurations,
• Breach to privacy i.e. non-authorised activities eventually access private data and execute.
To verify for these errors in a business process, algorithm 10 is composed. Authorised actors
are granted permission to Read/Write/Modify private data items. erefore compliant traces or
transactions are those where the Assignment is equivalent to the authorised actions (Assign ≡
Authorise). Violations are detected or identied in traces where authorised permissions dier
from the assigned (Assign 6≡ Authorise).
Algorithm 10 Privacy Data Constraint Checking
1: Input:
a. All Pi
b. Constraints (Privacy)
2: for all data where C=Privacy:[Read/Write/Modify] for actors (r) do
3: Assign= (r, e.ac)→ Privacy: Data Item.[Read/Write/Modify] ≡ Authorise
4: if (Assign ∈ seen, finished) 6≡ Authorise then
5: Assign 6|= Privacy
6: Violation: ”Authorised actors denied access to private data”
7: if rn 6∈ (r, e.ac)|rn ∈ Authorise then
8: Violation: ”Access leakage, non authorised actor access to private data”
9: end if
10: end if
11: end for
12: Return no violation of Privacy constraint for the processes if Assign |= Privacy
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e other form of violation is where privacy constrained data exists outside the restricted bound-
ary. is leads to a leakage since it is accessible by non-authorised actors. Similarly, where
authorised data is not visible in ‘seen’ and ’nished’ events it signies a violation in form of a
deadlock where data was not available or accessible to facilitate task execution. Authentication
and privacy constraints are enforced by means of process driven access control and authorisation
(PDAC) [84]. Section 7.7 discusses the PDAC concept in detail.
7.6 Overall Compliance Verication Algorithm
e overall compliance verication algorithm is a general algorithm that integrates the specic
constraint checking algorithms into a single algorithm to check the entire business process be-
haviour.
e application of this algorithm is two fold:
• It can be applied to verify a business process where a large amount of modications have
been made necessitating checking the entire model for constraints compliancy, or
• Where a business process is designed from scratch automatically requiring full scale ver-
ication for compliance with policy and regulatory requirements.
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Algorithm 11 Overall Compliance Constraint Verication Algorithm
1: Input:
a. All Pi
b. All Constraints
2: for all Pi:C = Control ow, Resource, Data, and Temporal do
3: Verify compliance with control ow constraints
Trace validity→ Call algorithm 1
Existence → Call algorithm 2
Precedence→ Call algorithm 3
Response→ Call algorithm 4
4: if Pi |= C = True then
5: Verify compliance with Resource constraints
Check SoD→ call algorithm 5
Check BoD→ call algorithm 6
Check Delegate→ call algorithm 7
6: Verify compliance with Data constraints
Check AA→ call algorithm 8
Check Auth→ call algorithm 9
Check Privacy→ call algorithm 10
7: Message = Compliance status for Control ow, Resource, Data constraints
8: Return overall compliance feedback for the provided business process.
7.7 Process Driven Access Control and Authorisation
PDAC is a concept we proposed in [86, 84] as a mechanism towards realisation of an automated
and agile, yet less complex solution to overcome the challenges of non-compliance to security
and privacy constraints. e motivation and rationale was based on the compliancy demands of
the 2018 revised GDPR. At the dawn of the May 2018 launch of the revised GDPR version, big
companies like Facebook, Inc [136] and Google LLC [133] were already faulted for data privacy
breach. e GDPR articles of interest to this thesis are the principles of security by design and
privacy by design. e former principle requires security of the data to be built within the in-
formation system design. e laer principle requires transparency from the data protector and
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Figure 7.5: Illustration of PDAC vs Traditional access control mechanisms
processor to make known to the data owner the status of their data i.e. when it is being collected,
processed and transmied. Before collection and processing, the data owner’s consent must be
sought.
PDAC leverages existing solutions to enhance access control and authorisations to achieve au-
tomated compliancy, especially with dynamic policies and regulations. It ensures regulated and
legalised data access based on its need to accomplish a specic process instance. As a divergent
access control mechanism the from existing access control mechanisms, access under PDAC is
based on the entire process instance by assessing the purpose, time and instance as opposed to
the subject, object or action to be commied. is is a paradigm shi from the traditional access
control models based on tasks [147], roles [147, 134, 50] and aributes [82, 79, 78] which grant
and authorise more access than what is required. is violates the data privacy principle.
Despite their role in security and privacy administration, classical access control mechanisms are
unable to support modelling and enforcement of security and privacy requirements presented by
current workows which must as well comply with many other regulations. Relatedly, workows
supporting collaborative business processes present more complex and dynamic security and
privacy requirements that require agility to implement which is not provided in the current
mechanisms. ey grant roles more authority and permissions beyond what may be required.
Figure 7.5 part (a) illustrates authorised users in a call centre granted full access to all customer
records indiscriminately. ey have access to records all time. Part (b) illustrates PDAC where
users are granted access to a single record per session of time a customer is being served.
Various extensions to the classical access control mechanisms have been suggested. In Table
7.2, a summarised description of mechanism extension is presented together with PDAC. It is
noticeable that the most common constraints dealt with are SOD and BoD. e suggested PDAC
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mechanism diers from the classical ones to address privacy and authentication constraints.
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Table 7.2: Research on extensions of Access control mechanisms
Proposal Constraints Mechanism Output State
Support dynamic assignment of access controls
based on the task instance context and task states
DSOD, BOD, Tempo-
ral constraints
BAC and
RBAC
AC agent enforcement
architecture
Design time,
Runtime
Support modelling of constrained workows for
local and global constraints such that a sound
workow constrained schema exists where au-
thorised user can execute a complete workow
instance
SOD, BOD, cardinality
constraints
TBAC and
RBAC
Formalised constrained
sound workow
Design time
e management of authorisations of organisa-
tion roles in a process view
SoD, duty of conict TBAC and
RBAC
Algorithm Design time
Authorisation and Access control model for giv-
ing subject access to objects during task execution
No concern for SoD or
BoD
RBAC Authorisation and
access control Model
Runtime
A privacy-aware BP modelling framework sup-
porting reasoning and enforcement of privacy
constraints
Separation of tasks,
Binding of Tasks, Ne-
cessity to know
User Roles Extension of BPMN 2.0
to PrVBPMN
Design time
PDAC - Support process driven access con-
trol and authorisation
Privacy, authenti-
cation and security
constraints
Process
Instance,
Time
Compliance verica-
tion Algorithm
Hybrid
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7.7.1 Implementation architecture for ProcessDrivenAccessCon-
trol and Authorisation
Access to data is granted by authorisation and revoked automatically in two ways i.e. i) Once
the purpose for which access was granted is accomplished, and ii) When the assigned duration
expires. In either case, the resource actor ceases to have access to data. For example, in Figure
7.5 user is assigned access to a single customer’s data for an instance of a call and access will
cease the moment the call ends.
During execution, when access to data is required, the authorisation service is invoked to
check the assigned access privileges. It then provides feedback for granted or denied access and
provide message to the user via the dashboard.
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Figure 7.6: PDAC Authorisation Service Architecture
Within the business process management system an activity event is initiated as step (1)
shows. e activity is then assigned to a resource actor which will accept it in step two (2). e
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activity now exists in the work list of the actor (system user) in the BPMS. e BPMS issues an
authorisation token request to access the required data in step (3). In step (4) the authorisation
service is managed by the authorisation engine implemented by underlying technologies like
identity and access management (IAM) and Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML).e
authorisation involves validation of the request against user identities, policies and customer
data in their specic databases. A collection and validation of a combination of these parameters
legitimises access authorisation. e token is validated either oine with a short duration session
token or with digital signature online validation. In step (5) a validated token is returned to the
BPMS authorising activity execution by the actor and stored in the browser or user client prole
in steps (6) and (7).
7.7.2 User Authentication
SAML technology supports enforcement of user identication and authentication. e user signs
into the client portal e.g. a browser which sends an authentication request to the user identity
database. e database authenticates the user by generating SAML authentication assertions that
identify the users and their information.
e browser contacts the validation service with the SAML assertion which requests tem-
porary security credentials and creates session for sign in. e sign in is sent to the browser
granting access to the users based on policies in the policy database.
7.7.3 GDPR Implementation
e customer self-service point is for implementation and fullment of GDPR requirements.
Enforcing compliance to GDPR requirements is achieved by enabling;
• Data owners have access to personal data by means of automated access.
• Restrict processing of data by data owners by directly interacting with data processors.
• Data modication and deletion through a self service interface.
• Data portability to enable data transfer serviced by the data owner.
• Audit and monitoring of data by its owner at any point in time.
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7.8 Summary and Discussions
is chapter has presented a set of algorithms as category constraint specic algorithms as part
of artifact contribution from this thesis. Before the algorithms, the chapter has shown how to
dene and express specications for checking constraints and eventually composed algorithms
that apply them for compliance verication. For each constraints category, an algorithm is com-
posed and presented. Algorithms are presented as independent and self-contained algorithms
to facilitate dierent but specic constraint checking. In whole when combined, overall model
verication is accomplished.
For each category of constraints, an overall algorithm can be composed. An example of such
is algorithm 12 that combines all algorithms. For each algorithm, inputs are dened, which are
processed to return intelligible outcome showing constraint compliance or violations. e inten-
tion of algorithms is to benet cases where one is interested in checking a model for compliance
to a particular change in policy. e requirements in this case do not have to necessarily check
the entire model as this would be expensive in terms of time and computer memory. is way,
only a categorical checking is employed for the specic requirements using a relevant algorithm.
By this approach, the problems of state explosion which limits application of model checking are
mitigated.
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Compliance Checking and
Verication
8.1 Introduction
e chapter presents the application of the artifacts, i.e. the compliance verication algorithms to
check the compliance of a business process with the required constraints.e formalisation and
the design of the compliance verication algorithm followed a step wise approach based on use
case 1 which was described in section 4.2 in chapter 4. To demonstrate artifact applicability,
we still apply use case 1 but in a dierent way. Use case 2 is used to evaluate the artifacts
in Chapter 9. For this purpose, understandability and space reasons, use case 1 is abstracted
to represent internal process operations of the store, and veried using the overall compliance
verication algorithm in section 8.4 Specically, the order processing instance is considered. e
rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 8.2 presents the revised use case, applicable
requirements and constraints. Section 8.3 lists a set of compliance requirements, shows their
translation into constraints through formal expressions using DL and LTL, and how they can
be veried based on a verication scenario. Section 8.4 illustrates the application of the overall
compliance verication algorithm to verify the entire business process. Section 8.5 presents a
discussion based on the verication outcomes while Section 8.6 presents chapter summary.
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8.2 e Abstracted Pick and Pack Use Case
e process starts with arrival of orders in the store’s order catalogue. e orders are sorted,
assigned and processed to completion. e order processing Eco system is composed of the
orders, customers, sta and, policies and regulations, regulatory agencies among others. ese
play dierent roles;
• Orders are placed by customers and pick them when they are ready or wait for delivery.
• Sta process orders at the store e.g. Pickers, Packers, supervisors among others.
• Policies and Regulations guide operations of the business process.
• Regulatory agencies specify and monitor enforcement of policies and regulations.
e activities in the abstracted pick and pack business process are briey described as follows;
• Select Order (So): the order is selected from the pending orders by a sta who will process
it. is is the initial activity which signals the start of order processing instance.
• Pick items (Pit): e items are picked by the store sta. A store may have one or more
store departments and sta may cross between departments or are restricted to one.
• Verify order (Vo): is is a quality check to ensure the order is fullled in terms of the right
items and quantities.
• Pack order (Po): e order is packed and made ready for delivery or pickup by the cus-
tomer.
• Hand over (Ho): e ready order is handed over to customer service unit
• Customer Pick up or Delivery (Cpd): if the order is not picked up the delivery sta will
deliver the item within the specied duration.
Based on the process activity brief description above, Consequently the model in Figure 8.1 is
realised.
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Figure 8.1: Abstracted pick and pack business process model
8.2.1 e Internal Requirements of the Business Process
As described, the business process must conform to a set of policies specic for a store. Some of
the relevant policies include;
Control ow and temporal policies to guide process executions are as follows;
1. Each order must start with the select order activity and end with customer pick up or
delivery. e total order processing time is 3 hours.
2. During order processing, big orders are picked by more than one sta. is activity dura-
tion should not exceed one hour.
3. Every order must be veried before it is packed. Verication of each order depending on
the size within 20 minutes.
4. Packed orders are ready for handover to customer service section.
191
CHAPTER 8. COMPLIANCE CHECKING AND VERIFICATION
5. Orders are picked by customers or delivered to customer premises. Delivery takes one
hour whereas the customers must pick their orders within a day otherwise they are put
in the storage.
In addition, resource based policies to guide allocation resources are as follows;
• Pickers are allocated to pick items and cannot execute verify orders.
• Packers are allocated to pack order task. However, they also execute verify order task.
• Pickers can be delegated to participate in order hand over to customers if they are free or
when there are high volumes.
• Supervisors oversee other employees and can execute any task.
• Supervisors can execute delegate tasks. E.g. supervisors can delegate pickers to pack items
e specied tasks are executed if access to necessary data is provided. To this eect, policies
to guide access control to data are specied as follows;
• Supervisors have full access to data and can grant data access to sta based on organisa-
tional roles and tasks they execute in the business process.
• Basic data must be accessible and available for sta to execute tasks that do not need much
restriction and control. For example, order list data should be accessible and available to
pickers, veriers and packers.
• Access control and authorisation must be observed for data privacy. For example, cus-
tomer personal data, nancial data among others
• Customer data is considered as private data to which the principle of privacy must be
observed.
• Security of the data and system is important and worth observation. To this eect, users
and sta must be authenticated to use the system.
e internal policies are superseded by the external regulations. e super store being cross
regional, several external regulations apply. Such as;
• e European union general data protection act (GDPR) which emphasizes data privacy
and security.
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• e Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) which emphasizes the separation of duty and binding of
duty.
• e UK consumer protection act which emphasizes consumer protection rights like right
to quality products and services, right to return goods, right to be refunded.
• e Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) or the NHS equivalent
which denes basic security and privacy practices for health care and pharmaceutical dis-
pensaries. e act applies to the stores since many of them operate pharmacies.
• Trade laws limiting sale of restricted products to specic groups of customers like those in
under age category. For example, sale of alcoholic products. Also, sale of health products
that require drug prescriptions.
• Service level agreements for acceptable business transactions and customer relations.
Both internal policies and external regulations must be complied with by the business pro-
cess. Because of the collaboration, contractual obligations are composed and agreed upon by the
parties as guiding principles for business operations. A collection of requirements from appli-
cable policies, rules, laws, standards and regulations forms a set of all compliance requirements
that the business process must conform with.is document is updated as change in policies and
regulations occur.
As earlier indicated, policies and regulations are stated in natural language and thus bound
to suer the challenges of natural language such as ambiguities and inconsistency. e extracted
requirements form the compliance constraints that are veried with the business process model.
e verication is only possible with formalised constraints. From this point, the artifacts put
forward by this thesis are applied. In the next sections, the application of constraint expression
mechanism is illustrated.
8.2.2 Constraint Elicitation and Expressions
In consideration of the above, a list of requirements and constraints are for the pick and pack
process is presented in tables in section A.2 of appendix A. e next step is to formalise the listed
constraints through formal specications in section 8.3 based on DL.
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8.3 Requirements Expressions
8.3.1 DL Based Specications
Following the constraint expression mechanism which was described in chapter 5, this section
illustrates requirements representations using DL. e symbols used include;
• u Conjunction of constraints
• unionsq Disjunction of constraints
• → Assignment of an activity to a constraint
• : Assignment of subsequent constraints aer the initial (control ow) constraint
• [, ] Brackets holding constraint aributes
Constraint Representations sing Unary Expressions
e unary expressions represent individual category-based constraints;
(a) Exemplied control ow and temporal constraint expressions Requirement 1 specify-
ing that the select order activity Starts every order processing instance, executed
within 10 minutes, assigned to Pickers but can be delegated and data access is lim-
ited access to order catalogue. is requirement can be expressed as follows:
So→ (Exist) uDuration : (10mins)
Pit→ [So]Precedeu BoundedExit (n−1) uDuration : (20− 50mins)
V o→ [Pit]Precede uBoundedExit[n]→ Duration : (≤ 20mins)
Po→ [V o]Response u Precede u V alid : (10mins)
Ho→ [Po]Precede uDelay : (20mins)
Cpd→ [Ho]PrecedeuBoundedExit[n]u(Duration : [1−2hrs]uRepetition :
[10mins])
(b) Exemplied Resource constraint expressions
So→ (Supervisor) uDelegate : (Supervisor → Pickers)
Pit→ (Pickers, Supervisors) uDelegate : (Supervisor → Packers)
V o→ SoD : (Supervisors,¬Pickers) uDelegate : (Supervisor)
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Po→ BoD : (Supervisors, Packers)
Ho→ BoD(Supervisors,Deliverystaff)
Cpd→ BoD(Supervisors,Deliverystaff)
(c) Exemplied Data constraint expressions
So→ Prv uAuthentication : (Ordercatalogue)
Pit→ AA : (Itemorderlists) u Prv : (Departmentitemlists)
V o→ Prv uAuthentication : (Itemorderlists)
Po→ Authentication(Ordercatalogue)
Ho : (Ordercatalogue)
Cpd→ V isible uAA : (OrderCatalogue) u Privacy : (Customeraddress)
Constraint Representations Using Binary Expressions Binary expressions are composite repre-
sentations involving combinations between sets of constraints. e requirements in Table 
involve combinations of constraints that guide execution behaviour. is subsection illustrates
expression of requirements involving binary constraints per activity.
(a) Select order execution constraints expression
So → (Exist u ¬Precede) u Duration : [< 10mins] u BoD : [Picker] u
Itemorderlist : [Auth] u [Prv]
Requirement 1 specifying that the select order activity Starts every order process-
ing instance, executed within 10 minutes, assigned to Pickers as BoD but can be
delegated and data access is limited access to order catalogue by access control and
authorisation.
(b) Expressions of Pick items execution requirements
Pit → (¬Exist[So] u BoundedExist[n(n−1)]) u Duration : [20 − 50Mins] u
(BoD : [Picker]u[Delegate : (Supervisors, P icker, Packer))uitemorderlist :
[AA] u [Prv]
e expression species that pick items activity is preceded by select order and can
be repeated several times until all items on the order list are picked. e scheduled
duration is between 20 and 50 minutes, with a BoD resource constraint for the
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picker, and access to item order list data granted by access and availability, and
by access control and authorisation.
(c) Expressions of Verify order execution requirements
V o → (Precede[Pit] u BoundedExist[n(n−1)]) u Duration : [< 20Mins] u
(SoD : [¬Pickers] u Delegate : (Supervisors, Packer)) u itemorderlist :
([AA] u [Auth])
e expression species that verify order activity is preceded by Pick items and its
conditions must be satised before the process continues to the next level which
implies that it is repeated several times. e scheduled duration is less than 20 min-
utes, with SoD resource constraint for the pickers and supervisor who can delegate
to pickers. Access to item order list data is granted by authentication, and by access
control and authorisation.
(d) Pack Order execution constraints expression
Po → (Precede[V o] u Response) u V alid[= 30Mins] u (BoD : [Packers] u
Delegate[Supervisors, P icker] u itemorderlist : ([AA] u [Auth])
e expression species that pack order activity is preceded by verify order and
occurs as a response to verify order. Its execution is valid for 30 minutes. e
assigned resource constraint is BoD for the packers and supervisor who can delegate
to pickers. Access to item order list data is granted by accessibility and availability,
and access control and authorisation.
(e) Handover Order execution constraints expressionHo→ (ExistuPrecede[Po])u
Delay[20Mins]uRole : [Supervisors,DeliveryStaff ]uitemorderlist : [AA]u
[Prv]
e expression species that handover order activity is preceded by Pack order. Its
execution is delayed for 30 minutes to allow batch processing of handover. e
assigned resources are supervisors and delivery sta. Access to item order list data
is granted by accessibility and availability, and by authentication.
(f) Customer pick-up or Delivery execution constraints expression Cpd → (Exist u
Precede[Po])u(Duration : [1−2HoursMins]uRepetition[10mins])u[Supervisors,DeliveryStaff ]u
(itemorderlist : [AA], customeraddresses : u[Prv]) e expression species
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that order delivery or customer pick-up activity is preceded by handover order, ex-
ecuted for a duration of 1-2 hours and it is repeated every 10 minutes in case the
order is rejected. e assigned resources are supervisors and delivery sta with
access to order list data granted by accessibility and availability, while customer
address data is granted by satisfying privacy data constraints.
8.3.2 Exemplied Formal Constraints
To enhance the reasoning capacity, DL was extended with integration of basic constructs of LTL
i.e. operators and quantiers to obtain more formal constraint expressions. e model logic
created facilitates compliance verication and checking of business process and constraints. e
section below presents the exemplied formal expressions.
(a) Select order execution constraint expression
G(So[init] ∧ [< 10mins] ∧ [Picker, Supervisor : BoD] ∧ [Itemorderlist :
(AA,Auth]
e expression species So as an initial activity whose duration is less than 10 min-
utes. It is assigned to pickers and supervisor as resources constrained by BoD which
implies that the picker can participate in another activity. Access to item order data
is controlled by access and availability as well as authentication.
(b) Pick Items execution constraint expression
G(Pitn
(n−1)
−−−−→ ∧[20−50Mins]∧[Picker : BoD, (Supervisors, Packer : Delegate)]∧
[itemorderlist : (AA,Prv)]
e expression species Pit as an activity that can be repeated for n times, for a du-
ration between 20-50 minutes. It is assigned to pickers and supervisor as resources
constrained by BoD which implies that the picker can participate in another activ-
ity. e supervisor can delegate task to packers. Access to item order list data is
controlled by access and availability as well as authentication.
(c) Verify order execution requirements
G(V on
(n−1)
−−−−→ ∧[< 20Mins]∧[(V erifiers[SoD])(Supervisors, Packers : [Delegate])∧
itemorderlist : (AA,Auth)])
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e expression species Vo as an activity that can be repeated for n times until it
passes, for a duration between of less than 20 minutes. It is assigned to packers as
resource constrained by SoD. e supervisor can delegate task to packers. Access to
item order list data is controlled by access and availability as well as authentication.
(d) Pack Order execution constraint expression
G(Po → ∧[30Mins] ∧ [Packers : BoDSupervisors, P icker : Delegate] ∧
[itemorderlist] : (AA,Auth))
e expression species Po as an activity to be executed for a duration of 30 minutes
or less by packers and supervisor as resources constrained by BoD which implies
that the packers execute Po in relation to another activity. e supervisor can del-
egate the activity to pickers. Access to item order list data is controlled by access
and availability as well as authentication.
(e) Handover Order execution constraint expression
G(Ho→ [20Mins]∧[(Supervisors), Pickers: Delegate]∧[itemorderlist :(AA,Auth)])
e expression species Ho as an activity scheduled for a duration of 20 minutes. It is assigned
to supervisors who can delegate to pickers. Access to item order list data is controlled by access
and availability as well as authentication.
(f) Customer pick-up or Delivery execution constraint expression
G(Cpd→ ∧[1−2HoursMins, 10Mins]∧ [Supervisors,DeliveryStaff ]∧ [itemorderlist :
AA, customeraddresses : prv])
e expression species Cpd as an activity scheduled for a duration between 1- 2 hours. It is
assigned to supervisors and delivery sta. Access to item order list data is controlled by access
and availability while customer addresses data is controlled by privacy constraint as well as
authentication.
(g) if Duration >=24 hours then Action ” Take package to store”
When the orders are not picked for the day, they are taken to the store for storage. e ex-
pressions in this section demonstrate the converted formal expressions making use of binary
relations among the constraints to specify behaviour of the process.
To illustrate the reasoning, a set of verication requirements are specied as follows;
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8.3.3 Verication Scenario - Requirements
In this scenario, the following verication requirements are listed, their specication and formal
expressions;
1. Every order processing instance starts with select order and ends with delivery or cus-
tomer pick up.
G((So), F (Cpd))
For purpose of checking termination of instances, each terminating case starts with select
order and ends with order delivery or pickup.
2. Every order processing instance must be veried. Verify order must exist in every instance.
G(∀σ ∈ Pi∃V o)
For every case of order processing instance must always be veried
3. Supervisors have rights to every task and can delegate tasks to other users.
G(∀Activities, Supervisor → (Prv.[Read]) ∧ F (Delegate))
For each activity, always the supervisor has access control and authorisation, and can
eventually delegate permissions.
4. A set of activities are BoD and SoD respectively
G((Pickers, Supervisors).BoD → (So, P it)
Activities select order and Pick item are always executed by resource actors pickers and
supervisors constrained as BoD. e roles meet resource actors selection conditions for
the execution of So and Pit.
G((Veriers,Supervisors)∧(¬Pickers).SoD → (V o)
Activity verify order is always executed by veriers or supervisors as designated role actors that
meet resource selection conditions for its execution. Pickers are excluded from roles that can
execute verify order.
5. Verify Order must wait until Pick order is completed. Pick order is repeated until all items are
picked.
G((V o)W (
∑n
( n−1)Pit
n)→ n = k)
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Verify order must wait until pick items executes for a specied number of times i.e. until all items
are picked where k = number of items.
6. Where stock of items is not available for an order, suspend order and contact customer
G(
∑n
( n+1n) Pit, F (Suspend ∧ Contactcustomer))
If the items picked do not sum up to the items ordered (if no more items are available), the order
is suspended and customer is contacted.
7. Unavailable items can be substituted upon permission from the customer
G(Pit→ [Item−unavailable], (Contactcustomer∧Replace)∨F (alternativeitemsatdelivery))
Where items on the order are not available, the customer is contacted to replace the items or
alternative items are carried and oered during the order delivery.
8. e total order processing time is approximately 3 hours. e total duration for processing each
case of the order is given by;
Total process duration=( (
∑
(a1. . . an)+delays)
(
∑
tn)
)
Duration= ∑
t
(So, P it, V o, Po,Ho,Cpd)
Using the formal specied verication requirements,the next section shows how to check for
their fullment and compliance through application of the verication algorithms.
8.4 Application ofComplianceVericationAlgorithms
To verify the business process’s compliance with above constraints, the overall compliance ver-
ication algorithm 12 is applied.
8.5 Discussion
Algorithm 12 is applied to check compliance to verify requirements enlisted in section. e
specic properties veried in this case include the following; Termination property: this property
is used to check the possibility that a model has start and end points, i.e. a model can start and
end. To check this property, the algorithm 12 checks for existence of initial and end activity
events for each complete case in a process instance. Absence of initial and end events indicates
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lack of termination which is also a source of deadlocks i.e. tasks that start and never complete.
It also violates the constraints for initial and end activities specied in requirement 1.
Deadlocks: checking for this deadlocks in models ensures that no activities remain stuck,
incomplete or unexecuted due to lack of resources, resource overutilisation or unintended lock
out or denial to data access. For example, due to SoD restrictions, it situations may arise where
no resource is available to execute a task. e algorithm checks to detect deadlocks likely to
be caused by resource allocation. is is enforced by checking constraints related to resource
allocation to process activities such that deviant behaviour leading to violations can be detected
early in time. From the use case, at least the supervisor role is assigned to each task as a continuity
strategy. e algorithm further checks for the existence of roles that can free over allocated
resources or execute tasks that may exist without assigned resources or whose resources may be
busy. From the use case, the supervisor role is assigned for each task as specied in requirement
3, thus the algorithm checks for its existence. e non-existence of supervisor role assignment
over tasks is considered a violation.
Livelocks: checking for livelock in the model ensures that no instances are trapped in innite
loops. For example sources of livelocks in the use case are; orders that remain pending because
of non-availability of stock items, orders that do not pass verication and executions that remain
pending due to denied data access. Specication 7 allows item substitution where an ordered
item is not available. is helps to prevent order suspension which is a likely source of livelocks.
e algorithm in this case will verify for existence and permission to execute the substitute item
activity in the model. Absence or lack of necessary resource assignments to execute this activity
amounts to a violation.
Temporal conicts checking: the verication of temporal constraints checks for conicts re-
lated to temporal assignments where resources (roles) may be assigned to dierent tasks whose
execution occurs at the same time, or activities that start and end at the same time yet assigned
to same resource. is would imply that only one task may be aended to due to conicts in
execution time causing a delay in the entire process duration. e algorithm checks for con-
formance to temporal requirements and detecting likely deviations based on the total process
duration. Where the duration is beyond the total activity scheduled times, it implies a delay.
e algorithm will proceed to check and identify the activities likely to cause delays and thus
violating the temporal constraints. Requirement 8 species total order process instance duration
to be 3 hours. e algorithm sums up the specic activity durations and delays to determine the
compliancy to the required process cycle time. If the execution time exceeds the scheduled time,
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then a temporal violation is reported.
Permission lock Property: the property relates to checking of conicts relating to access con-
trol and authorisations where permissions may be granted and denied at the same time, or permit
and authorise the same role for the same activity at the same time. is leads to permission locks
which the algorithm assists to identify by assessing the data constraint assignments concerning
access control and authorisation, security and privacy. From the case, access to data requires
access and availability for the specic assigned roles except where customer data which is con-
sidered private as requirement 6 and 7 specify. Access to customer addresses is controlled by
privacy constraint. e algorithm checks for compliance to this constraint. To facilitate further
evaluation of the artifacts outcomes, a practical implementation of a prototype is necessary.
8.6 Chapter Summary
Compliance verication involves checking a model’s conformance to specied constraints. is
chapter was dedicated to demonstrating application of the proposed compliancy approach in
chapter 7. Based on the abstracted industry based use case, this chapter showed how to;
• Extract compliance requirements into a single composed document.
• Use the proposed DL semantics, the requirements were formalised into constraints and
further expressed into a formal structure to support reasoning as a necessary condition to
achieve verication through model checking.
• Apply the proposed algorithms to verify for compliance of the business process with con-
straints through violation detection.
Generally, the chapter is dedicated to illustration of application and ecacy of the artifacts which
are the outcome of the research. However, the algorithms are generic to accommodate wide ap-
plications without limit to a specic area of application. is is further illustrated with evaluation
based on use case 2 in chapter 9. In the following chapter, an evaluation is conducted to rigor-
ously assess the expressivity, ecacy and eciency of the presented artifacts.
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Algorithm 12 Overall Compliance Verication - Pick and Pack Business Process
1: InPut:
BP, Constraints
2: for all Pi:C.(e.ac) = init, end do
init = So, end = Cpd
3: if init ∈ seen, finished 6= So then
”Violation of Start activity constraint.”
4: if end ∈ seen, finished 6= Cpd then
”Violation of End activity constraint.”
5: end if
6: end if
7: end for
8: Verify constraints BoD, SoD and Delegate
9: for all actors r(Pickers, Packers, V erifiers, Supervisors) ∈ R do
(Pickers).BoD = ((So, P it), P ickers)
(V erifiers, Packers).SoD = (V o, V erifiers) ∧ (V o′, Packers),¬Pickers)
(Supervisor, P ickers).Delegate = (V o, (V erifiers ∧ Pickers))
10: if (Packers).BoD ∈ seen, finished 6= ((So, P it), P ickers) then
”Violation of BoD constraint for Pickers over” e.ac = (So, P it)
11: if (V erifiers, Packers).SoD ∈ seen, finished 6= (V o, (V erifiers ∧
Packers)) then
”Violation of SoD constraint for Veriers and Packers over Vo”
12: if (Supervisor, P ickers).Delegate ∈ seen, finished 6=(Vo,(Veriers
∧Pickers)) then
”Violation of Delegate constraint for Supervisor and Pickers over Vo”
13: end if
14: end if
15: end if
16: end for
17: Verify for existence of verify order for each Pi
18: for each Pi, C= Exist.Vo ∈ σ do
∀σ ∈ Pi→ ∃ (Vo, Supervisor) =0
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19: if ∀Pi 6 ∃ Exist.Vo then
”Constraint Violation for Exist.Vo”
20: Verify for data constraint compliance Pi
21: if Order = ”Suspended” then
e.ac = Contact Customer, supervisor,[Read.customer data = authorise]
22: else
”Violation of data constraint, denied access to customer contact data”
23: end if
24: end if
25: end for
26: Verify compliance with Temporal constraints Pi
27: if Total Pi Duration 6=<∑ e.ac ∈Pi then
”Violation: Instance delay detected”
28: end if
29: Feedback
No Violation for start and end activity constraints for the provided business process.
No Violation of BoD constraint for the provided business process.
No Violation of SoD constraint for the provided business process.
No Violation of Delegate constraint for the provided business process.
No Violation of Existence of Verify order constraint for all instances in the process.
No Violation of assignment of supervisor actor for all instances in the business
process.
No Violation of temporal constraint for the provided business process.
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Evaluation and Discussion
9.1 Introduction
Previous Chapters showed application of our approaches using an example to show how the
our compliance verication approach works. In this chapter, we use a collaborative business
process to evaluate the design method and verication algorithms. A known evaluation model,
the method evaluation model (MEM) is also used to assess the ecacy of the artifacts. e rest of
the chapter is presented as follows. In section 9.2, the MEM model is introduced and and used to
evaluate the ecacy of our compliance verication approach. While section 10.3 the eciency
of the algorithms is evaluated using a second use case. e performance of the algorithms is
evaluated in section 9.3, and last section 9.6 summarises and concludes the chapter.
9.2 e Adopted Evaluation Model
Traditionally, dierent methods are applied to evaluate Information system designs. For exam-
ple, the method evaluation model (MEM) which employs user perceptions and performance and
intentions, and behaviour of users to evaluate models methodologically [108]. Figure 9.1 illus-
trates the MEM. Following the variables in MEM, a model is assessed in terms of the following
parameters;
• Eciency; the expected performance of the system
• Ecacy: expected benet from using the system
• User perception of eciency and ecacy of the model
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Figure 9.1: MEM model [108]
e ecacy parameter has been applied to evaluate the artifacts put forward in the thesis to
illustrate their expected benets. e constraint expression mechanism i.e. the DL language is
a less complex compliance requirement denition and constraint specication mechanism, with
semantics and syntax is close to natural language. With its application, it is possible to express
constraints naturally yet formal enough. e expected benet is the simplied process of compli-
ance denition and specication, while facilitating their comprehension and comprehensibility
for non-experts.
More still, the compliance verication using the designed algorithms is simplied because of the
iterative approach in which they are designed. For each constraint category, specic algorithms
are designed as well as the overall algorithm. is makes the verication process highly exible
in a sense that verication can be targeted to a specic constraint without having to check the
entire process, or otherwise. Moreover, the intelligible feedback returned pointing to the source
of the violation is easily comprehensible for the end users. Besides the ecacy, the algorithms are
as well evaluated in terms of performance capacity. e following section introduces algorithm
performance evaluation.
9.3 Performance Evaluation of the Algorithms
In general, performance evaluation of algorithms involves assessing their capacity in terms of
dierent parameters like scalability and eciency. e most common algorithm performance
measurement indicator is the computation complexity associated with the algorithm. Algorithm
complexity is a function f(n) for measuring time and space used by an algorithm in terms of
input size n. It is a mechanism to classify an algorithm’s eciency compared to alternatives.
An algorithm’s complexity is computed in terms of time and space as resources required by
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the algorithm to run. e amount of resources required by the algorithm depends on how much
of the Input resources are available to produce the output. To derive the required resources
therefore, a general function is applicable;
n→ f(n)
where
n = the Input size
f(n) = the worst-case complexity or average case complexity of the algorithm.
Worst-case complexity refers to the maximum amount of resources whereas average case com-
plexity is the average amount of required resources for Input of size n.
9.3.1 Time Complexity
Algorithm time complexity T (n) refers to the amount of time required by an algorithm to run
computed by counting elementary operations. It is expressed in terms of steps or operations
through which the algorithm processes the Inputs to produce output. For each operation, an
estimate of required time is dened and assumed to be constant for all steps. Since required time
will vary with input, increasing input sizes are relevant to compute time, given by the function:
O(n)
where O = the time and n is the input size.
If the computations are achievable in feasible time for deterministic Inputs, then the algorithm
is said to be of polynomial time and tractable.
In relation to the presented algorithms, the number of steps taken by the constraint checking al-
gorithm while verifying for compliance determines how much time is required. To achieve veri-
cation in polynomial time, compact inputs by means of constraint based checking is employed.
For example, from the control ow constraint category, a specic constraint like dependency
is checked each time. Besides,for each time verication is conducted, only relevant constraints
are checked as opposed to complete model verication, unless when required otherwise. is
approach to constraint verication is considered ecient and feasible in time and thus tractable
for the deterministic nite states.
e time computation depends on the input sizes to the elementary operation of the algorithm.
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e elementary operation is that operation which the algorithm performs. In our case the algo-
rithms detect violations by comparing modelled behaviour and observed behaviour based on
generated traces. erefore the elementary operation involves behaviour comparison which
dominates other operations. e comparison time is assumed constant regardless of the input
size of the constraints being checked. e time complexity of each algorithm is therefore given
by;
T (n) = n− 1 (9.1)
erefore, by assuming that each step in violation detection has the size O(1), the overall com-
plexity is given by
O(nn) (9.2)
Worst-case Time Complexity
To tell whether an algorithm detects a violation depends on the number of steps in the elementary
comparison operation. If a violation is not detected, then n comparisons are made to check all
states in a trace. Otherwise one comparison is made upon violation detection.
To compute the worst case time complexity,
• Let T1(n), T2(n), . . . be the checking times for all possible Inputs of size n.
• e worst case time complexity W (n) is then given as W (n) = maxT1(n), T2(n).
e worst-case time complexity for the algorithm therefore i;
W (n) = n (9.3)
e Average-case Time Complexity
e computation of average-case time complexity involves both possible Inputs of size n and the
probabilities of the Inputs. erefore;
• T1(n), T2(n), . . . are comparison steps for all possible Inputs of size n,
• P1(n), P2(n), . . . are Input probabilities Average-case time complexity is therefore given
by
P1(n) + P2(n) + . . . (9.4)
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9.3.2 Space Complexity
Space Complexity refers to computation requirements of the algorithm in terms of amount of
memory space required to compute the Input to realise the output.
9.4 Artifact Evaluation Based on Use Case 2
Use case 2 is adopted from [166] and used to evaluate the algorithms put forward in the thesis.
To facilitate constraints checking based on the car insurance use case, a car insurance collabora-
tive trading business process adapted is to an abstracted model shown in Figure 9.2. e model
illustrates a collaborative business process executed by dierent stakeholders interacting at dif-
ferent levels. e process starts when a policy holder makes a car insurance claim. e claim is
registered by the Euro Assist (insurance broker) company which assigns a garage and contacts
the insurance company. AGFIL, the insurance company when contacted forwards the claim to
Lee C.S which appoints an Assessor to assess the car damage. Aer assessment the car garage
is contacted which send repair cost estimates, repairs the car and forwards the invoice through
Lee C.S to the AGFIL which pays all invoices.
9.4.1 Use Case Adaptation and Application
From their original work [166, 168], the use case was used as a case to support contract mon-
itoring by detecting and guarding against violation by partners. Basically, the work supported
contract fullment by monitoring actions of contract partners in an e-contract. However, their
work does not detect any aws within the business process itself. In this thesis, we use the
case to evaluate the compliance verication algorithms by checking and detecting violations to
compliance constraints in the case as dened in Chapter 7. To facilitate the checking, sample
data in Table 9.1 is used as baseline data showing normal activities and events according to the
requirements.
Based on chained execution as a collaborative business process interaction mechanism where
each partner concentrates on a sub process, the car insurance trading business process is com-
posed of sub processes (see model 9.2) in which each partner is responsible for a specic com-
ponent. Table 9.1 shows process activities and events according to a control ow arrangement
and party actors as resources. e business process must conform to a set of constraints derived
from policies and regulations governing general business and car insurance trade. For illustration
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Figure 9.2: Abstracted Car insurance collaborative trading business process
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purposes, we limit the constraints to the following:
9.4.2 Car Trading Business Process Constraint Requirements
(a) Each complete process instance starts with register claim activity and ends with
payment for the raised claim (pay invoices).
(b) ere is a high level dependency and response between the activities. Completion
of an activity at the local level leads to start of corresponding activity at another
level. Any break in the Precedence or response between activities is a violation. For
example, Pay invoice is preceded by receive invoices. Invoices are paid in a batch
for all received for a period of one month. Each calendar month is 30 days.
(c) Activities assign garage and contact AGFIL are executed as BoD
(d) e user who receives invoices in AGFIL sub process should be dierent from the
one that pays the invoices because they should be subject to auditing to prevent
fraud.
(e) It is a regulatory requirement that a claim must be processed within 10 working
days.
(f) For security and privacy, customer data must be protected from misuse.
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Table 9.1: Abstracted Car Trading Process Activities
Activity Activity
Id
Dependency Actors Resource Con-
straints
Data Constraints
Register claim a.1 - Data clerk - Euro Assist BoD with a.2 Privacy
Validate Claim and Pol-
icy
a.2 a.1 Claims Manager - Euro Assist SoD with a.3 Authentication
Assign Garage a.3 a.2 Data clerk - Euro Assist SoD with a.2 Privacy
Contact AGFIL a.4 a.2 Data clerk - Euro Assist - Authentication
Notify Lee C.S a.5 a.4 Policy ocer - AGFIL - Authentication
Send Estimates a.6 a.2 Garage - Authentication
Assess otes a.7 a.6 Assessor Lee C.S - Privacy
Negotiate a.8 a.7 Assessor - Lee C.S - Authentication
Agree to repair a.9 a.8 Garage - Access and availability
Repair car a.10 a.9 Garage - -
Send Invoice a.11 a.10 Garage - Access and availability
Forward and reconcile a.12 a.11 Lee C.S - Auditor - -
Receive Invoices a.13 a.12 Accountant - AGFIL SoD with a.14 Authentication
Pay Claims a.14 a.13 Chief Accountant - AGFIL SoD with a.13 Authorisation
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9.4.3 Process Instances
From the abstracted car trading business process, three key process instances are realised; 1.
Insurance claim processing when the repair estimates are above £500 where negotiations have
to be involved to an agreed repair cost and its variants, i.e. 2. when the repair cost is above £500
requiring no negotiation and, 3. when repair estimates are below £500. Table 9.2 and its sub tables
represent the process instances. In process instance 1 (P1) sub table (a), the repair estimates are
above £500 requiring execution of negotiation until a repair cost is agree. Whereas in the second
process instance (P2) in sub table (b) repair cost estimates are above £500. However there is no
negotiation involved. In the last process instance (c)P3, repair estimates are below £500. e
policy to this eect requires automatic triggering of the repair task without need for negotiation.
Activities Assess quotes, Negotiate and Agree to Repair are thus skipped. For the three instances,
only one instance is permissible for each case.
213
C
H
A
PTER
9.
EVA
LUA
TIO
N
A
N
D
D
ISC
U
SSIO
N
Table 9.2: Variant Process Instances
(a) P1
Activity Events
Register Claim e1
Validate Claim e2
Assign Garage e3
Notify Garage e4
Notify Lee C.S e5
Get information e6
Contact Garage e7
Assess Car damage e8
Send Estimates >£500 e9
Receive Estimates e10
Assess Estimates e11
Negotiate e12
Agree to repair e13
Repair car e14
Send Invoices e15
Forward Invoice e16
Receive Invoice e17
Pay Invoices e18
(b) P2
Activity Events
Register Claim e19
Validate Claim e20
Assign Garage e21
Notify Garage e22
Notify Lee C.S e23
Get information e24
Contact Garage e25
Assess Car damage e26
Send Estimates >£500 e27
Repair car e28
Send Invoices e29
Forward Invoice e30
Receive Invoice e31
Pay Invoices e32
(c) P3
Activity Events
Register Claim e33
Validate Claim e34
Assign Garage e35
Notify Garage e36
Notify Lee C.S e37
Get information e38
Contact Garage e39
Assess Car damage e40
Send Estimates <£500 e41
Repair car e42
Send Invoices e43
Forward Invoice e44
Receive Invoice e45
Pay Invoices e46
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9.5 Evaluation of Verication Algorithms
Based on data in Tables 9.1 and 9.2, we evaluate the composed verication algorithms from chap-
ter 7 using the business process described in use case 2 with constraints stated in section 9.4.2.
e application and evaluation of the algorithms to verify compliance requirements of a dierent
scenario (use case 2) is an aestation of wide application of our artifacts. Based on the evaluation
outcomes, it shows that algorithms are applicable to dierent business scenarios. We can there-
fore conclude about their usefulness, applicability to various industrial cases and eectiveness
in supporting compliance verication.
i. Algorithm 1 Evaluation - Basic Process Instance validity
Algorithm 1 checks the validity of the process model based on its start and end activity events
for all process instances. According to constraint requirement (a) in section 9.4.2, each instance
starts with register claim and ends with pay invoices. Algorithm 1 is evaluated as follows.
1: Input:
a. Process Instances P1, P2 and P3
b. Constraint - Basic Validity
2: for each Pi ∈ BP do
e.ac = e.init, e.end
3: if e.ac = (e1, e19, e33[RegisterClaim]) 6∈ started, seen, finished then ”Violation:
Instance validity violated for Register claim events in all Pi”
4: if e.ac = (e18, e32, e46[payinvoices]) 6∈ started, seen, finished then
”Violation: Instance validity violated for pay invoice events in all Pi”
Otherwise, no violation of instance validity if the registerclaim and PayInvoice events ∈
started, seen, finished for all process instances
Performance evaluation of algorithm 1 in terms of time and space computation requirements
reports less time and space required to compute the verication outcome.
ii. Evaluation of Algorithm 3 - Precedence Verication
Algorithm 3 veries for compliance with precedence constraints (activities that must occur be-
fore others occur) for the business process as required by constraint (b) using traces in process
instances given in Table 9.2. In this scenario, the constraint restricts that Pay Invoice must be
preceded by Receive Invoices for a period of one month.
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1: Input :
a. Process Instances P1, P2, P3
b. Constraints (Precedence, validity)
2: for Pi ∈ BP with Precedence (Prec) and validity (Val) constraints C do
Prec =
e.ac.(e17 [Receive Invoice])⇒ e.ac.(e18 [Pay Invoice],[Val= >30 days])∈ (a)P1
e.ac.(e31 [Receive Invoice])⇒ e.ac.(e32 [Pay Invoice],[Val=>30 days]∈ (b)P2
e.ac.(e45 [Receive Invoice])⇒ e.ac.(e46 [Pay Invoice],[Val= >30 days])∈ (c)P3
3: if (Prec 6∈ seen, finished) then
Violation: “Precedence constraint violated at dierent events of the process instances”
Otherwise, no violation of Precedence and validity constraints if ∀Pi in the business process
Receive Invoice Precedes Pay Invoice
iii. Evaluation of Algorithm 4 - Response Verication
Response algorithm 4 veries for activities whose occurrence is a response outcome of occur-
rence of the current activity. It detects violations if occurrence conditional activities do not in-
duce the occurrence of the action activities. Response algorithm is evaluated based on response
constraint requirement in (b) of sub section 9.4.2 as follows:
1: Input :
a. Process Instances P1, P2 and P3
b. Constraints(Response)
2: for all Pi ∈ BP with Response constraints C do
Response =
e.ac.(e9[Send Estimates>£500] ∧e11[Assess car Damage] ∧e12[Negotiate] ∧e13 [Agree
to repair]) 7→ e14[Repair car]) ∈ P1
e.ac.(e27[Send Estimates >£500] 7→(e28[Repair car]) ∈ P2
e.ac.(e41[Send Estimates <£500] 7→ e42[Repair car]) ∈ P3
3: if (Repair car 6∈ started, seen, finished) then
Violation: ”Response constraint violated on repair car by the Garage”
4: else if e.ac.Conditional activity 67→ e.ac.Action activity then
Violation: ”Response (Action) activity did not occur when the condition activity occurred
for all instances.”
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Otherwise, no Violation of response constraint if Conditional activity 7→ e.ac.Action activity
for all or any of the instances in the business process.
iv. Evaluation of Algorithm 5 - SoD
e evaluation of SoD algorithm is based on role actors accountant and chief accountant con-
strained by SoD over Pay invoice activity as specied by constraint requirement (c) in 9.4.2.
1: Input:
a. Process Instances P1, P2, P3
b. Constraints (SoD)
2: for all resource actors (Accountant, Chief Accountant) where constraint = SoD do
e.ac.(Accountant, Chief Accountant).SoD→ (Pay Invoice) ≡ (Approve Payment, Chief
Accountant), (Pay Invoice, Accountant) ∈ Pi
3: if e.ac.(actors.Pay Invoice∈ seen, nished) 6=((Accountant, Chief Accountant).SoD) then
” Violation: SoD violated for Accountant and Chief Accountant over Pay Invoice”
Otherwise, no violation of SoD constraint for the provided processes if actors (Accountant, Chief
Accountant) for Pay Invoice events are ∈ seen, nished. If actors are dierent to those assigned
or do not exist, then a violation of the SoD constraint.
iv. Evaluation of Algorithm 6 - BoD
e evaluation is based on role actor data clerk at Euro Assist constrained by BoD for execution
of register claim and contact garage as specied by the constraint requirement (d) and data in
Table 9.1.
1: Input:
a. Process Instances P1, P2, P3
2: for each actor = Data Clerk where constraint = BoD do
[Data Clerk].BoD→e.ac.(Register Claim, Assign Garage)≡ (Register Claim,[Data Clerk])
∧(AssignGarage, [DataClerk]) ∈ Pi
3: if (Register Claim ∧ Assign Garage) ∈ seen, nished 6|= [Data Clerk].BoD then
Violation: ”BoD violated for Data clerk over Register Claim and Assign Garage”
Otherwise, no violation of BoD constraint for the instances in the provided business process if
Register Claim and Assign Garage ∈ seen, finished |= [DataClerk].BoD.
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v. Evaluation of Algorithm 9 - Authentication
Verifying for constraint requirements specied in (f) require algorithm for checking authenticity.
Algorithm 9 is evaluate as follows.
1: Input:
a. Process Instances P1, P2, P3
b. Constraints (Authentication [Auth])
2: for all data with constraint C = (Auth [True/False]) for actor = Data clerk do
Assign ≡ e2.(Validate Claim, [Data clerk])→ Auth = (Claims data:[True])
3: if (Assign 6= Auth ∈ seen, finished) then
Violation: ” Authenticated actors are denied access to restricted data.”
4: if ∃actor(rn) 6∈ Assign ∈ seen, finished then
Violation: ”Access leakage, non-authenticated actor gained to restricted data.”
Otherwise, no violation of Authenticity constraint for the instances in the provided business
process if authenticated actors and activity gain access to restricted data as Auth∈ seen, nished.
Violations are detected where non-authenticated actors have access to data other than Data clerk
or where authenticated actors are denied access to restricted data.
v. Evaluation of Algorithm 10 - Privacy
1: Input:
a. Process Instances P1, P2, P3
b. Constraints (Privacy)
2: for all data with constraint C = (Privacy [R/W]), actor= (Data Clerk, Assessor) do
Assign≡ e.ac.(e1(Register claim) ∧e3(Assign garage),[Data Clerk])→ Privacy = Autho-
rise:[R/W] ∈ P1
Assign ≡ (e11(Assess Estimates),[Assessor]→ Privacy = Authorise:[R/W/M ] ∈ P1
3: if (Assign 6|= Privacy ∈ seen, finished ) then
Violation: ”Assigned actors and tasks denied access to private data ”
4: if Assign 6= DataClerk,Assessor ∈ seen, finished then
Violation: ”Privacy leakage. Private data accessed by non authorised actors”
Otherwise, no violation of Privacy constraint for the instances of the provided business processes
if Assign |= Privacy ∈ seen, finished i.e. no unauthorised resource actors gain access to private
data or when no authorised actors or tasks are denied access to private data.
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9.5.1 Time Performance Complexity of the Algorithms
Because the prototype is not yet fully implemented, the practical performance assessment of the
time performance of the algorithms may not be realistic. In general terms, we can still approxi-
mate the time complexity requirements using the computation principles as described in section
. e time requirements for each of the algorithms in the previous sections will depend on the
time it takes each one of them to detect and report violations i.e. identify a constraint from the
prescribed behaviour and compare it with the observed behaviour in the trace. e computation
complexity will therefore consider the following aributes;
• Number of traces = nT
• Number of constraints being checked = nc
• Number of process instances = nI
erefore, the formulae below would enable time complexity computation for each algorithm by
substituting with actual aribute values. ;
O(n logTcI)
for linear algorithms and
O(nTcI)
for non-linear algorithms.
Summarily, the second case has been useful to provide data for evaluation of the applicability
and ecacy of the algorithms, and to show that the artifacts are applicable to dierent business
environments. To further evaluate the eciency of the algorithms, the next sections proceeds to
assess their performance.
9.6 Summary and Discussion
e chapter presented an abstraction of use case 2 as a basis for evaluating the composed algo-
rithms. For further evaluation of capacity of the algorithms, the method evaluation model (MEM)
was adopted.
e evaluation has revealed the appropriateness of the algorithms in detection of violations based
on use case 2 compliance requirements and constraints. e algorithms have been evaluated
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through an informed argument of the use cases as a way to establish the extent to which they
meet the design requirements. Using the MEM parameters, the experiments and results indicate
that the ecacy of the artifacts are appropriate and feasible for verifying compliance of col-
laborative business processes with policy and regulatory constraints. However, a prototypical
implementation is still necessary to enable a practical evaluation of our propositions especially
in terms of time and space requirements.
220
Chapter 10
Conclusion and Future work
10.1 Introduction
e chapter summarises the work presented in this thesis, its ndings and outputs. As a con-
clusion, the chapter recaps on the eorts taken to address the research question and aims that
were stated in chapter 1 in respect to the research contributions. In section 10.2, general obser-
vations are made while in section 10.3 the contributions from this work are presented. Section
10.4 presents the limitations and open problems. Section 10.5 is the general conclusion . Lastly,
section 10.6 sketches ideas and potential directions for future work.
10.2 General Observations
Compliance Management is a key business concept which when not given keen aention can
lead to drastic repercussions for the organisation. e organisations have to ensure that their
business processes align with the requirements specied in the policies and regulations.e as-
surance only comes when the business processes are veried for compliance. In Chapter 2 for
related work, it was indicated that the subject of business process compliance has received several
applications across the industry and academia. From the Figure 1.7 which situates the dimen-
sions of the compliance spectrum in the state of art, most contributions have been made in the
areas of compliance strategies and norms modelling. In our work, through a compliance verica-
tion approach composed of hybrid verication algorithms, we have contributed to the strategies
domain. Additionally, we have also contributed to usability domain by presenting less complex
mechanism and verication artifacts as the evaluation has shown. In the next section, the specic
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contributions from the thesis are presented in more details.
10.3 Contributions
e work presented in this thesis aimed at supporting end users to verify collaborative business
processes for compliance with policy and regulatory requirements. e outcome is a compliancy
verication approach supporting elicitation, specication and analysis of policy and regulatory
requirements, their translation into formal constraints that are veriable with collaborative busi-
ness processes for compliance. Towards achieving this goal, a number of contributions were
made, these are discussed in relation to the objectives that guided the study.
End users like the compliance ocers are not known to be experts in business process mod-
elling. e kind of support they need involves translation of the compliance requirements into
formal constraints in a simple comprehensible language that they can use so that they can fully
participate in the compliance process. Existing tools or approaches require strong technical and
mathematical skills that ordinary users may lack. e consequential contribution to this require-
ment was a compliance mechanism in form of a language based on description logic, which is
close to natural language yet expressive enough to support specication and reasoning about
constraints and process behaviour. To make the mechanism self-independent, we integrated ba-
sic constructs from temporal logic in form of operators and quantiers to support and facilitate
reasoning over the constraints and support verication.
e following contributions are realised in line with the objectives stated in Chapter 1.
Objective: To support the elicitation and translation of compliance requirements from source
documents into compliancy constraints.
Contribution 1: e contribution based on the above objective was realised with a mechanism
that end users can use to elicit and express relevant policy and regulatory requirements from
source documents. In this aspect, the application of DL based constraint expression language was
composed and presented with illustrations based on concrete business use cases. In comparison,
the constraint denition languages presented in the related work (Chapter 2) are associated with
diculty in application by requiring expertise or being specic to a given domain e.g CRL [46],
PENELOPE [56, 57, 55], FCL [131, 130] and SecBPMN [132]. Our mechanism is in form of a
language that whose syntactical and semantical structure are close to natural language making
is easy and ideal for application by ordinary users.
Objective:To demonstrate the application of simulation and analysis as a technique to support
222
CHAPTER 10. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
policy and regulatory variations and impact assessment.
Contribution 2: From objective 2, a contribution in form of application of Simulation analy-
sis technique was demonstrated in Chapter 4 Section 4.6.1 to analyze and assess the impact of
change in policy and regulatory requirements over key performance indicators in the business
process. To arrive at realistic projections, we based the analysis on an industry based use case
whose policies were varied according to dierent requirements specied in various scenarios
to determine the best, average or worst cases to support decision making. Additionally, simu-
lation supported the generation of traces that were useful to aid verication especially where
real data is not available. Traditionally, traces are mined from information system or business
process management system logs through process mining. is contribution reveals the role of
Simulation in analysis and generation of process instances and traces to facilitate design time
verication before actual implementation of system.
Objective: Design a compliance verication approach for supporting compliance verication of
collaborative business processes.
Contribution 3: An integrated compliance verication approach resulted as a contribution from
objective 3. is contribution in the thesis is presented in chapter 7 as Figure 3.5. e approach
is a comprehensive integrated road map towards achievement of compliance verication for col-
laborative business processes. Key of the components in the approach are various constraint
specic verication algorithms through which compliance of the business processes with pol-
icy and regulatory requirements is checked. Besides constraint specic algorithms, an overall
compliance verication checking algorithm is presented as algorithm (12). To demonstrate the
design and empirical applicability of the algorithms, two industry based collaborative business
processes are used, i.e. pick and pack case and the car insurance trading process for design and
evaluation respectively. Based on the outcome, the ecacy, eciency and performance of the
algorithms are reported in chapter 10. However, further evaluation is recommended as future
work based on practical implementation of the prototype.
Objective: Apply process driven authorisation and access control (PDAC), a novel mechanism
for implementing privacy and authentication
Contribution 4: Based on the above objective, a pair of architectures are composed and pre-
sented for practical implementation of both PDAC - a process driven authorisation access control
mechanism and another for a service verication languages. e PDAC is a novel access control
mechanism for authorising access based on purpose and time required to access data. PDAC
leverages traditional access control mechanisms based on task and roles as discussed in related
223
CHAPTER 10. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
work in Chapter 2. e contribution of these architectures forms a basis for future practical im-
plementation of the compliance verication approach. e implementation of prototypes based
on the architectures would facilitate practical evaluation of the artifacts using large data sets to
assess the ecacy and eciency of the artifacts.
Contribution 5: Based on Figure 1.6 in section 1.5, it was noted that an organisation is made
of dierent strategies and compliance management remains at a core focal point to ensure that
each of these strategies achieves compliance requirements. For instance, the soware industry
produces soware that must adhere to the soware standards. e Project management indus-
try is regulated by various bodies like PRINCE which specify rules that must be complied with.
e same applies for change management strategy. All these strategies have life cycles through
which they are managed. At each phase of the life cycle, regulatory compliancy ensures adher-
ence to the relevant laws, rules, standards and other forms of regulations through verication.
In this thesis, we have supported management of compliance requirements for the business pro-
cess management life cycle as an organisation strategy. However, we have put forwards generic
concepts, mechanisms and artifacts that are not only limited to the BPM life cycle but can be
applied in managing compliance requirements for other organisational strategies.
Dissemination of the Research outcomes:
e research outcomes have been disseminated in several presentations. For example; at confer-
ences, publications in conference proceedings, journal and key milestones in the EU H2020 FIRST
project. It is hoped that these contributions to the body of literature will further the subject of
compliance verication in relation to the future research directions.
10.4 Limitations
Some limitations were encountered especially due to the time frame in which the work was to be
accomplished. Regarding subject based limitations, some concepts have not been tackled. One
of them is loops. looping is a constraint common to almost all business processes. e proposed
mechanisms do not fully address verication concerns related to looping structures. We contend
that loops are potential causes of violations if not designed or veried. e concept of verifying
constraints relating to loops forms a proposition for a future direction of this research. A further
limitation is that a prototype has not been realised by this time which has limited the practical
evaluations to fully demonstrate our propositions of the language and algorithms. Despite the
unimplemented prototype, the specication language and the algorithms have been validated and
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evaluated using two dierent industry use cases. is is a considerable aestation of application
and value of the thesis outcomes.
e evaluation of the algorithms revealed that they are expressive enough to independently sup-
port end users to verify compliance of collaborative business processes.
10.5 Conclusion
e work presented in this thesis was set out to support compliance verication for collaborative
business processes with a focus on non-expert end users who are the subject maer experts yet
not competent in modelling and verication. From the related work it was noted that despite the
existing research in academia and industry, a denite solution for compliance verication of col-
laborative business processes is still lacking because they present unique characteristics. ese
characteristics as elaborated in the related work, they present specic verication requirements
against the various dynamic policies and regulations. ese requirements must be complied with
by the business process.
As a contribution from the thesis, we proposed a compliance management approach informed
by a set of requirements and objectives which have been addressed by the study.
Requirement 1: Compose a requirements elicitation and denition mechanism.
To address this requirement, a requirements denition mechanism was composed based on de-
scription language and linear temporal logic (LTL). e mechanism supports end users to elicit
compliance requirements from source documents of policies and regulations. More over, the
compliance requirements are translated into formal semantics and expressed as formal con-
straints. e mechanism is easy to use for ordinary users due to its closeness to natural language.
Requirement 2: Supporting compliance verication.
Addressing this requirement involved composition of various category based sub algorithms and
algorithms to support model checking at various levels; during process design, runtime and com-
pliance auditing. e algorithms have been validated and evaluated using two dierent industry
use cases. e outcome shows their ecacy, eciency and applicability.
Requirement 3: Providing Intelligible Feedback to the end user
One of the key limitations noted from the related is feed back that is technical and incompre-
hensible to end users. e algorithms put forward provide feedback to the user in an easy and
understandable form pointing to the source of compliance violation. is further illustrates com-
pliance verication support for non-expert end users.
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Besides the fullled requirements, the thesis is based on a technical foundation as shown in the
conceptual framework. is involved study and critical analysis of the existing state of the art in
compliance verication to support the propositions put forward. is way, the thesis contributes
to the existing knowledge in the state of the art.
10.6 Potential Future Research Directions
e projected direction of this research points to four key areas, i.e. addressing the concept of
time based violations, addressing loops as a source of process violations, Proving more soundness
of proposed language based specications, and implementing a practical prototype based on the
designed architectures.
• Time based verication: e concept of temporal requirements has been addressed but
not to a logical conclusion required for collaborative business processes. For example,
temporal violations based on relative or xed duration. Time based verication will be
further addressed in the future.
• Loops: Loops are common for all business processes. Dierent forms of loops based on
XOR or optional loops impose dierent restrictions on process behaviour. During exe-
cution, loops introduce new states which may be a source of violations in the business
process if not veried, thus leading to eventual non-conformance of the process. As a
future direction, verication of loop based violations in collaborative business processes
will be addressed.
• e proposed language based on description logic and linear temporal logic needs further
engineering to prove the soundness and completeness of the logic formulae. is will be
focused on in the future.
• Lastly, design and implementation of a prototype based on the composed algorithms and
architectures forms the other future direction. e prototype will facilitate a practical
evaluation of the proposed theory in form of a compliance verication approach. We plan
to implement the prototype with supporting databases enhanced with running real life
data to enable performance evaluation based on experiments. e implementation may
involve renements of the compliance approach, and /or the algorithms. More over, the
implementation will follow the architectures proposed in Figures 10.1 and 7.6. In the next
section the details of the proposed architecture for the proposed prototype are discussed.
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10.7 Prototype Implementation
To implement an environment that would facilitate practical validation and resolve com-
pliance issues in collaborative business processes to achieve compliant business processes
calls for a practical prototype implementation. e prototype would be based on the archi-
tecture presented in Figure 10.1, composed of interacting modules that utilise both policies
and regulations, and business process models to enforce compliance verication. e ar-
chitecture illustrates the three main modules and their interaction:
Module 1 - Model and Specify: e module is composed of 3 other sub modules that
interact to achieve compliancy verication. e interaction is as follows;
Sub module (i) is constraints formulation whose goal is to support compliance require-
ments and constraints specication. It facilitates the elicitation of policy and regulatory
requirements and their formalisation into compliance constraints.
Sub module (ii) supports the mapping of formal constraints with the policy and regulatory
constraints while sun module (iii) is dedicated to supporting verication of the business
process’s compliance with the constraints. e database stores both process models and
constraints. It also provides the inputs for constraints and models during verication as
well as a storage for verication outcomes and feedback.
Module 2 - Verication Service: e module is a service invoked during verication by
sub module (iii) via an API. It is encapsulated to be independent of module 1. is implies
that the verication service is not application specic or domain specic, whereby vari-
ous verication requirements can be supported. e service is composed of a verication
engine which employs described techniques and mechanism, i.e. the simulation technique
(discussed in Chapter 4), compliance verication algorithms (presented in Chapter 7) and
the process driven access control and authorisation mechanism (discussed in section 7.7).
Module 3 - Feedback and Reporting: e module provides feedback to the end user
about the compliancy or the violations detected during verication. e feedback should
be intelligible and in a format comprehensible for non-expert end users.
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